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INTRODUCTION 
Many of the nation's savings and loan associations, as well as the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), I are cur­
rently under severe financial stress.2 The Federal Home Loan Bank 
1. FSLIC insures both state and federally chartered savings and loan associations. 
12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1982). Since 1982, FSLIC insures certain federal savings banks as 
conversion of any institution eligible for FSLIC insurance to a federal savings bank. Pub. 
well. The Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (GSDIA), permitted the 
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1471 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In particular, see 

12 U.S.C..§ 1464(i) (1982). These federal savings banks are also insured by FSLIC. 12 

U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). In this comment, "association," "institution," and "savings and 
loan association" refer to a FSLIC-insured institution. "Bank" refers to an FDIC-insured 
institution. 
2. Almost one quarter of all savings and loan associations were merged out of exist­
ence between 1980 and 1983. S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
MARKETS AND MONEY 273 (3d ed. 1987). By the mid-1980's, many associations operated 
at dangerously low net worth, those operating with less than one percent net worth being 
considered on the verge of insolvency. Those operating with between one and three percent 
were operating below regulatory net worth requirements. Id. (citing Mahoney & White, 
The Thrift Industry in Transition, 71 FED. RESERVE BULL. 137 (1985». Currently, there 
are "around 445 insolvent thrift institutions being sued by creditors nationwide for billions 
of dollars." Nat'l L.J., March 21, 1988, at 26, col. 4. 
FSLIC also is facing a net worth crisis. FSLIC's primary reserves have fallen below 
the two billion dollar mark, yet FSLIC insures 3,234 institutions which have more than 
$1.1 trillion in total assets and more than nine hundred billion dollars in deposits. Letter 
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Board (Board), the federal agency which supervises both the thrift in­
dustry and FSLIC, is authorized to appoint FSLIC as the receiver for 
insolvent associations. 3 As receiver, FSLIC may liquidate the associa­
tion, put it back on a sound footing, merge it with a solvent associa­
tion, or create a new association.4 
An insolvent savings and loan association, by definition, is unable 
to meet all of its liabilities. As the association defaults on its obliga­
tions, creditors become entitled to sue, typically on a contract claim. S 
In many instances, an association already is in court defending claims 
when the Board appoints FSLIC as receiver and places the association 
in receivership.6 As receiver, FSLIC steps into the shoes of the associ­
ation, takes control of the association's assets, and takes over the asso­
ciation's rights and obligations, including the association's obligations 
to its insured and non-insured creditors.7 If FSLIC liquidates the as-
from William J. Anderson (Assistant Comptroller General) to Representative Femand J. 
St. Germain and Senator William Proxmire (Mar. 3, 1987) (appearing in GENERAL Ac­
COUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: THE TREASURY!FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK 
BoARD PLAN FOR FSLIC RECAPITALIZATION, at 1-2 (1987». According to the General 
Accounting Office's 1986 FSLIC audit, FSLIC "may have a negative net worth" of more 
than three billion dollars. Id. at 1. 
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(D) (1982). 
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(A) (1982). FSLIC's present financial status may be ad­
versely affecting its ability to meet its statutory obligations. FSLIC reserves are so low that 
FSLIC is able to close and liquidate only the weakest associations. Brief of Appellant at 12 
n.5, CHG Creditors Comm. v. FSLIC No. 86-3646 (consolidated with Morrison-Knudsen 
Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (citing Barth, Brumbaugh, 
Sauerhaft, & Wang, Implications/or Risk-Taking in the Thrift Industry, CoNTEMP. POL'y 
ISSUES 1-6 (1985». "The FSLIC is required to resolve every failure at a cost no greater 
than that of liquidation." Beesly & Tracy, The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo­
ration, 16 FED. HOME LoAN BANK BOARD J. 13 (April 1983). See also 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1729(b)(I)(A)(v) (1982). Thus, if liquidation is the least costly alternative, FSLIC must 
pursue it. Liquidation, however, involves a substantial initial outlay of FSLIC funds be­
cause FSLIC must pay the insured accounts promptly. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). Other 
FSLIC options do not require such a substantial initial outlay of funds. For example, when 
FSLIC elects to merge an insolvent association with a solvent one, the depositors' accounts 
are transferred to the solvent association. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). 
Since 1982, however, FSLIC may give assistance to troubled thrift institutions through 
loans and direct deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (1982) (enacted as part of the GSDIA Pub. 
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1480). As a result, FSLIC may be keeping some associations going 
by giving them cash infusions, because it does not have the large cash reserves to pay 
depositor claims if the associations were to close. If so, FSLIC and the Board may be 
violating their statutory mandates in two respects. First, the Board may not be placing 
associations in receivership that really should be, and second, FSLIC may be spending 
more money in the long run by keeping shaky associations going than it would by promptly 
closing and liquidating. See infra note 173 for statutory conditions which require the 
Board to appoint a receiver. 
5. See Part II for the facts and discussion of the cases. 
6. See id. 
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6 (1987). 
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sociation, it must first satisfy the insured creditors (the depositors),8 
and then sell off the assets and satisfy the remaining uninsured credi­
tors, including itself.9 To determine the validity of the uninsured cred­
itors' claims, those claims must be adjudicated,1O and FSLIC has 
asserted that it has the exclusive authority to adjudicate them. 1 1 That 
is, all creditors must present their claims to FSLIC for adjudication, 
and courts must dismiss any ongoing litigation. Creditors have chal­
lenged FSLIC's assertion of exclusive adjudicatory authority, and two 
United States Courts of Appeals have decided the issue differently. 
In North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth,I2 
the Fifth Circpit Court of Appeals determined that Congress intended 
FSLIC to have' exclusive authority to adjudicate creditor claims and 
that all creditor claims are thus "switched to the administrative track" 
once FS~fC is named receiver.13 According to the administrative 
claims pr~cedure outlined and approved by the Hudspeth court, a 
creditor ~ust first present any claim to FSLIC as receiver. 14 IfFSLIC 
disallows ,he claim, the creditor may appeal to the Board. Is Only af­
ter appeall to the Board is a creditor entitled to pursue its claim in 
court, and then only in the form of judicial review of the administra­
tive decisibn under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).I6 If the 
creditor already is suing the association in court at the time that the 
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). After FSLIC reimburses the depositors, it is subro­
gated to the depositors' rights. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). 
9. FSLIC is often the single largest uninsured creditor. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. 
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1987). 
10. [d. All obligations and assets must be determined in the liquidation context. [d. 
11. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). FSLIC assumes its role as adjudicator primarily 
in the liquidation context, because the validity of all claims must be determined. FSLIC 
contends, however, that once it has been appointed receiver, it has the authority to adjudi­
cate all creditor claims whether it chooses to liquidate or not. [d. 
Most creditor claims are not adjudicated if FSLIC resolves the receivership in one of 
the other authorized ways. For example, if FSLIC merges the insolvent association with a 
sound association, all of the association's obligations and rights become obligations and 
rights of the sound association. FSLIC may, however, freeze out a particular class of credi­
tors by transferring all assets and debts of the insolvent association to the solvent associa­
tion except for any debt owed to a member of the class of creditors to be frozen out, thus 
preventing this class of creditors from pursuing its claims against the solvent association. 
Although the creditors may pursue their claims against the insolvent' association, there are 
no assets to satisfy the claims. This is illustrated in the discussion of Hudspeth at infra 
notes 77-106 and accompanying text. 
12. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). 
13. [d. at 1103. 
14. [d. at 1102-03. 
15. [d. at 1102. 
16. [d. at 1103. These three steps constitute the "administrative track" as outlined 
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association is placed in receivership, the Hudspeth ruling requires the 
court to dismiss the creditor's court case so that the claim may be first 
adjudicated administratively. Most courts that have been presented 
with similar facts--creditors bringing court actions against associa­
tions that are in receivership, or to be soon placed in receivership-­
have followed the Hudspeth approach and dismissed the court actions 
so that the claims may be resolved administrativelyY 
In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.,18 the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals took an entirely different approach and held 
that Congress intended FSLIC not to have any adjudicatory power.19 
Under the Mo"ison-Knudsen approach, some form of a FSLIC ad­
ministrative claims procedure is legitimate, but that procedure does 
by the Hudspeth court. The APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-06, 1305,3105, 
3344, 7521 (1982). 
According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, the standard of review under the APA for 
FSLIC adjudication (assuming it were authorized) is either the "arbitrary and capricious" 
or the "substantial evidence" standard, both of which are more deferential than the de novo 
standard. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1222 (9th Cir. 1987). 
In a de novo proceeding, all the evidence is considered anew, without deference to previous 
findings of fact. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO­
CESS § 7.4.1, at 370 (1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE]. Thus, the creditor, under the Hudspeth 
approach, never receives a de novo proceeding in a court of law. 
17. See, e.g., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Say. & Loan Ass'n, 829 
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988); FSLIC v. 
Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Zohdi v. FSLIC, 
56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1987) (No. 87-255); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside 
Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987); Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 
1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1986); York Bank & Trust Co. v. 
FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Say. & 
Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609 
(C.D. Utah 1987); FSLIC v. Quality Inns Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1987); Resna 
Assoc. v. Fin. Equity Mortgage Corp. 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.J. 1987); First Fin. Say. & 
Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 
1233 (D. Mont. 1987); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Colony First 
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410 (C.D. Ca. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank 
v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Lyons Say. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Sunrise Say. & 
Loan Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp. 
347 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Murdock-SC Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 624 
F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ca. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(without opinion), petition for cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87­
452); Keller v. Antioch Say. & Loan Ass'n, 492 N.E. 2d 937, 143 Ill. App. 3d 278, 97 Ill. 
Dec. 278 (1986); FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987); Glen Ridge I 
Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), supplemental opin­
ion on motion for rehearing, 735 S.W.2d 244 (1987). 
18. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987),petitionfor cert filed sub. nom., FSLIC v. Steven­
son Assoc., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-451). 
19. Id. at 1215, 1222. 
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not and cannot amount to adjudication.20 While a court may, and 
often should, dismiss a creditor's court claim for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, that is a matter of judicial discretion.21 The 
Morrison-Knudsen court intimated that by permitting adjudication of 
private common law claims by a non-article III court, the Hudspeth 
approach may present serious constitutional problems which the Mor­
rison-Knudsen court's contrary statutory construction avoids.22 
The issue presented in the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen 
cases-whether FSLIC has the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor 
claims in its capacity as receiver for insolvent savings and loan associa­
tions23-is presented in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth 
Savings & Loan Association 24 and will come before the Supreme Court 
in the 1988-1989 term. Both the approaches of the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals present challenging statutory and constitu­
tional questions concerning the legality of FSLIC's adjudication of 
creditor claims. The resolution of the statutory issue involves an anal­
ysis of congressional intent through an examination of the relevant 
statutes and their legislative histories. With respect to congressional 
intent, there are four possible interpretations: 1) Congress intended 
FSLIC to have exclusive power to adjudicate creditor clai~s (the 
20. Id. at 1218. 
21. Id. at 1223-24. 
22. Id. at 1221-22. The Morrison-Knudsen court's approach, noting the unfairness of 
FSLIC adjudication of claims, avoids possible due process problems as well. Id. at 1215­
16. FSLIC controls the assets, is often the largest creditor of the association, is struggling 
to remain solvent, and is the decisionmaker. Id. If the claims procedure is an adjudicatory 
one, the creditor is disadvantaged; he or she is denied a disinterested decisionmaker and, on 
subsequent judicial review, the court is likely to defer to FSLIC's determination. Id. at 
1221-22. If the claims procedure is a non-adjudicatory one, the claimant, even if he or she 
is required to exhaust administrative remedies, would be entitled to a de novo judicial pro­
ceeding. See id. at 1221-24. 
The Morrison-Knudsen approach also avoids confiict with the right to a jury trial 
under the seventh amendment. U.S. CoNST. amend VII. 
23. To clarify at the outset, the main issue addressed in this comment is whether 
FSLIC, in its capacity as receiver, has the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims 
against insolvent thrift associations. Generally, these claims do not depend on FSLIC's 
enabling statute or any regulation of the Board for their resolution. Rather, they are often 
state law claims, usually contractual in nature, and do not arise out of FSLIC's mishan­
dling of the receivership. Any claim that arises out of FSLIC's handling of the receivership 
is a different type of claim, and its resolution will depend on FSLIC's enabling statute or a 
regulation of the Board. These two types of claims are analytically distinct, and FSLIC 
adjudication of them poses different problems. Although the main focus of this comment is 
the former, the latter are discussed at variouS points. See infra notes 68-73 & 475 and 
accompanying text. 
24. 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988). 
Coit presents no new analysis on the issue; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis is 
found in Hudspeth. See infra note 144 for the facts of Coit. 
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FSLIC-Hudspeth position), 2) Congress intended FSLIC to have con­
current adjudicatory authority with courts, 3) Congress took no posi­
tion on the specific issue of granting FSLIC adjudicatory authority, 
and 4) Congress intended not to confer any adjudicatory authority on 
FSLIC (the Morrison-Knudsen approach). 
In addition to the question of statutory construction, there are 
two related but distinct constitutional issues raised by exclusive 
FSLIC adjudication. The first, discussed in Morrison-Knudsen, is the 
propriety of a non-article III entity adjudicating claims that arguably 
can be adjudicated only in article III courts.2S The second issue, not 
addressed by either the Hudspeth or Morrison-Knudsen courts, con­
cerns a possible due process violation caused by the lack of a neutral 
decisionmaker in FSLIC adjudication.26 
Finally, in the event that there is no statutory basis for FSLIC 
adjudication, or alternatively, that there is statutory authority to adju­
dicate but constitutional problems prohibit exclusive FSLIC adjudica­
tion, the Board must explore alternative adjudicatory and non­
adjudicatory administrative claims resolution procedures and select a 
procedure that is both constitutional and consistent with the needs of 
FSLIC. If the selected procedure is non-adjudicatory, courts will ap­
ply the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and require 
creditors to pursue their claims administratively in most cases.27 
Part I of this comment discusses the history and background of 
FSLIC and the Board, presents the key statutes on which the courts 
rely, and explains the current and proposed claims procedures. Part II 
presents the facts of the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen cases, ex­
plains the holdings of both courts, and discusses the central policy 
considerations of the opinions. Part III presents the many statutory 
arguments for and against the existence of exclusive FSLIC adjudica­
tory power and subjects them to critical analysis. Then Part III ex­
plains how the Board might promulgate regulations that would 
establish FSLIC adjudicatory authority for FSLIC without an explicit 
congressional mandate. Part IV investigates two major constitutional 
problems and outlines alternative claims and appeals procedures that 
25. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221. 
26. The Morrison-Knudsen court noted this problem, but did not discuss it in consti­
tutional terms. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216. 
27. The Morrison-Knudsen court discussed the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies in the context of the current FSLlC claims procedure (which the 
court found to be non-adjudicatory). See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223-24. This 
comment examines the doctrine in the context of alternative adjudicatory and non-adjudi­
catory claims resolution procedures in Part V. 
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would pass consitutional muster. Finally, P~rt V discusses alternative 
adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory administrative remedies and the ju­
dicial doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Structure of the Board and FSLIC 
Congress created the Board in 1932 as part of the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Act (FHLBA}.28 The Board is an independent federal reg­
ulatory agency which supervises FSLIC and the regional Federal 
Home Loan Banks,29 which are federally chartered institutions cre­
ated by the FHLBA.30 In addition, the Board charters and supervises 
federal savings and loan associations created ~y the Home Owners 
Loan Act (HOLA}.31 Congress granted the Board considerable super­
visory power, including rulemaking authority.32 
Created by the. National Housing Act of 1934 (NHA},33 and 
placed under the supervision of the Board,34 FSLIC is a govemment­
28. Ch. 522 § 17, 47 Stat. 736 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437(1) (1982». The 
Board is an independent agency located in Washington, D.C. T. MARVELL, THE FED­
ERAL HOME LoAN BANK BoARD 38 (1969). Congress established the Board to stimulate 
the housing industry by providing loans to prospective home owners. Id. The Board con­
sists of three members who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
Id. at 40. In addition to supervising FSLIC, the Board oversees the chartering of new 
associations and the merging of existing associations. Id. See also G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS, & INSTITUTION 270-71 (1986). 
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982). There are twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks, 
T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 20, whose main purpose is to make funds available to 
savings and loan associations for home mortgage loans. Id. These banks are analogous to 
the regional Federal Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve System. Id. 
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). 
31. Ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 and 
Supp. IV 1986». 
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a), 1464(d)(II) (1982). Section 1437(a) provides in part: 
"The board ... shall have power to adopt, amend, and require the observance of such rules, 
regulations, and orders as shall be necessary from time to time for carrying out the pur­
poses of the provisions of this chapter." Id. Section 1464(d)(ll) provides in part: ''The 
Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for the reorganization, consolidation, 
liquidation, and dissolution of associations . . . insured by the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation ...." Id. 
33. Ch. 847, Title IV, § 402, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730g 
(1982 and Supp. IV 1986». 
34. Congress enacted the NHA to provide home mortgage insurance to both savings 
and loan associations and banks. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27. The Federal Home 
Administration (now the Department of Housing and Urban Development) administered 
the mortgage insurance program. Id. Congress, through the NHA, created FSLIC and 
placed it under the Board to insure the depositor accounts in savings and loan associations, 
thereby giving depositors of thrift institutions the same protection that depositors in other 
banks already had. Id. at 27-28. (Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Com­
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owned insurance corporation insuring the deposits in both federally 
chartered savings and loan associations3S and qualifying state associa­
tions.36 In addition to its obligations as insurer, FSLIC has two re­
lated fun~tions: first, to monitor state chartered savings and loan 
associations and enforce compliance with federal law and regula­
tions;37 and second, to act as conservator or receiver38 for insolvent 
associations.39 
B. Statutory Powers ofFSLIC as Receiver 
Title 12, section 1729 of the United States Code prescribes 
FSLIC's duties and powers as a receiver generally.40 Once the Board 
has named FSLIC receiver,41 FSLIC is authorized: 
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association; 
(ii) to take such action as may be necessary to put it in a sound 
solvent condition; 
(iii) to merge it with another insured institution; 
(iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over its assets; 
pany (FDIC) the previous year to insure bank deposits. Id. at 28. See infra notes 289-316 
and accompanying text for further discussion of the FDIC and a comparison of FSLIC to 
the FDIC.) The NHA enabled savings and loan associations to compete with banks for 
depositor funds and ,to prevent panic runs on savings institutions that forced so many insti­
tutions to fail in the early 1930's. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 28. Congress, in enacting 
the federal deposit insurance system (FSLIC and FDIC), was responding to the banking 
crisis of the early 1930's when one half of all banking institutions failed. S. KIDWELL & R. 
PETERSON, supra note 2, at 124. 
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a)(I) (1982). 
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a)(2)(1982). See 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b)(1982) for the application 
procedures that apply to state chartered institutions, and 12 U.S.C. § 1726(c) (1982) for the 
reasons that an application may be rejected. 
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982). See section III B (2)(bXiv) for the discussion ofFSLIC 
enforcement powers over state chartered savings and loan associations. The Board has 
enforcement powers as well. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). See section III A for the discus­
sion of Board enforcement powers over federally chartered associations. 
38. The statutes do not distinguish between conservatorship and receivership powers, 
but the regulations do. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 548 with 12 C.F.R. § 549 (FSLIC is a conser­
vator when it steps in and operates an association, and a receiver when it exercises one of its 
other options under 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b». In this comment, the word "receiver" is used in 
place of the phrase "conservator or receiver." 
39. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1987). 
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982). 
41. For a description of the determinations that the Board must make before it ap­
points a receiver for an insured association, see infra note 173. If the association is state 
chartered, additional conditions must obtain. See infra note 225. Once the Board appoints 
FSLIC as receiver for a state chartered association, the Board and FSLIC have the same 
powers over the state association as they would over a federal association. See generally 12 
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). Some savings banks iiI the process of converting their charters 
may still be FDIC-insured, in which case the Board must appoint the FDIC receiver. 12 
U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). 
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(v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or 
(vi) to make such other disposition of the matter as it deems 
appropriate; 
whichever it deems to be in the best interest of the association, its 
savers, and the Corporation; and 
(B) shall pay all valid credit obligations of the association.42 
In the event of a default,43 FSLIC must pay each depositor to the 
extent insured as soon as possible.44 FSLIC then becomes subrogated 
to the rights of the paid-off depositors4S and competes with other unin­
sured creditors for the remaining assets of the failed association.46 
Section 1729(d), entitled "Additional powers of Corporation," 
applies in the event that FSLIC liquidates an association and provides: 
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the 
Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of and to 
collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to settle, compro­
mise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, 
and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection 
therewith, subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, or, in cases where the Corporation has been appointed 
conservator, receiver, or legal custodian solely by a public authority 
having jurisdiction over the matter other than said Board, subject 
only to the regulation of such public authority.47' 
42. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(b) (1982). 
43. An association is in default when the Board places it in receivership "for the 
purpose of liquidation." 12 U.S.C. § 1724(d) (1982). 
44. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1728(b), 1729(b)(2) (1982). FSLIC may pay the depositor in cash 
or make available to the depositor an account in either a new insured association or in 
another insured association. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). 
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(2) (1982). 
46. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). The introduction of § 1729(d) refers to FSLIC's 
control of federal receiverships, or federalized state receiverships. The second part of 
§ 1729(d) refers to state-controlled receiverships. See section III B (2)(a) for the complete 
analysis of this subsection. Section 1729( d) originally was enacted as § 406( d) of the NHA 
and read as follows: 
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions in default, the Cor­
poration shall have power to carry on the business of and to collect all obligations 
to the insured institutions, to settle compromise, or release claims in favor of or 
against the insur~d institutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary 
in connection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the court or other public 
authority having jurisdiction over the matter. 
National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, title IV, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1259. 
Congress amended § 1729(d) when it passed the GSDIA. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). 
Although the amended language was slated for expiration three years after the October 15, 
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The Hudspeth court relied on section 1729(d)in finding that FSLIC 
had adjudicatory authority.48 To establish that FSLIC not only has 
adjudicatory authority, but exclusive adjudicatory authority, the Hud­
speth court relied on title 12, section 1464(d)(6)(C)49 of the United 
States Code, in conjunction with section 1729( d). Section 
1464(d)(6)(C) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subsec­
tion, no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any 
conservator or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, re­
strain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or 
receiver."5o Part III of this comment discusses and analyzes in detail 
sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), their legislative histories, and the 
arguments advanced in both the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen 
cases. 
C. Creditor Claims and Appeals Procedures 
The Board has promulgated rules governing FSLIC's handling of 
creditor claims against both insolvent state and federally chartered in­
stitutions.51 Those rules require FSLIC to notify all creditors that 
they must "present their claims, with proof thereof" to FSLIC.52 
Once presented with a claim, "[t]he receiver shall allow any claim sea­
sonably received and proved to its satisfaction. The receiver may 
wholly or partly disallow any creditor claim . . . not so proved, and 
1982 enactment (see sunset provisions of the GSDIA, 96 Stat. 1488), it did not expire until 
October 13, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. IV 1986). This change was to have "no effect 
on any action taken or authorized" while such amendment was in effect. Id. (explanatory 
statement accompanying notice of expiration of the GSDIA amended language). Section 
1729(d) now reads as originally enacted. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
The GSDIA's amended language controls all cases cited in this comment with the 
exception of Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Firstsouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(upholding the Hudspeth approach under the current version of § 1729(d». See infra note 
141 for the facts of Coit. 
48. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. 
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). 
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). Congress enacted § 1464(d)(6)(C) as part of 
the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 
1028, which considerably extended § 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA), 
ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132. The HOLA is codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). As originally enacted, § 1464(d)(6)(C) only applied to receiver­
ships of federally chartered associations, but the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BP A) made 
§ 1464(d) generally applicable to federalized state receiverships as well. See section III B 
(2)(a)(ii) for the legislative history of the BPA. See section III A (1) for the legislative 
history of the FISA. 
51. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 569a.8 (1987). Section 549.4 applies to creditors of federally 
chartered associations and § 569a.8 applies to creditors of state-chartered associations. 
52. Id. 
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shall notify the claimant of the disallowance ...."53 These rules do 
not establish a decisionmaking procedure for the receiver to follow in 
determining the validity of creditor claims that are based on law other 
than FSLIC's enabling statute or Board-promulgated rule. The deci­
sionmaking procedure is established by unpromulgated regulations of 
the Board.54 The procedures replace the functions of a court, and the 
controlling law usually is state law. 
53. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1987). Section 569a.8(b) provides in part: "Any claim 
filed ... and proved to the satisfaction of the Receiver shall be allowed by the Receiver. 
The Receiver may disallow in whole or in part or reject in whole or in part any creditor 
claim ... not proved to its satisfaction ...." 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(b) (1987). 
54. The Board has adopted a detailed claims procedure, but it has not yet promul­
gated the procedure as a regulation. See "Procedures for the Administration and Determi­
nation of Claims Filed with FSLIC as Receiver" [hereinafter "Procedures for Receiver"] 
(14 pages of printed material available from the Board, accompanied with 3 forms, a flow 
chart, and 2 pages of filing instructions, entitled "Instructions for Filing Claims with the 
FSLIC as Receiver" (hereinafter "Filing Instructions") (undated office-printed material 
available from the Board». 
According to the "Filing Instructions," once notice has been published pursuant to 
regulation, each non-depositor creditor must file a "Proof of Claim" on forms provided by 
FSLIC. The c'laimant must provide documentation in support of the "Proof of Claim" and 
all material must be received by FSLIC within 90 days of the first notice of publication. 
FSLIC then reviews the "Proof of Claim" forms to see that they are properly completed. 
Once complete, FSLIC determines within 180 days of receipt whether the claim is "recon­
cilable" (whether the claim "may be allowed based upon the books and records of the 
association") and thus allowed. If the forms are not properly completed, the receiver will 
notify the claimant, and the claimant may amend his or her application provided the 90­
day deadline has not passed. Additional time may be given if good cause is shown. "Filing 
Instructions" at 1. 
Should the claim be unreconcilable, FSLIC may require the claimant to provide more 
information for further FSLIC review, and the claimant will be given additional time to 
provide this information. The receiver then must notify the claimant as to what documents 
have become part of the administrative record. The claimant has 30 days to request that 
the receiver include other documents as part of the administrative record. The record is 
then made available to the claimant. Id. at 1-2. 
After reviewing all of the documents, the receiver prepares a "proposed determina­
tion" which includes proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and mails a copy to 
the claimant. Within 30 days of the mailing date, the claimant may request FSLIC to 
reconsider the proposed determination. If this request is made, the receiver shall reply, ~ 
stating whether or not it agrees with the claimant. If the claim is disallowed in full or in 
part, the receiver's statement includes notification that the claimant has the right to Board 
review. If the claimant does not request reconsideration, the proposed determination be­
comes final. Id. at 2. 
Any appeals to the Board must be in accordance with the Board's appeals procedures, 
and filed within 60 days. For details of the appeals procedure, see infra note 56. Finally, 
the instructions include the statement that "Appeal of the Receiver's Determination is a 
Pre-requisite to Obtaining Judicial Review." Id. 
FSLIC appoints "Special Representatives" who 
shall be the decisionmaker, and the Claims Counsel shall provide legal advice to 
the Special Representative. The Special Representative, in his discretion, may 
assign the tasks of review of claim to Claims Counselor to other agents of the 
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The promulgated rules both permit and require Board review of 
claims disallowed by the receiver. ss As with proceedings before the 
receiver, the 'regulations do not set forth any decisionmaking proce­
dures for the Board to follow in reviewing appeals. 56 
Special Representative, subject to the oversight and direction of the Director, OF­
SLIC, with the advice and consent of the General Counsel. 
"Procedures for Receiver" at page 7. "Director, OFSLIC" refers to the "Director of the 
Office of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as defined in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 500.20 (1986)." "Procedures for Receiver" at 4. "General Counsel" refers to the "Gen­
eral Counsel to the Board, as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 500.17 (1986)." "Procedures for Re­
ceiver" at 4. "Special Representative(s)" refers to 
individua1(s) designated as Special Representative(s) for the FSLIC as Receiver 
for an association as stated in the Board Resolution appointing the FSLIC as 
Receiver. The Director, OFSLIC with the concurrence of General Counsel, shall 
designate the Special Representative(s) for each receivership . . . . The Special 
Representative(s) shall conduct the cJaims procedure, including the determina­
tion of the merits of claims. 
Id. at 5. 
55. The basis for Board review under 12 C.F.R. § 549.5(b) is found in the following 
sentence: "Unless ... the claimant files a written request for payment regardless of the 
disallowance, disallowance shall be final, except as the Board may otherwise determine." 
Id. The basis for Board review of claims disallowed under 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(d) is the 
foIlowing sentence: "The Receiver shall file with the Board ... a list of creditor claims filed 
after the date fixed [deadline for the filing of claims] ... and a list of claims disallowed by 
the receiver. . .. Any such claim may be allowed by the Board in its discretion upon good 
cause shown." Id. 
56. The Board employs an appeals procedure which it has not yet promulgated in the 
form of rules entitled "Procedures for the Processing and Determination of Administrative 
Appeals From Decisions of the FSLIC as Receiver" (6 pages of undated office-printed 
material available from the Board) [hereinafter "Appeals Procedures"] 
The Board has delegated final decisionmaking authority on appeals of FSLIC's final 
decisions to the Director, Office of the FSLIC (Director). "Appeals Procedures" at 1. The 
appeals procedures are for implementing 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 549.5 and 549.5-1 under au­
thority of 12 U.S.c. § 1437 (1982). "Appeals Procedures" at 1. 
The creditor has 60 days to appeal FSLIC's final determination. To appeal, the credi­
tor must send the following to the Director: (1) a copy of the administrative record, (2) a 
"clear and concise" statement of the facts and arguments on which appeal is based, and 
(3) appropriate citations to legal authority. Id. at 2-3. The burden of proof is on the claim­
ant at all times. Id. at 4. 
In most cases, the Director makes a preliminary review within 60 days. The Director 
then notifies the claimant that: 1) the record is complete, 2) more information is required, 
or 3) an additional 30, 60, or 90 days is required before completion of preliminary review. 
If the appeal is not timely, any objection to the receiver's final determination is waived. 'A 
timely appeal is necessary to obtain judicial review. If the claimant does not object to any 
portion of the receiver's determinations, that portion is not subject to appeal. Id. at 3. 
On timely receipt of all appeals material, the Director makes a determination that the 
record is complete. The Director must issue a decision within 180 days from the date that 
the record is found to be complete. The Director will either make a decision on the merits 
with the concurrence of the General Counsel, or, with or without the concurrence of the 
General Counsel, submit the appeal to the Board for a decision on the merits. If the Direc­
tor decides on the merits, the Director notifies the claimant in writing, setting forth the 
reasons for the determination. This is deemed final agency action for purposes of judicial 
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In November, 1985, the Board proposed rules that "would codify 
existing procedures and provide u~form and complete procedures for 
the presentation and determination of claims, as well as for appeals 
from claims determinations. "57 If adopted, the proposed regulations 
largely will codify the procedures currently 'in use. 58 
There are weaknesses in both the current and proposed claims 
and appeals procedures. According to the FSLIC position accepted 
by the Hudspeth court, the FSLIC claims procedure is exclusive; the 
creditor loses both his or her independent right to pursue a claim in 
court and the constitutional right to a jury trial. The potential unfair­
ness of this result is compounded by the deferential standard of review 
of administrative adjudications. According to Hudspeth, judicial re­
view is available under the APA only after the creditor has exhausted 
the administrative claims and appeals procedures. 59 The standard of 
review under the APA is either the "arbitrary and capricious", 60 or 
the "substantial evidence" standard,61 both of which afford considera­
ble deference to FSL~C's determination.62 Thus, the creditor loses not 
only the right to bring a court action in the first instance, but also the 
review. Id. at 4-5. Unless the Director submits the appeal to the Board or notifies the 
claimant that additional time is needed, failure to issue a determination within 180 days 
also constitutes final agency action affirming FSLIC's final determination. Id. at 6. 
If the Director submits the appeal to the Board, the Board will review the record and 
any advice of the Director. The Board, in its sole discretion, may permit the claimant to 
supply additional information in writing or may "entertain oral argument." The claimant 
receives written notice of the Board's determination, and that also constitutes final agency 
action. The Board also considers extensions of time and may grant them for good cause. 
Id. 
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,977 (1985). 
58. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,993, 48,994 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 569c.7, 569c.9 pro­
posed November 27, 1985). The proposed regulations are still pending. Confirmed by tele­
phone interview with Office of the General Counsel of the Board (Jan. 22, 1988). 
59. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1135 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The APA is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 
701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 7521 (1982). 
60. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). 
62. According to the Morrison-Knudsen court: 

The "substantial evidence" test applies under the APA only to agency,adjudica­

tions "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an 

agency hearing," or to an administrative "hearing provided by statute". 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 554(a), 706(2)(E). FSLIC's administrative process for handling creditor 

claims appears to involve no "hearing" at all. If that is true, the "arbitrary and 

capricious" standard would be controlling. This standard might be even more 

deferential that the "clearly erroneous" test found deficient in Northern Pipeline .. 

Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222 n.5 (citing Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982». 
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opportunity to have a court evaJuate the evidence anew.63 
Because FSLIC's claims procedure "appears to involve no 'hear­
ing' at all,"64 many of the traditionaJ safeguards of a jury triaJ6S are 
absent. For example, the claims procedure involves only the individ­
uaJ creditor and FSLIC, so that the creditor is denied the opportunity 
to rebut evidence that another creditor might bring.66 The most sig­
nificant weakness, however, is the lack of a neutraJ decisionmaker in 
FSLIC adjudication.67 If the claims and appeals procedure were non­
adjudicatory, the unfairness to the creditor would be minimized. If 
the creditor and FSLIC are unable to come to terms, the creditor 
could bring a court claim. 
Because the claims procedure is designed to determine the valid­
ity of creditor claims against the insolvent association that do not de­
pend on FSLIC's enabling statute, and to provide a means of review of 
that determination, there are additional problems with both the Hud­
speth approach and the FSLIC regulatory scheme. Hudspeth requires 
the creditor to pursue all claims administratively. FSLIC as receiver 
has special receivership powers; for example, FSLIC has the power to 
repudiate certain contracts that are otherwise valid,68 yet both the cur­
rent and proposed regulations lack the proceduraJ apparatus by which 
creditors may challenge FSLIC's decision to repudiate a contract. 
The current appeals procedure also does not accommodate such a 
challenge; that procedure involves review merely of FSLIC's final de­
termination of the claim, and usua11y depends on state law, not 
FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation. There appears to be no 
aJternative administrative procedure for handling these claims; there­
fore, Hudspeth requires all claims to be handled administratively when 
not all claims can be handled administratively. This is, perhaps, less a 
problem of the Hudspeth approach than it is a failing of the Board to 
promulgate regulations which would accommodate chaJlenges to 
FSLIC's handling of a receivership. 
63. This concern is discussed in Part IV A. 
64. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222 n.5. See supra notes 54 & 56 for claims and 
appeals procedures. 
65. See infra note 462 for the list of traditional safeguards of a jury trial. 
66. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC, (consoli­
dated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (86­
2081). 
67. These matters are discussed in Part IV B. 
68. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,991 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.69(f)(3) (proposed 
Nov. 27, 1985». Under the current regulations, FSLIC has the power to repudiate a con­
tract in its capaCity as receiver for state-chartered associations, 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6(c)(3) 
(1987); but not for federally chartered associations. 
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Furthermore, the creditor does not to have the opportunity to 
participate in a FSLIC decision to repudiate a contract, for example. 
Those decisions appear to be made without any kind of hearing. Any 
judicial review of the decision may come too late for creditor partici­
pation, for FSLIC is not liable for decisions it makes as receiver;69 if 
the affairs of the association have been wound up, the party to the 
contract has no recourse.70 
Not only is there no administrative procedure available to chal­
lenge FSLIC's determinations as receiver, there are few substantive' 
regulations which detail FSLIC powers. Thus, if a creditor seeks judi­
cial review under the APA, a reviewing court may not be able to deter­
mine whether FSLIC acted properly as receiver because the 
regulations either fail to or inadequately address many substantive is­
sues.71 Under the current regulations, for example, it appears that 
FSLIC does not have the power to freeze out a class of creditors,72 yet 
FSLIC froze out a class of creditors in the Hudspeth case.73 Accord­
ingly, FSLIC makes decisions which affect the interests of a creditor 
unilaterally, the creditor is unable to challenge the decision adminis­
tratively, and courts will be unable to determine whether FSLIC acted 
properly. 
To summarize, there are two types of claims: first, the initial de­
termination of the validity of the claim where the controlling law is 
not FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation (usually it is state 
law); and second, challenges to FSLIC's receivership authority and 
69. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 49, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3103; First Sav. & Loan Ass'nv. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (D. Haw. 1982). 
70. For an example of this, see the discussion of Hudspeth in section II A. 
71. See 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985). 
72. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 549, 569.a (1987). 
73. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for facts of Hudspeth. A reviewing 
court would be unable to determine the propriety of a FSLIC decision to freeze out a class 
of creditors. The p~oposed rules also fail to provide FSLIC with the power to freeze out 
creditors. 
The proposed regulations authorize FSLIC, in its capacity as receiver for either state 
or federally chartered associations, to repudiate a contract, yet the circumstances under 
which FSLIC may do so purposefully were left vague. The Board, in the comment section 
of the proposed rules, indicated that the power to repudiate a contract would be limited to 
executory contracts and leases. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,976 (1985). The Board did not define 
"executory contract." Id. . 
The current rules fail to provide a means for both determining which claims may be 
preferred and how participation interests in loan agreements are to be treated in the event 
of liquidation. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970. The Board proposed the new rules in order to improve 
the claims procedures and provide "new rules of general applicability." Id. The proposed 
regulations provide rules for participation interests and priorities. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,995 
(1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 569c.1O and 569c.ll). 
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determinations based on FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regula­
tion. This comment primarily is interested in the former: the propri­
ety of exclusive adjudication of creditor claims that are most often 
founded on state law. However, it is important to note the difference 
and to avoid any confusion between the two types of claims. With 
respect to the former type of claim, there is an administrative proce­
dure for determining the validity of claims, but it has serious proce­
dural weaknesses. With respect to the latter type of claim, there is no 
effective administrative procedure for challenging FSLIC's action. In 
addition, there are serious substantive problems as well, because the 
powers of FSLIC as receiver are not detailed in either the statutes or 
the applicable Board regulations.74 
This discussion has illustrated both the substantive and proce­
dural unfairness inherent in the Hudspeth approach. The discussion of 
the two major cases in Part II elaborates many of these weaknesses. 
Part III then carefully scrutinizes the statutes and the courts' readings 
of those statutes. 
II. THE CASES 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals each decided the 
issue of exclusive FSLIC adjudication differently. The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that FSLIC has exclusive adjudicatory author­
ity in receivership proceedings.7s The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
on the other hand, held that FSLIC has no adjudicatory authority.76 
This section presents the facts of these two cases, explains the courts' 
reasoning, and discusses the policy implications of both decisions. 
With almost no case law on the matter, both courts relied on statutory 
construction and policy rationales inferred from the legislative histo­
ries of the various congressional acts amending the HOLA and NHA. 
The arguments themselves are presented and analyzed in Part III. 
A. North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth77 
The dispute in Hudspeth began in 1977 when the State of Missis­
74. For more discussion of this problem, see infra note 475. 
75. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). 
76. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), peti­
tion for cert. filed sub. nom, FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U,S. Oct. 6, 
1987) (No. 87-451). 
77. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals revised and reversed an earlier, now withdrawn, opinion. 
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sippi passed a law requiring all state-chartered savings and loan as­
sociations to be FSLIC insured. 78 The Board refused to authorize 
FSLIC to insure the accounts of North Mississippi Savings & Loan 
Association (Old North) unless then-president Joseph Hudspeth re­
signed his position.79 Joseph Hudspeth resigned only after he and Old 
North executed an agreement for Old North to pay him a "regular 
monthly amount."80 In 1982, Old North brought suit in state court, 
asking the court to find that the compensation agreement was either 
voidable or did not exist.81 Hudspeth counterclaimed, asking for 
,either specific performance or damages. 82 
In 1983, Mississippi placed Old North in receivership, appointing 
FSLIC as receiver.83 The Board then appointed FSLIC as sole re­
ceiver and "federalized"· the receivership.84 Proceeding under section 
I 
1729(b)(1)(A)(iv),8S FSLIC created a new federal association, New 
North Mississippi Federal Savings and Loan Association (New 
North), and appointed a federal conservator to run it.86 FSLIC trans­
ferred to New North all of Old North's assets, except that New North 
"agreed to reconvey to the FSLIC as receiver ... any potential claim 
for malfeasance against Old North's officers or employees."87 FSLIC 
also transferred all liabilities to New North, except for "any obligation 
owed by Old North under a compensation agreement such as Hud­
speth's."88 FSLIC, as receiver for Old North, stopped paying Hud­
speth.89 Hudspeth joined as parties both New North, as transferee in 
interest, and FSLIC, as receiver for Old North.90 New North subse-
Claims for Lack of Subject Matter at 11-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLlC, No. C85-7192 
(N.D. Calif. February 7, 1986). 
78. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(I)(B)(i)(I) (1982), if the Board finds that certain 
conditions exist under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)(i), (ii) or (iii) (1982), it may appoint 
FSLIC as receiver of state-chartered associations. The receivership becomes "federalized" 
and FSLlC has the same control of the state association as it would have over a federal 
association. The state authority that initially appointed FSLlC receiver would, thereafter, 
have no control over the receivership. 
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(A)(iv) (1982). 
86. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099. 
87. Id. at 1099 n.!. 
88. Id. at 1099. FSLlC froze out certain creditors, including Mr. Hudspeth. Even if 
Hudspeth's contract claim were upheld, Old North would not have any assets to satisfy it. 
89. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099. 
90. Id. 
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quently removed the action to federal court. 
According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district 
court "construed Hudspeth's counterclaim as a challenge to the valid­
ity of the FSLIC's termination of the compensation contract and its 
transfer of Old North's assets and liabilities to New North."91 The 
district court relied on sections 1464(d)(6)(C)92 and 1729(d)93 and 
held that" 'original jurisdiction over the conduct ofthe FSLIC ... lies 
with the ... [Board],' rather than any court."94 Because "Hudspeth's 
sole remedy was a petition to the . . . [Board] with judicial review 
available under the Administrative Procedure Act,"9S the district 
court dismissed Hudspeth's claim.96 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals affirmed,97 finding that "any court ruling that New North bears 
a liability not assigned it by the FSLIC would modify the FSLIC's 
distribution of assets, and would 'restrain or affect' the FSLIC's pow­
ers as a receiver in violation of 12 U.S.C. section 1464(d)(6)(C)."98 
The court also stated that any court ruling that Old North owed Hud­
speth a debt would likewise restrain or affect the powers of the receiver 
and thus "all of Hudspeth's claims are switched to the administrative 
track."99 
91. [d. at 1101. Because the district court in Hudspeth "construed Hudspeth's coun­
terclaim as a challenge to the validity of the FSLIC's termination of the compensation 
contract," the enforceability of the agreement as a matter of state law was no longer at 
issue. Rather, FSLIC's authority to terminate the agreement was at issue, and the ques­
tion was whether Board "regulations did not authorize the FSLIC here to set aside an 
otherwise-enforceable contract." [d. 
According to the regulations, FSLIC, as receiver for a state-chartered savings and 
loan, may "[r]eject or repudiate any lease or contract which it considers burdensome." 12 
C.F.R. § 569a.6(c)(3) (1987). Interestingly, there is no corresponding authority for FSLIC 
to repudiate a contract when it is receiver for a federally chartered association. Yet, FSLIC 
must "pay all valid credit obligations." 12 U.S.c. § 1729(b)(I)(B) (1982). The regulations 
do not specify the circumstances under which FSLIC may find a contract burdensome. A 
reviewing court would have no basis for deciding whether FSLIC acted within its authority 
or not. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text for the discussion of the unfairness of 
the procedures and regulations. 
The district court's Hudspeth opinion was never officially published, and is unavaila­
ble. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, W.C. 83-193-NK-P, slip op. (N.D. Miss. 
March 12, 1984). 
92. 12 U.S.c. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). See sections II A and III B (I) for the legisla­
tive history and analysis of this § 1464(d)(6)(C). 
93. 12 U.S.c. § 1729(d) (1982). See sections III B (2)(a) for the legislative history 
and analysis of § 1729(d). 
94. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101 (quoting unpublished district court opinion). 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 1103. 
98. [d. at 1102 (quoting, in part, § I 464(d)(6)(C». 
99. [d. at 1103. One criticism 0:- the Hudspeth opinion that is not made by any other 
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The Hudspeth court inferred from the legislative history of the 
Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA)loo that "Congress wanted the 
FSLIC to be able to act quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operat­
ing, or dissolving a failed institution, and intended that the FSLIC's 
ability to accomplish these goals not be interfered with by other judi­
cial or regulatory authorities."l0l In particular, the Hudspeth court 
used the policy rationale inferred from the BP A to interpret section 
1729(d), which the court mistakenly believed was enacted as part of 
the BPA.102 
The Hudspeth court found the existence of regulations controlling 
FSLIC's claims procedure to be additional evidence of FSLIC's adju­
dicatory authority.103 Those regulations permit FSLIC to "disallow 
claims 'not proven to its satisfaction.' "104 Finally, the court relied on 
a similar but factually and legally distinct federal district court case 105 
for the proposition that Hudspeth's "claims are switched to the ad-
court deserves mention: the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided too much. The en­
forceability of Hudspeth's agreement as a matter of state law was no longer an issue in the 
case and the court's holding should be limited to the types of claims at issue in Hudspeth 
and not all claims. The only claims at issue in Hudspeth were claims pertaining to FSLlC's 
~ handling of the receivership, and the controlling law is FSLlC's enabling statute or Board 
regulation, yet the Hudspeth ruling applies to all claims. Subsequent opinions of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals have confirmed this reading of Hudspeth by requiring that state 
law-based questions be adjudicated administratively. See infra notes 143-44. 
100. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (1968). 
101. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. The court quoted language from the Senate Re­
port explaining the BPA: "FSLlC's authority '[i]n carrying out its receivership responsibil­
ities ... would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
... .' .. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1968 U. S. 
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539). 
102. See section III B (2)(a) for the legislative history and analysis of § 1729(d). 
103. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. The court cited 12 C.F.R. §§ 569a.8 and 549.4 
(1987). See supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current 
regulations. 
104. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 (citing §§ 569.a8 and 549.4). 
105. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251 (D. 
Haw. 1981) (First Savings I). In First Savings I, state authorities placed the state-chartered 
First Savings & Loan Association (First Savings) in receivership on February 25, 1980, and 
the Board immediately appointed FSLlC as the receiver. Id. at 252. First Savings alleged 
that FSLlC and state banking authorities conspired with First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association (First Federal) to force First Savings into receivership so that First Federal 
could buy First Savings' assets. Id. The ousted directors of First Savings filed suit on 
February 28, 1980, against FSLIC, First Federal, and the state officer that placed the asso­
ciation in receivership. Id. 
The plaintiffs sought three types of relief. First, they asked the court to remove FSLIC 
as receiver. Id. at 253. The court denied this request because First Savings failed to name 
the Board as a party to the action. Id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A), an association 
placed in receivership has· 30 days to challenge the Board's appointment of the receiver. 
According to First Savings I, a court can remove FSLIC as receiver only by ordering the 
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ministrative track." 106 
B. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.107 
The Morrison-Knudsen case involved five consolidated appeals; 108 
each of which concerned claims against the insolvent Westside Federal 
Savings and Loan Association (Westside), which the Board placed in 
receivership on August 30, 1985. 109 
Board to do so, First Savings I, 531 F. Supp. at 253, because "no court may take any action 
for or toward the removal of any ... receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). 
Second, First Savings asked that its assets be restored. First Savings I, 531 F. Supp. at 
253 (FSLIC had sold First Savings' assets to First Federal). The court also refused this 
request because the Board was not a party to the action. Id. at 2~4. According to the 
court, it could not order FSLIC to return to First Savings the assets it sold to First Federal 
because that would constitute restraint of a receiver in a receivership function. Id. 
Third, First Savings asked for damages in tort against FSLIC. Id. at 255. The court 
denied this relief because the action was not brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
Id. 
First Savings I does not require that all claims be switched to the administrative track, 
nor does it require that creditor claims against the association be adjudicated by FSLIC. 
First Savings I required that the Board be named a party to actions challenging FSLIC's 
handling of the receivership and to any action removing FSLIC as receiver. However, any 
action for the removal of the receiver also must be filed within 30 days of FSLIC's appoint­
ment as receiver. Any subsequent challenge to remove FSLIC as receiver must be brought 
directly with the Board. Id. at 254. The court also stated that "affected individuals may 
still request the Board to investigate the actions of a receiver and take whatever steps are 
necessary to insure compliance with the law. If the Board decides to take no action, judi­
cial review of this decision may be available" under the APA. Id. (footnote omitted). First 
Savings I may require that all challenges to FSLIC's handling of a receivership be pursued 
administratively, while saying nothing at all about how the adjudication of creditor claims 
against the receivership should be handled. If Hudspeth had read First Savings I in this 
way, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals could have dismissed Hudspeth's challenges of 
FSLIC's handling of the receivership without holding that FSLIC has exclusive adjudica­
tory authority. But the HUdspeth court's holding encompasses all claims, as the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals' subsequent cases show. 
The ousted directors of First Savings brought a subsequent action against First Fed­
eral, FSLIC, and the Board. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
547 F. Supp. 988 (D. Haw. 1982) (First Savings II). The court in First Savings II refused to 
entertain the plaintiffs' request to remove FSLIC as receiver because the 30 day statutory 
period which entitled the ousted directors to bring a court action to remove FSLIC as 
receiver had expired. Id. at 994-95. The First Savings II court found that it had no juris­
diction to entertain challenges to FSLIC's handling of the receivership. Id. at 996-97. First 
Savings II might stand for the proposition that challenges of FSLIC actions as receiver 
which are based on FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation are not reviewable by a 
court at all. However, neither First Savings I or First Savings II applied to state law-based 
creditor claims against the insolvent association. 
106. HUdspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. 
107. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. FSLIC v. 
Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-451). 
108. Id. at 1212. 
109. Id. at 1212-13. FSLIC as receiver elected liquidation. Id. at 1216. 
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In Rembold v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Association,11O an un­
named borrower brought suit in state court against Gibraltar Savings 
and Loan Association (Gibraltar), asking the court to void a two mil­
lion dollar obligation. Gibraltar removed the action to federal district 
court and impleaded Westside. lIl FSLIC was appointed receiver and 
was substituted as party for Westside. FSLIC moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court granted the motion, 
relying on Hudspeth. 112 Gibraltar appealed.ll3 
In American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Westside Fed­
eral Savings & Loan Association,114 American Federal Savings and 
Loan Association (American), sued Westside in federal district court, 
seeking "declaratory relief on the validity of the various agreements" 
included in a participation loan agreement that involved Westside 
loans to CHG International Corporation (CHG).11S FSLIC was ap­
pointed receiver and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris­
diction. Again, relying on Hudspeth, the court sustained the motion, 
and American appealed. 1I6 
In Stevenson Associates v. FSLIC 117 and Morrison-Knudsen Com­
pany v. CHG International Inc., 118 Morrison-Knudsen brought suit in 
California state court against CHG, Westside, and Stevenson Associ­
ates (Stevenson), seeking damages arising out of a condominium pro­
ject. Stevenson cross-claimed against Westside. FSLIC was appointed 
receiver, and removed all claims to federal district court. FSLIC re­
lied on Hudspeth, and successfully moved to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Stevenson appealed both the dismissal of its own 
claims and the dismissal of Morrison-Knudsen's claims. 119 
In CHG Creditors Committee v. FSLIC,120 Westside filed a claim 
in CHG's bankruptcy proceeding. FSLIC was appointed receiver of 
Westside and made a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju­
risdiction. The district court supervising the bankruptcy proceeding 
110. 624 F. Supp. 1006 (W.O. Wash . .1985). Rembold was the only one of the five 
district court decisions appealed that was reported. 
111. Gibraltar alleged that Westside had promised to repay the debt in the event that 
the borrower defaulted. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1213. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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denied the motion, and FSLIC appealed. 121 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals maintained jurisdiction in 
Rembold, American Federal, and Stevenson,122 and held that FSLIC 
had no adjudicatory authority.123 The court, however, remanded to 
the district court the question of whether it should require exhaustion 
of administrative remedies before adjudicating the case. 124 
The Morrison-Knudsen court, like the Hudspeth court, examined 
the key statutes and legislative history, but arrived at the opposite con­
clusion, finding that Congress intended FSLIC not to have any adjudi­
catory authority. The Mo"ison-Knudsen court refused to read 
sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) as empowering FSLIC with exclu­
sive adjudicatory authority .. The Morrison-Knudsen court found no 
evidence in the language or the legislative history of the statutes to 
indicate that Congress intended FSLIC to have adjudicatory power. 12S 
The Morrison-Knudsen court examined three policy arguments, 
two in criticism of the Hudspeth court, and one in support of its own 
holding. First, the Morrison-Knudsen court admitted that efficiency in 
winding up the affairs of an insolvent association in order to preserve 
FSLIC assets is sound policy,126 but denied that Congress authorized 
FSLIC to have the unlimited power it needed in order to further this 
policy.127 The court stated that FSLIC must comply with the statu­
tory scheme that Congress enacted long before FSLIC's current diffi­
culties arose,128 noting that, until the 1980's, FSLIC never argued that 
it had exclusive adjudicatory power. 129 Second, granting FSLIC ex­
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1214. In CHG Creditors Comm. and Morrison-Knudsen (district court 
case), the court dismissed the appeals. Id. at 1213. In CHG Creditors Comm., the court 
held that the district court's refusal to dismiss was not appealable because it was not a final 
order. Id. at 1214. In Morrison-Knudsen, the court stated that Stevenson had no standing 
to appeal the dismissal of Morrison-Knudsen's claims. /d. 
123. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 811 F.2d at 1212. 
124. Id. at 1223. See infra text accompanying note 135 for the factors to be consid­
ered by a court in deciding whether to require exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
125. Id. at 1215, 1222. 
126. Id. at 1216. This policy motivated Congress to enact the Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA) and the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA). See section 
III A (1) for the discussion of the legislative history of the FISA. See section II B (2)(a)(ii) 
for the discussion of the legislative history of the BP A. 
127. The Hudspeth court interpreted the policy of the BPA as authorizing FSLIC to 
have whatever power it needed to advance this policy. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. 
The court found that exclusive adjudication furthered this end, and thus concluded that 
FSLIC has exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims. Id. at 1101-03. 
128. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216. 
129. Id. The statutes on which FSLIC relied for exclusive adjudication were enacted 
in 1934 and 1966. See section III B (2)(a)(i) for the legislative history of the NHA. See 
section III A (1) for the legislative history of the FISA. Although FSLIC admitted that it 
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clusive adjudicatory authority does not necessarily serve this policy of 
efficiency. The court noted that judicial review under the Administra­
tive Procedure Act is just as capable of producing delay in the winding 
up of the affairs of an insolvent association as is initial court 
adjudication. 130 
The main policy consideration that influenced the Morrison­
Knudsen court was fairness: the court questioned whether it was ap­
propriate for FSLIC to have the power both to adjudicate money 
claims, and at the same time control assets and claim a major portion 
ofthem.l3l The current financial problems of FSLIC132 only amplified 
this concern.l33 
The Morrison-Knudsen court's concern with procedural and sub­
stantive fairness is apparent in the court's discussion of whether to 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a matter of judicial 
discretion. 134 Factors such as efficiency and cost are balanced against 
never argued that it had such power until the 1980's, it stated that this was so because no 
federally chartered associations were liquidated between 1941 and 1980. See FSLIC's Peti­
tion for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 7 n.6, Mor­
rison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) (86-2063) (86-2081) 
(86-3621) (86-3646) (86-3658). (Subsequent citations of this brief omit reference to the 
docket numbers.) 
The Morrison-Knudsen court cited two ~xamples of pre-1980's cases where FSLIC 
failed to assert the exclusive power to adjudicate. In Baker v. F. & F. Investment Co., 489 
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973), black plaintiffs alleged that they were charged an excessive price 
for the homes that they purchased. FSLIC was successor in interest to the savings and loan 
association that made loans to the seller. The court held that claims for money damages on 
the contract should be dismissed as to FSLIC unless plaintiffs could prove compliance with 
the Illinois statute of limitations, but that plaintiffs' equitable claims should not be dis­
missed. ld. at 831-38. Presumably, if the plaintiffs could prove compliance with the statute 
of limitations, the court would have jurisdiction over the contract dispute. In addition, 
FSLIC never moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to exclusive 
FSLIC adjudication. 
In Hancock Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 360 F. Supp. 1125 (0. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 
1325 (9th Cir. 1974), creditor sought a declaratory judgment or a determination of owner­
ship of receivership assets. The district court dismissed the action due to lack of federal 
question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Id. FSLIC never argued that it had exclu­
sive authority to adjudicate claims, and, thus, the plaintiffs would have been able to bring 
an action in state court. 
130. Mo"ison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216-17. The Hudspeth court failed to show 
how initial review would delay that liquidation process. Id. 
131. ld. at 1216. 
132. See supra note 2. 
133. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216. 
134. ld. at 1223. "[T]he district court must balance the agency's interest in applying 
its expertise, correcting its own errors, making a proper record, and maintaining an effi­
cient, independent administrative system, against the interests of private parties in finding 
adequate redress." Id. 
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fairness. -According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, these factors 
include: 
[1] whether resort to the administrative process would be futile, 
[2] whether the administrative process is well understood and well 
developed, [3] whether a prompt decision as to all of the contested 
issues in the case is likely, [4] whether an exhaustion requirement 
would be fair to the parties in light of their resources, [5] whether it 
would be fair to other parties in the case whose interests might be 
affected, [6] whether the interests of judicial economy would be 
served by requiring exhaustion, and [7] whether the agency demon­
strates that not requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its 
functioning. 13s 
Were the district court to apply these factors to the facts of Mor­
rison-Knudsen in light of the current FSLIC claims procedures,136 the 
court could have maintained jurisdiction. First, the administrative 
process likely would have been futile because the claims, originally 
filed against Westside, became claims against FSLIC as receiver for 
Westside. Because FSLIC is an interested adjudicator, the claimants 
likely would not receive adequate redress, and thus exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies would be futile. 137 Second, the claimants proba­
bly would have ended up in court for judicial review of their claims 
because FSLIC's claims procedure is not well developed. There is no 
capacity for handling complicated claims involving numerous parties 
and numerous legal issues. 138 The third factor also poses problems for 
FSLIC adjudication. Although the claims procedure is designed to 
135. Id. at 1223-24. 
136. See supra note 54 for current claims procedures. 
137. See Appellant's (Stevenson) Opening Brief at IS, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC 
(consolidated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 
1987» (86-2081) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1983»: 
It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest 
in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes .... [T)he financial stake 
need not be ... direct or positive.... It has also come to be the prevailing view 
that 'most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with 
equal force to ... administrative adjudicators.' 
Id. 
The presence of an interested decisionmaker in an adjudicatory claims procedure is a 
more serious factor than the lack of a disinterested decisionmaker in an non-adjudicatory 
claims procedure. The discussion in the above text is merely illustrative. 
138. For example, in Morrison-Knudsen, there were many claimants of Westside's 
assets, including FSLIC. In addition, there were counterclaims, cross-claims, and im­
pleaded parties as well. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text for the facts of 
Morrison-Knudsen. FSLIC's claims procedure is designed to handle each creditor's claim 
individually, and does not provide a means to address other parties' claims. See supra note 
54 for FSLIC's claims procedure. 
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result in a speedy determination, it probably would not have in this 
case because so many different claims and parties were involved. This 
problem also implicates the fifth factor. 139 In a complicated participa­
tion loan agreement like that involved in Morrison-Knudsen, a FSLIC 
judgment as to one party could affect the rights of another party and 
thus be unfair against the other party. As the parties had already gone 
to court and the claims involved were unlikely to have been settled 
through the administrative process because of the complicated agree­
ment and the many parties involved, the concern of the sixth factor 
would also be raised, and it might well serve the interest of judicial 
economy for a court to maintain jurisdiction over the claims. Finally, 
FSLIC would not be able to demonstrate that not requiring exhaus­
tion, in this instance, would unduly interfere with its functioning. 140 
Applied to the facts of Hudspeth, these factors also would militate 
against requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. 141 
Between the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen decisions, many 
courts had an opportunity to decide the issue. Every court142 that en­
tertained arguments on the issue followed the Hudspeth approach. 143 
139. There was no evidence presented in the Morrison-Knudsen case which indicated 
that requiring exhaustion would have been unfair in light of the parties' resources, which is 
the fourth factor. It could have been unfair, however, because the parties had prepared 
their cases. It can only cost the parties more money if the case is dismissed and pursued 
administratively, especially if that procedure is likely to be futile, and thus the likelihood, at 
least, of unfairness is increased. It should be noted that all of these factors relate to each 
other-the existence of one factor makes another factor more likely. 
140. FSLIC claimed that not requiring exhaustion would interfere with its exclusive 
adjudicatory authority. The Morrison-Knudsen court reasoned that judicial adjudication 
did not interfere with FSLIC's powers because FSLIC did not have exclusive adjudicatory 
authority. See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216-17. But see FSLIC's Petition for Re­
hearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing in Banc 3-4, Morrison-Knudsen 
Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), where FSLIC argued that exhaus­
tion was critical to its functioning. Even if an exhaustion requirement is critical to FSLIC's 
function generally, that is insufficient to establish that not requiring exhaustion unduly 
interferes with FSLIC's functioning in a particular case. 
141. The key factor would be the absence of an effective administrative procedure for 
challenges of FSLIC's decisions as receiver. Thus, requiring exhaustion would be futile. 
142. The only exception is CHG Creditors Comm. v. FSLIC, in which the district 
court refused to grant FSLIC's motion to dismiss. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text 
for the facts of Morrison-Knudsen. 
143. See Brief of Appellee (FSLIC) at 6-7, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consolidated 
with Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987». The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals reaffirmed its position in two subsequent cases: Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290 
(5th Cir. 1987) (action by depositors to recover the uninsured portion of deposits dismissed 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (creditor's attempt to perfect a lien on receivership property dismissed according 
to Hudspeth). Among the many district courts that have followed the Hudspeth approach 
are: First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987); 
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Since Morrison-Knudsen, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has af­
firmed the Hudspeth approach twice. l44 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has also affirmed the Morrison-Knudsen approach.14s Even in 
light of the Morrison-Knudsen holding, however, the vast majority of 
courts which have addressed the issue of whether the FSLIC has ex­
clusive power to adjudicate creditor claims in its capacity as receiver 
for insolvent savings and loan associations have chosen to follow Hud­
speth.l46 Two recent state court cases embrace the Mo"ison-Knudsen 
Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Mont. 1987); Baskers v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358 
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Colony First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410 (C.D. 
Ca. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93 
(W.O. Wash. 1986); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 
'576 (N.D. III. 1986); Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. 
Fla. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp. 347 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Murdock-SC Assoc. v. 
Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ca. 1985), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987) (without opinion), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-452). 
144. In Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Say. & Loan Ass'n, 829 F.2d 
563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. ll05 (1988), Coit brought suit in state 
court against FirstSouth in October, 1986, alleging several state law claims, including 
"usury, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair deaIing." 
The Board placed FirstSouth in receivership in December, 1986, and FSLIC removed the 
action to federal district court. Id. The district court granted FSLIC's motion to dismiss, 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Coit court indicated that, although 
courts disagree about the proper standard of review for FSLIC adjudications, any adminis­
trative review disposed of due process problems. Id. at 565 (citing Woods v. Federal 
Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 14ll (5th Cir. 1987). The court also ruled that 
Coit's other constitutional challenges-violation of separation of powers under article III 
and deprivation of the right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment-were not ripe for 
resolution. Coit, 829 F.2d at 565. 
In FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1392 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub 
nom. Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1987) (No. 87-255), the plaintiffs 
brought suit alleging "fraudulent diversion of loan proceeds" and breach of contract, as 
well as "violations of federal law." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Hud­
speth approach, holding that once FSLIC is appointed receiver, courts lose jurisdiction to 
entertain all claims against the receivership estate because "no end runs around the re­
ceiver's broad realm of authority" are permitted. Id. at 1394. 
145. Murdock-SC Assoc. v. Beverly Hills Say. & Loan Ass'n, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 
1987), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 624 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1985), petition for cert. 
filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-452). 
146. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed Hudspeth but indicated some 
willingness to reconsider its decision if arguments on exclusive FSLIC adjudication were 
presented to it. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th 
Cir. 1987). In an attempt to evade the Hudspeth holding, the creditor claimants in Lyons 
amended their complaints to avoid asking for any affirmative relief. Thus, the court did not 
hear the arguments on the adjudication issue. The Lyons court found Hudspeth controlling 
and held that the claim must first be adjudicated administratively. The court decided that 
it could not follow the Morrison-Knudsen court without having the issue argued before it, 
and thus affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. Lyons, 828 F.2d at 395. 
Many district courts and state courts have continued to follow Hudspeth. See. e.g., 
York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Acquisition Corp. 
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approach in its entirety;147 At least two other cases offer support for 
the Morrison-Knudsen approach without fully embracing it. 148 Fi­
nally, one court followed the Hudspeth court's statutory interpretation 
but found it unconstitutional. 149 
of Am. v. Sunrise Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Olden­
burg, 658 F. Supp. 609 (p. Utah 1987); FSLIC v. Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D. 
Md. 1987); Resna Assoc. v. Fin. Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.I. 1987); 
FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. 
v. FSLIC, (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tx. Ct. App. 1987). 
147. FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd., No. C-6776 slip op. (Tex. Sp. Ct. 
March 30, 1988); Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987). 
The Summenree court refused to follow the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals even though 
Texas is in the fifth circuit and there is state precedent on following the Fifth Circuit Court . 
of Appeals on questions of federal law. Summenree, 742 S.W.2d at 450. 
148. Peninsula Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
The claimant in Peninsula brought suit against FSLIC in two capacities: on state law con­
tract claims based on pre-receivership conduct of the association, and for conduct of 
FSLIC after receivership. Id. at 507. The Peninsula court denied FSLIC's motion to dis­
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and maintained jurisdiction over all claims at 
issue. [d. 
The court construed FSLIC power more narrowly than the Hudspeth court, yet more 
broadly than the Morrison-Knudsen court, and followed neither. The court distinguished 
the facts of Peninsula so as to avoid both the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen approaches. 
The claims in Peninsula involved both pre- and post-receivership conduct. The court at­
tempted to draw the distinction between contract claims against the insolvent association 
(pre-receivership) and claims against FSLIC's handling of the receivership (post-receiver­
ship) and found that FSLIC had no authority to adjudicate post-receivership claims. Ac­
cording to the Peninsula court, the claims in both HUdspeth and Morrison-Knudsen 
involved only pre-receivership conduct. [d. at 509-10. The Peninsula court erred on this 
point. All of the claims in Hudspeth involved post-receivership conduct; Hudspeth chal­
lenged FSLIC's decision to terminate his contract and the authority ofFSLIC to freeze him 
out. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for the facts of Hudspeth. 
The Peninsula court found that Congress did not intend FSLIC to have the power to 
adjudicate all claims: if Congress intended FSLIC to hear all claims, Congress would have 
provided so expressly. Peninsula, 663 F.2d at 509-10. The Peninsula court did follow the 
Morrison-Knudsen court in one respect: if the case is one that can be brought in court or 
decided through an administrative process, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mat­
ter of discretion for the court. [d. at 510-11. The Peninsula court then discussed some of 
the factors that might be involved in a decision to keep or relinquish jurisdiction. Among 
the factors discussed were: 1) the level of complexity of the case, 2) the fact that the admin­
istrative procedure is not well developed for processing mixed claims (claims involving pre­
and post-receivership) conduct, 3) the possibility of unfairness to the claimant if the claims 
are resolved in an administrative process (a court proceeding may be more expensive for 
the creditor, in a complicated case, and the creditor does not get a chance for full presenta­
tion of evidence). [d. 
In FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior. Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Utah 1987), the court held 
that FSLIC did not have authority to adjudicate state law-based counterclaims against an 
insolvent association. 
149. Glen Ridge I Condominium, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (supplemental 
opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tx. Ct. App. 1987) (Congress intended FSLIC to have 
the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims, but such delegation of power was uncon­
stitutional.). The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the result of the Texas Appellate Court's 
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III. EXCLUSIVE FSLIC ADIUDICATION: STATUTORY 

CONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BOARD 

RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 

Part III presents and analyzes the courts' arguments for and 
against the statutory authority for exclusive FSLIC adjudication. Sec­
tion A analyzes the position that FSLIC's authority, whether adjudi­
cative or otherwise, is exclusive. Section B evaluates the argument that 
FSLIC has adjudicatory authority. Section C then discusses the possi­
bility that the Board, through its rulemaking power, might establish 
FSLIC adjudicatory authority. 
A. Section 1464(d)(6)(C): An Exclusive FSLIC Remedy 
The Hudspeth court relied on section 1464(d)(6)(C)ISO in finding 
that FSLIC, as receiver, had the exclusive power to adjudicate credi­
tors' claims against insolvent savings and loan associations. lSI Careful 
analysis of the text and the legislative history, however, demonstrates 
that Congress neither provided for nor intended an exclusive FSLIC 
remedy for state law-based creditor claims. Enacted as part of the 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA),IS2 section 
1464(d)(6)(C) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, no 
court may take any action, for or toward the removal of any conserva­
tor or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, restrain or 
affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or 
receiver."IS3 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that once the Board 
holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claims, but disagreed with the appel­
late court's reasoning. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominium, Ltd., No. C-6776 slip 
op. (Tex. Sp. Ct. March 30, 1988). The Texas Supreme Court followed the Morrison-Knud­
sen court's statutory construction, finding that FSLIC had no adjudicatory authority, and 
thus found that the court of appeals "erroneously reached the Article III issue." Id. The 
Texas Supreme Court further stated that it "neither approve(s] nor disprove[s] the holding 
of the court of appeals that the exercise of adjudicatory power by the FSLIC as receiver 
violates Article III ...." Id. See infra notes 421-25 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of the court of appeals' constitutional analysis. 
150. 12 U.S.c. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). 
151. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. FSLIC also argued that 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1464(d)(6)(C), together with § 1729(d), is analogous to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(I)(1982). 
Under § 362(a)(I), the "filing of the bankruptcy petition operates to stay all judicial pro­
ceedings against the debtor." Brief of Appellee at 19, 'stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consoli­
dated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (86­
2081). However, these sections provide only that certain proceedings can be stayed, as 
discussed infra at text accompanying note 177. 
152. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982». 
153. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). 
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appointed FSLICas receiver, courts lose jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims against the insolvent association. 1s4 Judicial "resolution of 
even the facial merits of claims outside of the statutory reorganization 
process would delay the receivership function" of distribution of assets 
and thus constitute restraint of a receiver in violation of section 
1464(d)(6)(C).1SS The Hudspeth court argued indirectly, reasoning 
that a receiver has the power to liquidate, and a lesser included part of 
that power is the right to "[fix] the time and manner of distribu­
tion."IS6 Any court ruling that a creditor was owed a debt would in­
terfere with FSLIC's power to fix the time and manner of the 
distribution of assets,IS7 and would constitute impermissible restraint 
of a receiver under section 1464(d)(6)(C).ls8 
The Morrison-Knudsen court, on the other hand, reasoned that 
court adjudication of either the amount or the existence of a claim 
under FSLIC adjustment would not affect or restrain the receivership 
function because FSLIC as receiver did not possess adjudicatory au­
thority.ls9 The Morrison-Knudsen court criticized the Hudspeth 
court's reasoning: "Judicial adjudication ... does not restrain or af­
fect a receivership; it simply determines the existence and amount of 
claims that a receiver is to honor in its eventual distribution of as­
sets."I60 The Morrison-Knudsen court faulted the Hudspeth court for 
154. The Hudspeth court's position is that §§ 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), taken to­
gether, establish exclusive FSLIC adjudication. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. The court 
does not analyze the statutory authority separately. For heuristic purposes, this comment 
examines the adjudicatory issue and the exclusive adjudicatory issue separately. First, this 
comment, in section III A, examines the extent to which 1464(d)(6)(C) establishes an ex­
clusive remedy. Then, in section III B, this comment examines the extent to which 
1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) establish adjudicatory authority. 
155. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. Plaintiff Hudspeth argued that a determination by 
the court that the defunct savings and loan owed him a debt (as opposed to a fixed amount) 
did not restrain or affect the receivership function. Id. at 1102. 
156. Id. (quoting Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947». 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. As the Morrison-Knudsen court noted, 
this section does not describe the powers of FSLIC as receiver; rather, it simply says that a 
court may not interfere with FSLIC's powers. Id. Thus, if adjudication is one of FSLIC's 
powers, then § 1464(d)(6)(C) would prohibit courts from interfering with FSLIC adjudica­
tion. This, however, would not amount to exclusive FSLIC adjudication because FSLIC 
would not have any authority to prevent courts from adjudicating. 
With respect to FSLIC's receivership powers, § 1464(d)(6)(C) does appear to prevent 
courts from interfering with them. For example, FSLIC decides whether to merge or liqui­
date an insolvent association. Section 1464(d)(6)(C) prevents courts from interfering with 
that decision. 
160. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(citing Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549' (1947». 
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flawed logic,161 asking "[i]f judicial review, which will delay-perhaps 
by years-the liquidation process, does not restrain or affect a receiver, 
then why does initial adjudication by a court of creditors' claims do 
SO?"162 If the Hudspeth court's argument were valid, then judicial re­
view also would restrain or affect the receivership function impermissi­
bly, because it would delay the distribution of assets: either both 
initial adjudication and subsequent judicial review restrain a receiver­
ship function, or neither does so. Judicial review does not restrain a 
receiver impermissibly-indeed, judicial review is part of the Hudspeth 
approach. Thus, initial adjudication does not restrain a receiver. 
Regardless of whether FSLIC has adjudicatory authority, section 
1464(d)(6)(C) does not establish exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory author­
ity. An examination ofFISA's legislative history supports the position 
that courts are not prohibited from adjudicating once the Board ap­
points FSLIC as receiver. None of the courts that addressed this issue 
properly utilized this legislative history in its statutory analysis. 163 
The purpose of section 1464(d)(6)(C) was to prevent court interven­
tion in FSLIC receivership proceedings in only two circumstances, 
neither of which is the adjudication of creditor claims. 
1. Legislative History of FISA 
The purpose of FISA was to "strengthen the regulatory and su­
pervisory authority of the Federal agencies [the Board and FDIC] over 
insured ... savings and loan associations."I64 Prior to its enactment, 
the Board had only two enforcement powers: it could take over the 
savings and loan association by placing it in receivership, or it could 
terminate the association's insurance. 16S Both powers seem to be dras­
tic measures if the Board simply wanted to force a solvent savings and 
loan to comply with the law. FISA granted the Board new enforce­
ment powers: 1) to issue permanent and temporary cease-and-desist 
orders requiring that the association stop certain specified conduct, 
2) to remove dishonest officers and directors, and 3) to examine any 
corporation controlled by an officer of the savings and loan. 166 
161. Id. at 1216. . 
162. Id. Under the Hudspeth approach, the creditor is ~titled to judicial review 
under the APA once administrative remedies have been exhausted. 
163. Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. 
III. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987), briefly discussed the legislative history of 
FISA, but only in a general way. 
164. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 
1028, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1204 (emphasis added). 
165. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 32-33. 
166. Id. These powers are codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). 
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Congress viewed these new powers as intermediate, less drastic 
powers to be used in order to prevent "violation of law or regulation 
and unsafe and unsound practices which otherwise might adversely 
affect the Nation's financial institutions."167 Although FISA affected 
receivership powers, Congress' primary interest was to supplement the 
Board's and the FDIC's arsenal of regulatory and supervisory powers 
over their respective institutions. 
Prior to FISA's enactment, the Board proceeded under section 
5(d)(1) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA)168 to force a 
savings and loan to correct violations of law or regulation. It was 
often a "long-drawn-out process ... [and was] ill-suited to securing 
prompt correction of irregular practices or unsafe operation."169 
FISA replaced this process by channelling appeals of the Board's en­
forcement orders through an administrative procedurepo According 
to the Senate Report explaining the FISA, "[h]earings provided for in 
section 5(d) [1464(d)] would be held in the federal judicial district in 
which the home office of the association is located, ... [and] con­
ducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act ...."171 
The only hearings provided for in section 5(d) are for determining 
whether the Board's exercise of enforcement power against a savings 
and loan association is appropriate. FISA did not speak to the admin­
istrative adjudication or other resolution of creditors' claims. 
Though it increased the Board's enforcement powers, FISA lim­
ited the Board's power to appoint a receiver. The legislative history 
167. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REp. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 
2nd Sess. I, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3533 (hereinafter 
S. REP. No. 1482). 
168. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
169. S. REP. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 4-5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 3537. Section 5(d)(I) of the HOLA, prior to the enactment of the FISA, 
provided for an administrative hearing, and, in the absence of a special statutory review 
procedure, a party could have obtained initial court review of a final order of the Board in a 
federal district court, followed by an appeal to a court of appeals. However, within 30 days 
after service of notice upon it of alleged violations, the association could waive the adminis­
trative hearing and submit the controversy to a federal district court. Often, the ensuing 
trial de novo was a long, drawn out process; in one case, pre-trial discovery procedures 
lasted three years. [d. 
170. For example, temporary cease-and-desist orders can be stayed by the local dis­
trict court if appealed within 10 days of the issuance of the order. Permanent cease-and­
desist orders, on the other hand, may be challenged in court only after a hearing is held 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. S. REP. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 10-11, re­
printed in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3541-3542. 
171. [d. at 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3546 (em­
phasis added). 
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shows that, under FISA, the Board could no longer appoint a receiver 
whenever it deemed it necessary,172 but only when certain circum­
stances obtained. 173 The statute granted a savings and loan associa­
tion placed in receivership for any of the prescribed circumstances 
thirty days to bring an action in district court for removal of the re­
ceiver.114 If any "proceeding such as an action to stay a temporary 
cease-and-desist order, or a petition by an association for judicial re­
view of a cease-and-desist order"17s is pending in court at the time that 
the savings and loan is placed in receivership, those proceedings would 
be stayed "pending the outcome of the association's action to remove 
the conservator or receiver ...."176 
The Senate Report concluded by summarizing the bill as follows: 
The provisions of this subparagraph [l464(d)] would, in effect, 
limit the jurisdiction of a court to order the removal of a conserva­
tor or receiver, except in an action for removal brought by an asso­
ciation under authority of paragraph (6)(A) [1464(d)(6)(A)] of the 
proposed amended section5(d) [1464(d)], or, except at the instance 
of the Board, to restrain the exercise of the powers or functions of a 
conservator or receiver. 177 
172. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3544. 
173. Id. The Board must find that 
one or more of the following (grounds exist]: (i) insolvency in that the assets of 
the association are less than its obligations to its creditors and others, including 
its members; (ii) substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation 
or violations of law, rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice or 
practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound conditions to transact business; (iv) willful 
violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final; (v) concealment of 
books .... 
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982). 
174. S. REp. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 14, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 3545. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. If a court upheld the appointment of the receiver, judicial review of any 
cease-and-desist order would be moot, because the association must challenge the legality 
of the order administratively as prescribed by F1SA. If not, the proceedmgs would resume. 
177. Id. (emphasis added). One court quoted this language as evidence of Congress' 
intent to channel creditor claims through the administrative process. Lyons Say. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The court read 
the language broadly, much the same way that the Hudspeth court read § 1464(d)(6)(C). 
The Lyons court also quoted language from the House Banking and Currency Committee's 
summary of the FISA: "The scope of judicial review shall also be in conformity with the 
provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code relating to judicial review of administrative 
action, . . . . The purpose of the new language is to safeguard the right of individuals and 
institutions from arbitrary and capricious agency action." Id. (quoting from H. REp. No. 
2077, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966». This language does not support the Lyons court's 
holding because it is referring to challenges to Board supervisory orders as discussed above 
in the text. 
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This legislative history demonstrates that section 1464( d) does 
not provide an administrative procedure for resolving creditor claims, 
and limits the jurisdiction of a court in only two respects. First, a 
court may not remove a receiver after thirty days from the time of 
appointment. Second, if a court were entertaining an association's 
challenge to a Board cease-and-desist order, and the association were 
subsequently placed in receivership, then the court action would be 
stayed. Read together with the specific statutory language, the history 
shows that, in enacting FISA, Congress contemplated only the limita­
tion ofjurisdiction in these two specific respects, and not the wholesale 
elimination of the couft'S jurisdiction. Further, and directly under­
mining the Hudspeth court's conclusion, neither of the two jurisdic­
tional limitations intended by Congress has anything to do with 
FSLIC adjudication of hreditor claims. FISA simply does not address 
the creditor claims issue, and thus establishes neither adjudicatory au­
thority nor exclusive adjudicatory authority. Support for FSLIC's au­
thority to adjudicate such claims must come, if at all, from some other 
source. 
B. Statutory Authority for FSLIC Adjudication 
This section examines the many statutory arguments that have 
been used to justify FSLIC's adjudicatory authority. Subsection III B 
(1) explores section 1464(d)(6)(C), in the general context of the 
HOLA. Subsection III B (2) explores several statutes in the NHA, 
with primary emphasis on section 1729(d). Subsection III B (3) dis­
cusses the current regulations. Then, subsection III B (4) compares 
FSLIC to the FDIC. Finally, section III C explores whether the 
Board may use its rulemaking power to authorize FSLIC adjudication. 
1. The HOLA and FSLIC Adjudication 
FSLIC argued, and the Hudspeth court agreed, that section 
1464(d)(6)(C)178 established FSLIC adjudicatory authority. 179 Section 
1464(d)(6)(C) is part of the HOLA.180 Under the HOLA, the Board is 
authorized to charter and oversee fed,eral savings and loan associa­
tions. 181 In addition, the Board has the power to appoint FSLIC as 
receiver for state and federally chartered institutions. 182 Section 
178, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 153 for 
the language of § 1464(d)(6)(C). 
179. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at llOI. 
180. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
181. See id. 
182. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
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1464(d)(6)(C) is but one provision of a complicated section 1464(d).183 
As discussed in section III A of this comment, section 1464(d), which 
Congress enacted as part of FISA, prescribes Board powers, not 
FSLIC powers. The HOLA, in general, does not prescribe the powers 
and duties of FSLIC as receiver. 
" According to the Hudspeth court, as explained in section III A, 
1464(d)(6)(C) prohibits courts from adjudicating claims against the re­
ceivership once FSLIC is appointed as receiver. Therefore, since 
courts are prohibited from adjudicating, FSLIC must adjudicate. 184 
The Mornson-Knudsen court read section 1464(d)(6)(C) as a pro­
vision which prohibits courts from interfering with FSLIC's receiver­
ship powers, but not as establishing what those powers are. 18S Under 
the Morrison-Knudsen approach, section 1464(d)(6)(C) would pre­
clude a court from interfering with FSLIC adjudication of creditor 
claims if FSLIC had adjudicatory authority, but section 1464(d)(6)(C) 
does not establish such authority. Because adjudicatory authority is 
not among the traditional powers of a receiver,186 the Morrison-Knud­
sen court reasoned that such authority must come from some other 
statutory source. 187 Even if the power to adjudicate was among the 
traditional powers of a receiver, relevant statutes would define FSLIC 
183. 12 u.s.c. § 1464(d) (1982) is entitled "Proceedings to enforce compliance with 
law and regulations; cease and desist proceedings; temporary cease-and-desist orders; sus­
pension or removal of directors or officers; appointment and removal of conservator or 
receiver; hearings and judicial review; regulations for reorganization, dissolutions, etc.; pen­
alties; definitions; application to other institutions." 
184. The Hudspeth court's position is that § 1464(d)(6)(C), together with § 1729(d), 
establishes exclusive FSLIC adjudication. The court does not explain how adjudicatory 
authority is established, except by the inference that FSLIC must adjudicate because courts 
cannot. 
185. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. 
186. Id. 
187. The Morrison-Knudsen court stated that a receiver's functions do not ordinarily 
include the power to adjudicate, and relied on Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947): 
"The establishment of the existence and amount of a claim against the debtor in no way 
disturbs the possession of the liquidation court, in no way affects title to the property, and 
does not necessarily involve a determination of what priority the claim should have." Mor­
rison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217 (quoting Morris, 329 U.S. at 549). Hudspeth also cited 
Morris as authority for the proposition that the receiver has the right to fix the "time and 
manner of distribution" of the assets ofthe receivership. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 (quot­
ing Morris, 329 U.S. at 549). Hudspeth argued that court adjudication of claims consti­
tuted impermissible restraint of this receivership function. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. 
Morrison-Knudsen's use of the Morris opinion is much more in keeping with the context of 
the Morris opinion. 
The Court was describing the "two-fold" liquidation process. Morris, 329 U.S. at 549. 
One aspect of this process involves the distribution of property. "No one can obtain part of 
the assets or enforce a right to specific property in possession of the liquidation court [or 
receiver] except upon application to it." Id. The other aspect involves the "proof and . 
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powers because FSLIC is a statutory receiver. ISS 
2. The NHA and FSLIC Adjudication 
Title IV of the National Housing Act (NHA)IS9 prescribes the 
duties and powers of FSLIC. Section 1729(d)l90 of that act describes 
FSLIC's powers upon the liquidation of an insured association. The 
Morrison-Knudsen court rejected FSLIC's argument that section 
1729(d) authorized FSLIC adjudication,191 while the Hudspeth court 
relied on section 1729(d) as establishing FSLIC adjudication. 192 Sub­
section (2)(a) explores section 1729(d) from its original enactment 
through its subsequent amendments and demonstrates that section 
1729(d) alone does not establish adjudicatory authority. Subsection 
(2)(b) explores other statutes of the NHA, and concludes that section 
1729(d) in the context of the NHA does not establish FSLIC 
adjudication. 
allowance" of claims, which is "distinct from distribution." Id. Courts adjudicate the 
claims; the receiver distributes the assets. 
The "right rule of decision" is that a "valid judgment in personam [as opposed to a 
judgment in rem over the assets] can not be ignored in another action." Beach, Judgment 
Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 30 YALE L.l. 674,679-80 (1921). This view is consis­
tent with the position the Supreme Court adopted in Morris, that is, courts may not inter­
fere with the receiver's control of the assets, and court adjudication does not interfere with 
the receiver's control of the assets. 
The Morrison-Knudsen court unearthed some evidence that Congress might have con­
sidered that the power to adjudicate was among the powers of a receiver. When Congress 
amended the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1766, 1783 and 1787 (1982), to pro­
vide for receivership authority, the following comment was included in the legislative his­
tory: "[The provisions] are similar to those which are customarily prescribed in other types 
of liquidation and would authorize, for example, . . . the receipt and adjudication of 
claims." S. REP. No. 1647, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONGo 
SERVo 1323, 1324. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219 n.3. Morrison-Knudsen stated that 
Congress simply was mistaken, that "Federal receivers of insolvent banks have never had 
the power conclusively to adjudicate creditor claims. In any case, section 1766(b)(3) along 
with its legislative history is so remote from the cases at bar that it cannot affect our deci­
sion. Without more it is too slender a reed to support FSLIC's construction of its own 
statutory authority." Id. (citation omitted). 
< 
188. Powers of a statutory receiver are determined by statute. 66 C.l.S. Receivers 
§ 184 (2d. ed. 1972). "The powers and functions of a statutory receiver are limited by the 
purpose of the statute under which he is appointed." Id. See e.g. Illinois Savings & Loan 
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 923 (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
189. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
190. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). 
191: Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218-19. 
192. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. 
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a. Section 1729(d) 
In 1934, Congress enacted section 1729( d) as part of the NHA. 
Section 1729(d) read: 
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions in de­
fault, the Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of 
and to collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to settle, 
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured in­
stitutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary in con­
nection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the court or 
other public authority having jurisdiction over the matter. 193 
Though Congress did not alter the language of section 1729(d) when it 
enacted the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA),194 the BPA provided: 
"In connection with the liquidation of any ... [state chartered savings 
and loan] the language 'court or other public authority having juris­
diction over the matter' ... shall mean said Board."19s In 1982, the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (GSDIA) amended the 
language of section 1729(d). From the passage of the GSDIA in 1982 
until October 15, 1986 when the language expired, section 1729(d) 
read: 196 
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the 
Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of and to 
collect all obligations to the insured institutions, settle, compromise, 
or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and 
to do all things that may be necessary in connection therewith, sub­
ject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
or. in cases where the Corporation has been appointed conservator. 
receiver. or legal custodian solely by a public authority having juris­
diction over the matter other than said Board. subject only to the 
regulation ofsuch public authority.197 
Both the Hudspeth and Mo"ison-Knudsen courts interpreted the 
GSDlA-amended language. 198 
193. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, Title IV, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1259. 
194. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 357 at 359. 
195. /d., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 357. This lan­
guage, deleted in 1982 by the GSDIA. has been reinstated. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) 
(Supp. IV 1986). 
196. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 1729(d) now reads as 
originally enacted. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
198. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Coit Independence Joint Venture v. 
FirstSouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cerL granted. 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) 
under the reinstated original language of § 1729(d) and held that the difference did not 
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If Congress intended, through section 1729(d), to empower 
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, it had three opportunities to do 
so, first when Congress enacted the NHA, or subsequently when it 
passed either the BPA or GSDIA. Before exploring section 1729(d) in 
the context of the NHA, the BPA, and the GSDIA to determine 
whether Congress authorized FSLIC adjudication, this subsection ex­
plains and criticizes the positions of the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knud­
sen courts. 
The Hudspeth court looked to the language of section 1729(d) 
and the legislative history of the BP A to demonstrate that section 
1729(d), in conjunction with section 1464(d)(6)(C), established FSLIC 
adjudication. 199 "Congress wanted the FSLIC· to be able to act 
quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operating, or dissolving a failed 
institution, and intended that the FSLIC's ability to accomplish these 
goals not be interfered with by other judicial or regulatory authori­
ties."2°O Once again, the Hudspeth court reasoned that this policy pre­
vents courts from adjudicating, thus inviting the inference that FSLIC 
as receiver has an implied power to adjudicate. 
The Hudspeth court made two mistakes which limit the persua­
siveness of its argument. First, the court stated that section 1729(d) 
originally was enacted as part of the BP A.201 Congress, however, en­
acted section 1729(d) as part of the NHA some thirty-four years prior 
to the BP A. Second, the Hudspeth court employed the legislative his­
tory of the BPA to interpret the GSDIA language.202 According to 
section 1729(d) at the time that Congress enacted the BPA, FSLIC 
was subject "only to the regulation of the court or other public author­
ity having jurisdiction over the matter."203 The GSDIA changed this 
language, so that FSLIC was subject "only to the regulation of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board ...."204 The GSDIA language, 
affect the Hudspeth approach that all claims were switched to the administrative track. Id. 
at 564. 
199. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101. 
200. Id. at 1101. "[T]he Senate confirmed that FSLIC's authority '[i]n carrying out 
its receivership responsibilities ... would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board ... .' .. Id. at 1101 (quoting S. REP. No. 1263. 90th Cong .• 2d 
Sess. 10. reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530. 2539). 
201. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101 n.2. Using legislative history to interpret a statute 
is a legitimate analytical tool. However. the legislative history referred to ought to be that 
of the statute in question. or the use of the different legislative history should be specifically 
noted and defended. 
202. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101-02. 
203. See supra text accompanying note 193 for the language of § 1729(d) as it existed 
in 1968. 
204. See supra text accompanying note 197 for the GSDIA-amended language. 
, 
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coupled with the legislative history of the BP A, provides support for 
the Hudspeth approach that no court may interfere with FSLIC, but 
the court's reliance on the BPA's legislative history is misplaced. The 
Hudspeth court relied on the legislative history of the BPA, enacted in 
1968, in interpreting the GSDIA language of section l729(d), enacted 
in 1982, when, in fact, Congress enacted the statute in 1934-thirty· 
four years prior to the BP A. 
The Hudspeth court then compounded this error. The court con· 
cluded that Congress, in enacting the BPA, intended FSLIC as re· 
ceiver to have unlimited power to facilitate the efficient and 
inexpensive winding up of the affairs of insolvent associations. The 
court reasoned that adjudication is such a power, and thus concluded 
that FSLIC had adjudicatory authority.2os While the BPA was en· 
acted, in part, in order to facilitate efficiency and limit the costs of 
receivership proceedings, the BPA neither provided FSLIC with ex· 
clusive adjudicatory authority, nor with carte blanche to do whatever 
it deemed would further efficiency. 
FSLIC argued in Morrison·Knudsen that the power to adjudicate 
was necessary and thereby included in the powers to "settle, compro· 
mise, or release claims ... and to do all things that may be necessary 
...."206 The Morrison-Knudsen court dismissed this argument as un· 
duly burdening the word "necessary" and as being "incompatible" 
with the explicitly granted powers to settle, compromise, or release 
c1aims.207 According to the court, adjudicators do not settle, compro­
mise, or release claims; they adjudicate, holding for one party or the 
other.20s 
i. Legislative History of the NHA 
There is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to estab· 
lish FSLIC adjudication when it enacted the NHA in 1934.209 The 
main purpose of the bill was to provide home mortgage insurance that 
all banking establishments could offer their customers in order to ease 
the effects of the Depression.210 The savings and loan industry and the 
Board opposed the legislation, fearing that other banking institutions 
205. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 110t. 
206. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218, 1219 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) 
(Supp. IV 1986». 
207. Id. at 1219. 
208. [d. 
209. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750)(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
210. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27. 
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would take away a portion of the home mortgage business.211 To ap­
pease the savings and loan industry, Congress created FSLIC through 
Title IV of the NHA212 to insure the accounts of savings and loan 
associations.213 Congress copied FDIC214 and made FSLIC part of 
the Board.2lS This enabled saving and loan associations to compete 
with other banking institutions.216 
There are two factors which support the conclusion that Congress 
did not intend to grant FSLIC adjudicatory powers in the 1934 Act. 
The first is the language of section 1729(d) itself.217 As previously 
discussed, adjudication is not one of the specifically enumerated pow­
ers, and is, in fact, inconsistent with some of those powers. Second, 
Congress modelled FSLIC after the FDIC, a pre-existing govemment­
owned insurance corporation which also acts as receiver for insolvent 
banks. The FDIC does not have adjudicatory authority.218 To the 
extent that Congress intended to copy the FDIC, it probably did not 
intend to empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. Thus, if sec­
tion 1729(d) establishes adjudicatory authority, it must do so by virtue 
of an amendment. 
11. Legislative History of the BP A 
Though it did not alter section 1729(d), Congress did enact the 
cryptic phrase: "In connection with the liquidation of any ... [state 
chartered savings and loan], the language 'court or other public au­
thority having jurisdiction over the matter' in subsection (d) of this 
section shall mean said Board."219 The question is whether Congress, 
by means of this enactment, altered the meaning of section 1729( d) to 
authorize FSLIC adjudication. 
Congress enacted the BP A to solve a specific problem connected 
with state-chartered associations that arose in the 1960's. As of 1980, 
FSLIC had paid insurance claims to depositors of only thirteen sav­
211. Id. For this reason, Congress gave this job to the Federal Housing Administra­
tion (now part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development). Id. 
212. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
213. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27. 
214. Id. at 84. 
215. 14,. at 27. 
216. Id. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 193 & 197 for the language of § 1729(d). 
218. See infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
219. Pub. L. No. 90-390, 82 Stat. 296, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & An­
MIN. NEWS 359. The GSDIA deleted this language in 1982, but Congress reinstated it on 
October 13, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). 
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ings and loan associations.22o Six of the thirteen insolvencies occurred 
in the 1960's, and five of those six involved Illinois associations.221 All 
five thrift institutions were state-chartered and FSLIC-insured. Prior 
to the BPA of 1968, which amended section 406(k) of the NHA,222 
FSLIC and the Board did not have the same powers over state­
chartered savings and loan associations as they did over federally 
chartered associations. In the case of state-chartered thrift institu­
tions, a state commissioner, and not the Board, had authority to ap­
point a receiver, yet FSLIC still was required to pay all of the 
depositors' insured accounts in the event of insolvency.223 In the Illi­
nois cases, the state commissioner appointed a state receiver; the ac­
tions of this receiver put severe stress on FSLIC's assets.224 
The purpose of the BPA was to assure that the Illinois situation 
did not recur. To effectuate this purpose, Congress gave the Board the 
power to appoint FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered associations 
placed in receivership under certain conditions, essentially "federaliz­
ing" the receivership. 22~ 
220. Note, FSLIC Federal Receivership Appointments for Allegedly Insolvent State 
Savings and Loan Associations: A Plot to Federalize State Savings and Loans Against their 
wiln 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 783, 791 n.47 (1984) (citing D. CoHEN & R. FREIER, THE 
FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK SYSTEM 11 n.6 (1980» [hereinafter Federalize State 
Savings]. 
221. Id. 
222. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1701-17SO(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
223. See T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 99-102 (description of the protracted receiv­
ership of Marshall Savings & Loan Association). 
224. Federalize State Savings, supra note 220, at 791. See also S. REp. No. 1263, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530,2536 [here­
inafter S. REp. No. 1263]. In the case of the insolvent Illinois savings and loan associa­
tions, FSLIC paid out more than 216 million dollars. By the time that the BPA was passed 
in 1968, FSLIC had yet to recover any of the funds, even though one of the associations 
had been in receivership for five years. The state commissioner did not appoint FSLIC as 
receiver and refused to give FSLIC any information on the financial status of the associa­
tion until the hearings on the BPA were held in 1968. FSLIC paid one thrift, Marshall 
Savings & Loan Association, 83 million dollars for the insured accounts. Marshall had the 
use of that money for three years, interest-free, while the association was in the hands of a 
state receiver. FSLIC lost the use of this money and the interest it would have earned, and 
recouped nothing in this three year period. Id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2537. 
225. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2538. Before 
the Board can appoint FSLIC receiver for a state-chartered association, the following con­
ditions must be met: 1) the state must first place the association in receivership, 2) the 
Board must determine that the § 1464(d) grounds exist, and 3) the savings account holders 
must be unable to withdraw funds. [d. at 9-10, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 2538-39. Once the Board appoints FSLIC as receiver, the receivership is 
handled in the same way as if the association were federally chartered. Id. at 10, reprinted 
in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2539. 
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The Senate Report explained the enacted provision which affected 
section 1729(d): 
Section 406(c)(3)(B) authorizes the FSLIC to liquidate the institu­
tion in an orderly manner or make such other disposition of the 
matter as the FSLIC might deem to be in the best interest of the 
institutions, its savers, and the FSLIC. In carrying out its receiver­
ship responsibilities, the committee expects the FSLIC to give due 
consideration to the interest of all of the claimants upon the assets 
of the association, including general creditors, uninsured depositors, 
and association stockholders. The authority of the FSLIC in this 
regard would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board and not to that of any State authority, adminis­
trative or judicial, which may previously have had regulatory au­
" thority with respect to the institution. 226 
This language must be interpreted in light of the history and purposes 
of the 1968 Act. To give FSLIC and the Board more control over the 
appointment of a receiver and the liquidation proceedings of state­
chartered associations, Congress wrested both administrative and judi­
cial power from the state and gave it to the Board and FSLIC. To 
allay fears that FSLIC would abuse its power and conduct liquidation 
proceedings in an arbitrary manner, Congress instructed FSLIC to 
give "due consider~tion to the interest of all of the claimants upon the 
assets of the association. "227 
The language of section 1729(d) as it existed at the time of the 
BP A can now be understood in the context of the BPA. It dealt solely 
with the particular problem of FSLIC control of state-chartered sav­
ings and.1oan associations. Pursuant to state law, a state authority 
could appoint whomever it wished as receiver for a state-chartered as­
sociation. Until and unless the Board stepped in and appointed 
FSLIC receiver, the state-appointed receiver would be under the com­
plete control of the state authority.228 Then, once the Board ap­
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. The powers of a state-appointed non-FSLlC receiver are established by state 
law. Those powers, at least in general, do not include the power to adjudicate. For exam­
ple, in Illinois, a creditor may prove his or her claim "to the satisfaction of the receiver" or 
adjudicate it in a court. Illinois Savings & Loan Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 923 
(Smith-Hurd 1970). The powers of a receiver under Illinois law are analogous to the pow­
ers of the FDIC as receiver. The receiver may allow a claim, but does not have final au­
thority to refuse a claim. See section III C for the discussion of the FDIC. Furthermore, 
the creditor may bring a claim in any court that has subject-matter jurisdiction; the creditor 
is not limited to the court supervising the receivership. See FSLlC v. Krueger, 435 F.2d 
633,636 (7th Cir. 1970) (An action in personam brought in a federal district court does not 
interfere with the state court's supervision of the receivership.). 
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pointed FSLIC, the state authority would lose all control over FSLIC. 
The language added by the BPA refers to FSLIC receiverships of fed­
eralized state-chartered savings and loan associations. In such cases, 
FSLIC shall have the power to act in the specified ways, "subject only 
to the regulation" of the Board.229 The language of the BP A thus had 
this specific purpose, and did not in any way establish FSLIC 
adjudication. 
If section 1729(d) empowers FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, 
it must be by virtue of the GSDIA. Subsection (2)(a)(iii) explores the 
legislative history of the GSDIA to determine whether Congress in­
tended to empower the FSLIC with adjudicatory authority through 
the 1982 Act. 
iii. Legislative History of the GSDIA 
Congress enacted the Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act of 1982 (GSDIA) to "revitalize the housing industry by strength­
ening the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and 
ensuring the availability of home mortgage loans."23o The GSDIA 
gave savings and loan institutions increased banking powers which en­
abled them to offer consumers more services and to compete more ef-· 
fectively with other banking institutions.231 In addition, the GSDIA 
provided greater protection to depositors and creditors232 and granted 
FSLIC and the FDIC greater flexibility to "deal with financially dis­
tressed depository institutions."233 
In strengthening FSLIC's powers, section 122(a) of the GSDIA 
authorized FSLIC to make loans to insured depository institutions in 
order to prevent default or lessen FSLIC's risk, and to merge insolvent 
institutions with solvent ones.234 Section 122(b) increased FSLIC's 
powers over a defaulted federally chartered savings and loan associa­
229. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
230. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). 
231. S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 2, at 126. In the early 1980's, rising 
interest rates and unstable infiation rates seriously threatened savings and loan institutions. 
Consumers were taking their savings out of savings and loans and investing their money in 
money market funds. Most of the savings and loan investments were in long term home 
mortgages at fairly low interest rates. See Comment, The "Brokered Deposit" Regulation: 
A Response to the FDIC's and FHLBB's Efforts to Limit Deposit Insurance, 33 U.C.L.A. L. 
REv. 594, 610-14 (1985). 
232. S. REp. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3055 [hereinafter S. REp. No. 536]. 
233. Id. . 
234. Section 122(a) amended § 406(f) of the National Housing Act (codified at 12 
U.S.C. 1729(f) (1982». See S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232, at 48-49, reprinted in 1982 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3102-3103. 
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tion in order to equal FSLIC's powers over state-chartered associa­
tions.23s Finally, the GSDIA gave the Board increased, but only 
temporary, authority over state-chartered savings and loan associa­
tions. Section 122(d) of the GSDIA authorized the Board to appoint 
FSLIC receiver for a state-chartered savings and loan association 
before the state authorized the receivership.236 The state r~mained 
free to appoint FSLIC receiver and, until and unless the Board inter­
vened, the state authority controlled FSLIC and the receivership.237 
The GSDIA-enacted language of section 1729(d) reflects the dis­
tinction between sections 1729(b) and (c). Between 1982 and 1986, 
when the GSDIA expired, the Board could have appointed the FSLIC 
receiver for state-chartered associations in either of two ways. First, 
the state could have placed the association in receivership, and then 
the Board could have stepped in and appointed FSLIC as receiver 
based on statutory grounds as established by the BP A. Second, under 
the GSDIA, the Board could have appointed FSLIC as receiver with­
out waiting for the state to place the association in receivership. In 
either event, the Board controlled FSLIC, and the state authorities 
were without any control. After the emergency power to appoint 
FSLIC as receiver without prior state action expired,238 the language 
of section 1729( d) no longer needed to reflect this distinction, and thus 
the language of 1729(d) as amended by the GSDIA expired, and the 
235. Section 122(b) amended § 406(b) of the National Housing Act (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982». See S. REP. No. 536, supra note 232, at 49, reprinted in 1982 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3103. Prior to the GSDIA, "an anomalous situa­
tion exist[ed] whereby the ability of the FSLIC to make "such other disposition' of a de­
faulted S&L as in the best interests of its insured members applie[d] only to State-chartered 
insured institutions, and not to Federal associations." Id. 
236. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c)(I)(B)(ii)(I) and (c)(I)(B)(ii)(II) (1982). See section III B 
(2)(a)(ii) for an explanation of when the Board could appoint FSLIC as receiver for state­
chartered savings and loan associations prior to the GSDIA. 
According to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the Board is 
allowed "to appoint the FSLIC as conservator or receiver of a State-chartered insured insti­
tution upon a determination that the institution is in an unsafe or unsound condition to 
transact business, has substantially dissipated its assets, or had assets less than its obliga­
tions. However, the Bank Board must seek written approval from the relevant State official 
prior to exercising such receivership authority, and FSLIC may act without such approval 
only if the state fails to act in a timely manner or FSLIC is appointed receiver by a pubic 
[sic] authority of an institution in default." S. REP. No. 536, supra note 232, at 8, reprinted 
in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3062. 
The authority to appoint FSLIC in this fashion was a temporary authority; it expired 
on October 15, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
237. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2)(A) (1982). 
238. This emergency power (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (c) (1982» expired October 
15, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (Supp. IV 1986). 
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earlier language was reinstated. 239 
The GSDIA temporarily increased the Board's powers, expedit­
ing Board procedures for appointing FSLIC as the receiver for state­
chartered thrift institutions.24O Like the BP A and the FISA, each of 
which also increased the Board's and FSLIC's authority over state­
chartered associations, the GSDIA did not provide for the administra­
tion or adjudication of creditors' claims. Section 1729(d), as originally 
enacted, or as altered by the BPA or the GSDIA, does not establish 
FSLIC adjudicatory authority.241 
b. FSLIC Adjudication and Other Statutes in the NHA 
The previous discussion has illustrated that adjudicatory author­
ity for FSLIC cannot by derived from section 1729(d) alone. This sub­
section explores other statutes in the NHA's statutory scheme that 
may tend to prove or disprove the existence of authority for FSLIC 
adjudication. It concludes that Congress did not intend, through the 
NHA, to empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. 
I. Section 1729(b)(1)(B): Power to Pay Valid Claims 
Section 1729(b)(1)(B) provides: "In the event that a Federal asso­
ciation is in default, the Corporation shall be appointed as conservator 
or receiver and as such shall pay all valid credit obligations of the 
association."242 FSLIC argued that the power to "pay all valid credit 
239. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
240. Congress reasoned that early intervention might prevent a default, or, at a mini­
mum, minimize a troubled association's loss of assets and minimize FSLIC payment from 
FSLIC's own fund. S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232, at 8-9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3061-62. 
241. In order to determine the force of any statute, a court must examine the statute 
against the background of the entire statutory framework. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 
1219 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.(19 How.) 183 (1857)). 
FSLIC also argued that: 1) its rejection of a claim is "analogous to a trustee's rejection 
of a contract in a bankruptcy proceeding." Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. Section 365(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that a "trustee, subject to the court's approval, 
may assume or reject any executory contract." 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). Even though 
the court would be a bankruptcy court, § 365(a) does not give the trustee sole power to 
reject or assume a contract. Id. To extend FSLIC's analogy further, one could argue that 
the bankruptcy court's control over the trustee is analogous to the Board's control over 
FSLIC. However, the Board merely reviews FSLIC's conclusion. The bankruptcy court, 
on the other hand, "has full power to inquire into the validity of any claim asserted against 
the estate ...." In re Dean, 460 F. Supp. 452, 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939)).. 
242. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(B) (1982). Section 1729(b) is entitled "Powers of Cor­
poration on default of Federal Savings & Loan Association." Section 1729(b)(I)(A) lists 
the following additional powers: the receiver is authorized 
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association; (ii) to take such action 
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obligations" further evidenced Congress' intent to grant FSLIC power 
to adjudicate creditor claims.243 The Mo"ison-Knudsen court coun­
tered by observing that Congress used the word "valid" in the ordi­
nary sense, to indicate that it does not want FSLIC to pay invalid 
claims, noting that "(wJho determines 'validity' is not specified [by 
§ 1729(b)(1)(B)]."244 The Morrison-Knudsen court's view is more 
consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language. Given that 
meaning ofthe term "valid," this section ofthe statute simply does not 
support the inference that Congress granted FSLIC the authority to 
determine the validity of such claims, let alone adjudicate them. 
11. Section ·1728: Suits by Depositors 
Section. 1728('?) requires the Corporation, 
[i]n the event of a default by any insured institution, [to pay] ... 

each insured account in such insured institution . . . . Provided, 

That the Corporation ... in any case where the Corporation is not 

satisfied as to the validity of a claim for an insured account, ... may 

require the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction 

before paying such claith.245 

"The language used indicates unambiguously that Congress antici­
pated judicial adjUdication [of depositor claims] in the event of a dis­
puted claim."246 
Section 1728( c), a statute of limitations for depositors' suits, pro­
vides that: "No action against the Corporation to enforce a claim for 
payment of insurance upon an insured account of an insured institu­
tion in default shall be brought after the expiration of three years from 
the date of default ...."247 The Morrison-Knudsen court viewed this 
as persuasive evidence that Congress "anticipated judicial adjudica­
tion" for depositors' claims. 248 
as may be necessary to put it in a sound solvent condition; (iii) to merge it with 

another insured institution; (iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over 

its assets; (v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or (vi) to 

make such other disposition of the matter as it deems appropriate; whichever it 

deems to be in the best interest of the association, its savers, and the Corporation 

Id. • 
243. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218. 
244. Id. 
245. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). 
246. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. 
247. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(c) (1982). 
248. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. The court relied on Jugum v. FSLIC, 637 
F. Supp. 1045 (W.n. Wash. 1986), where depositors brought suit in federal district court to 
recover insurance on their deposits. The Jugum court held that: 1) plaintiffs were entitled 
273 1988] FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS 
The Morrison-Knudsen court inferred from its analysis of the stat­
ute of limitations that "FSLIC may adjudicate neither depositors' nor 
creditors' claims."249 According to the court, it does not make sense 
to "assume that FSLIC must litigate depositors' claims, with which it 
has great expertise, but may adjudicate creditors' claims against the 
institution in receivership, as to which its expertise is much less 
...."~50 FSLIC is part of a federal system of deposit insurance, the 
purpose and function of which is to insure deposits. Congress created 
the system and was obliged to detail depositors' rights and FSLIC du­
ties.2S1 There is no corresponding statute detailing non-insured credi­
tors' rights. The Morrison-Knudsen court's position is that Congress 
would not have given FSLIC power to adjudicate creditors' claims, 
while denying such power over depositors' claims. 252 
FSLIC could counter that because Congress neither provided 
that FSLIC may require a creditor to prove its claim in court before 
paying an uninsured creditor, nor provided a statute of limitations for 
uninsured creditor claims, Congress did not envision the judicial reso­
lution of creditor claims. Furthermore, since Congress did not envi­
sion judicial resolution of such claims, it must have intended 
administrative resolution. This argument, however, is not persuasive. 
There are statutes of limitations covering all claims. The statutes in 
the NHA create a contractual relationship between the depositor and 
the insurer and enumerate the duties and rights of both. The rights of 
creditors are established by common law or other federal and state 
statutes. Congress provided for depositors' rights in the NHA because 
it created FSLIC to insure depositor accounts. Congress was silent on 
the rights of creditors because their rights are determined by other 
law.2S3 
to bring a court action, 2) the court was not limited to review of agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (plaintiffs had first presented their claims to FSLIC who 
denied them in part), and 3) § 1728 was an independent source of jurisdiction that did not 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies (although plaintiffs had exhausted adminis­
trative remedies). Id. 
249. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. 
250. Id. 
251. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1728 (1982). 
252. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. FSLIC is better equipped to deal with 
depositor claims than creditor claims. Id. There is limited potential for complicated de­
positor claims. On the other hand there is great potential for complicated creditor claims. 
Morrison-Knudsen is an example. See supra notes 107-124 and accompanying text for the 
facts of Morrison-Knudsen. FSLIC is hardly equipped to sort this out, given the nature of 
its claims procedures. See supra note 54 for details of FSLIC's claims procedures. 
253. One might contend that because Congress failed both to establish a contractual 
relationship between FSLIC as receiver and uninsured creditors and to preserve a creditor's 
right to a court action, Congress intended to defer to agency control over all creditor 
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iii. Section 1730: Jurisdiction 
Section 1730(k) provides, in part: 
(B) any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation 
shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the 
United States, and the United States district courts shall have origi­
nal jurisdiction thereof, ... and (C) the Corporation may, ... re­
move any such action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the 
United States district court for the district ... by following any 
procedure for removal ... in effect: Provided, That any action, suit, 
or proceeding to which the Corporation is a party in its capacity as 
conservator, or receiver, or other legal custodian of an insured 
State-chartered institution and which involves only the rights or ob­
ligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution 
under State law shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the 
United States.2S4 
In arguing against FSLIC adjudicatory authority, the Morrison­
Knudsen court contended that section 1730(k)(l) reflected "Congress's 
tacit assumption that claims against FSLIC's receivership assets would 
be amenable to judicial resolution,"2ss and interpreted this section as 
"distributing between state and federal courts the jurisdiction over 
suits that must be brought in court."2S6 
According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, the proviso clause 
keeps certain actions in state court.2S7 FSLIC argued, on the other 
claims. It follows from this argument that Congress empowered FSLIC and the Board 
with more authority over uninsured creditors' claims than over depositors' claims. Consid­
ering the purposes of the NHA-to insure depositors' accounts-it is unlikely that Con­
gress would have so intended. 
254. 12 U.S.C. §§ 173O(k)(I)(B), 1730(k)(I)(C) (1982). 
255. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. 
256. [d. 
257. [d. (citing Hancock Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 492 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1974». 
In a declaratory action to determine the ownership of the assets of a state-chartered associ­
ation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because the proviso clause required that the action be brought in 
state court. Hancock, 492 F.2d at 1327. The Hancock court "assumed that, were it not for 
this proviso clause, § 1730(k)(I) would confer jurisdiction" on the federal courts. [d. at 
1327 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3550). Furthermore, the Hancock court reached this con­
clusion "in spite of some dicta in recent opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit suggesting that clause (B) relates solely to removal proceedings by the FSLIC in 
actions in which it has been made a party." Hancock, 492 F.2d at 1328 n.2 (citing Katin v. 
Apollo Sav., 460 F.2d 422, 425 n.5 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972) (That 
section [1730(k)(I)] provides jurisdiction in suits in which FSLIC is plaintiff but denies 
jurisdiction where FSLIC as defendant removes the action to federal court.), and FSLIC v. 
Krueger, 435 F.2d 633,636 (7th Cir. 1970) (proviso relates "solely to removal proceedings 
from state courts in actions wherein the corporation has been made a party"». 
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hand, that the proviso clause applies on1y to receiverships of state­
chartered, state-regulated associations, where FSLIC has been named 
receiver by the state and the Board has not yet appointed FSLIC re­
ceiver.2s8 So long as such a receivership has not been "federalized,"2s9 
creditor actions against FSLIC as receiver of a state-chartered savings 
and loan association do not arise under federal law and cannot be re­
moved to federal court. 
The Morrison-Knudsen court found that section 1730(k)(I) does 
not limit a court's jurisdiction, although other statutes may limit juris­
diction in particular ways.2OO The Morrison-Knudsen court found no 
other statutory authority which limits the jurisdiction of a court with 
respect to creditor claims. Furthermore, the court stated that section 
1730(k)(I) indicates that Congress contemplated that creditor claims 
would be resolved in federal court, so that the proviso provides an 
exception for a defined class of claims against state associations which 
have not been federalized. 
FSLIC, on the other hand, contended that sections 1464(d)(6)(C) 
and 1729(d) limit a court's jurisdiction with respect to creditor 
claims,261 and thus section 1730(k)(I) simply does not apply. How­
ever, as previously discussed, section 1729(d) neither limits a court's 
jurisdiction, nor establishes FSLIC adjudication,262 and section 
1464(d)(6)(C) on1y limits the jurisdiction of a court in two specific 
contexts.263 Thus, in the absence of any other statute limiting the ju­
risdiction of court adjudication of creditor claims, section 1730(k)(1) 
permits court adjudication. 
IV. Section 1730: Powers as Supervisor and Receiver Compared 
A comparison of FSLIC's powers as supervisor of state-chartered 
thrift institutions with its powers as liquidator of insolvent associations 
confirms that Congress did not intend to empower FSLIC with adjudi­
catory authority in its receivership capacity. Section 1730,264 entitled 
"Termination of insurance and enforcement provisions," is similar to 
258. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear­
ing in Bane at 12-13 n.8 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
259. See supra note 225 and accompanying text for an explanation of how a state 
receivership is "federalized." 
260. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. As previously discussed, § 1464(d)(6)(C) 
limits the jurisdiction of a court in two contexts. See section III A (1). 
261. See First Amer. Say. Bank v. Westside, 639 F. Supp. 93, 97 (W.D. Wash. 1986). 
262. This proposition is established in section III B (2)(a). 
263. This proposition is established in section III A. 
264. 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982). 
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section 1464(d),26S and grants FSLIC several enforcement powers. 
Section 1730(b) empowers FSLIC to withdraw an association's insur­
ance coverage without the consent of the association. 266 Sections 
1730(e) and (f) provide FSLIC with the authority to issue permanent 
and temporary cease-and-desist orders.267 Finally, sections 1730(g) 
and (h) allow FSLIC to remove or suspend a director or officer.268 
These subsections provide that challenges to FSLIC enforcement or­
ders will be handled through an administrative procedure consisting of 
an administrative hearing followed by judicial review.269 The Mo"i­
son-Knudsen court correctly observed that Congress empowered 
FSLIC, through section 1730, and the Board, through section 1464, to 
adjudicate violations of federal law in their capacities as supervisors of 
the nation's savings and loa:n associations.27o 
Section 1729 is entitled "Liquidation of insured institutions. "271 
Its subsections describe FSLIC's powers and duties as receiver for 
both state and federally chartered institutions.272 Enforcement powers 
are not included in this section. No mention is made of any type of 
administrative procedure or judicial review, and no analogous statute 
to either section 1730(j) or section 1464(d)(7)(A) is included, detailing 
the manner in which hearings shall be held . . 
This comparison shows that Congress established different statu­
tory programs for handling FSLIC enforcement actions and creditor 
claims. Congress explicitly empowered FSLIC to adjudicate chal­
lenges to its enforcement powers; Congress gave no such explicit adju­
dicatory authority for the closely-related area of resolving creditor 
265. As discussed in section III A, § 1464(d) is entitled "Proceedings to enforce 
compliance with the law and regulations; cease and desist proceedings; temporary-cease­
and desist orders; suspension or removal of directors or officers; appointment and removal 
of conservator or receiver; hearings and judicial review ...." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). 
Part of the HOLA, this section gives the Board various enforcement powers over federally 
chartered associations and prescribes an administrative process for challenging any Board 
enforcement action under this act through an administrative procedure consisting of an 
initial hearing with subsequent judicial review. Section 1464(d)(7)(A), which defines the 
type of hearings and the manner in which they shall be conducted, makes no mention of 
creditor claims. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982). 
266. 12 U.S.C. § 173O(b) (1982). 
267. 12 U.S.c. §§ 1730(e) and 1730(f) (1982). 
268. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(g) and 173O(h) (1982). 
269. 12 U.S.C. § 17300) (1982). Section 17300) specifies the administrative proce­
dure to be followed for challenges to FSLIC enforcement orders. Id. Section 17300) is 
analogous to 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982). 
270. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. 
271. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982). 
272. See discussion of § 1729 in section III B (2)(a). 
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claims. In view of this lack of explicit authority, Congress did not 
intend to empower FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims. 
3. The Regulations 
Whether Congress intended to empower FSLIC with adjudica­
tory authority or not, the current regulations governing creditor 
claims do not establish adjudicatory authority.273 The Board promul­
gated sections 549.4(a) and 569a.8274 for the administration of creditor 
claims. Together, they require FSLIC to notify all creditors that they 
must "present their claims, With proof thereof" to FSLIC as re­
ceiver.275 Once presented with a claim, "[t]he receiver shall allow any 
claim seasonably received and proved to its satisfaction. The receiver 
may wholly or partly disallow any creditor claim ... not so proved, 
and shall notify the claimant of the disallowance. "276 
The Hudspeth court viewed these regulations as evidence that ad­
judication is a receivership function ofFSLIC.277 Because an agency's 
interpretation of its authority evidenced in part by its regulations is 
entitled to great weight,278 the Hudspeth court concluded that 
FSJ,JC's interpretation must be upheld "unless demonstrably irra­
tional."279 On the other hand, the Morrison-Knudsen court recog­
nized such deference, but reasoned that "deference will not save an 
agency interpretation that is contrary to clear congressional pur­
pose."280 Not only did the Mo"ison-Knudsen court find FSLIC's in­
terpretation to be contrary to "congressional purpose," it also found 
that the regulations failed to support the FSLIC interpretation.281 
By their terms, the regulations permit FSLIC to allow or disallow 
273. See section III C for a discussion of the scope of Board rulemaking authority. 
The Board may have the authority to empower FSLlC with adjudicatory authority even in 
the absence of specific statutory authority for FSLlC adjudication. 
274. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(a), 569a.8 (1987). Section 549.4(a) applies to creditors of 
federally chartered associations and 569a.8 applies to creditors of state-chartered 
associations. 
275. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(a) (1987). Creditors of state -chartered associations must also 
present their claims. See 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8 (1987). 
276. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1987). Section 569a.8(b) provides, in part: "Any claim 
filed ... and proved to the satisfaction of the Receiver shall be allowed by the Receiver. 
The Receiver may disallow in whole or in part or reject in whole or in part any creditor 
claim ... not proved to its satisfaction ...." 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(b) (1987). 
277. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 n.5. 
278. Id. at 1103 (citing Mattox v. FIC, 752 F.2d 116, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1985) and 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984». 
279. FSLlC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear­
ing in Banc at 8, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'I, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). 
280. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1215 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). 
281. Id. at 1218. 
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a claim.· The Morrison-Knudsen court found this power to be 
equivalent to "[p]aying or refusing to pay [a claim, which] ... is not 
an adjudication of a claim,"282 but merely an administrative deci­
sion.283 Further, while the regulations may enable FSLIC to deter­
mine "whether a dispute exists," they do not empower FSLIC "to 
resolve disputes with the force of law."284 
To support its determination that the regulations do not establish 
adjudicatory authority, the Morrison-Knudsen court compared the 
language detailing the depositor claims procedure with the language 
detailing creditor claims procedure. Section 549.5-1(b)(2) provides in 
part: "The receiver shall approve any seasonably filed claim proved to 
its satisfaction. The receiver may wholly or partly disallow any claim 
... not so proved . . .. [D]isallowance shall be final, except as the 
Board may otherwise determine."28s FSLIC does not have the power 
to adjudicate depositor claims.286 The language of section 549.5­
1(b)(2) is almost identical to that of sections 549.4(b) and 569a.8(b) 
and (d) and thus cannot provide the basis for exclusive adjudicatory 
power.287 Furthermore, comparing sections 549.4(b), 569a.8(b) and 
569a.8(d) to sections 509.1 through 509.22288 yields the inescapable 
conclusion that sections 549.4(b) and 569a.8(b) and (d) do not estab­
lish adjudicatory authority. Sections 509.1 through 509.22 occupy 
nine full pages in the Code of Federal Regulations and detail every 
aspect of trial-like proceedings for challenges to FSLIC's enforcement 
orders. There is nothing remotely trial-like about the regulations ap­
plicable to depositor and creditor claims procedures. 
4. Comparison to the FDIC 
Subsections III B (1), (2), and (3) combine to show that Congress 
did not empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority and thus that the 
Hudspeth court's holding is incorrect. By comparing FSLIC to the 
FDIC, this subsection demonstrates that the Morrison-Knudsen 
court's holding also is incorrect: although Congress did not empower 
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, Congress did not prohibit FSLIC 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. 12 C.F.R. § 549.5-1(b)(2)(1987). 
286. See the discussion in section III B (2)(b )(ii). 
287. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 n.2. The court wondered "how a single 
administrative process [could] ... be adjudicative for creditors but non-adjudicative for 
depositors." Id. 
288. 12 C.F.R. §§ 509.1-509.22 (1987) (detailing procedures for FSLIC adjudica­
tions of challenges to its enforcement orders). 
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from adjudicating.289 The Morrison-Knudsen court's contention that 
Congress intended FSLIC and the FDIC to have parallel authority in 
all respects is not borne out by the facts: while a statute prohibits the 
FDIC from adjudicating, no statute similarly bars FSLIC from such 
undertakings. 
Congress created the FDIC as part of the Federal Reserve Act of 
1933.290 The FDIC insures banks established under the National 
Bank Act of 1864,29\ and other qualified banking institutions.292 The 
Comptroller of Currency appoints the FDIC as receiver for insolvent 
banks.293 The Morrison-Knudsen court contended that: 
[C]ongress has given the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) the same powers by statute that the Board has given the 
FSLIC by regulation: to receive "legal proof" of creditors' claims 
and to pay only on "such claims as may have been proved to [its] 
satisfaction." . . . But the FDIC has never claimed, and no court 
has ever found, that these powers vest the liquidating agency rather 
than the district courts with the ultimate power to adjudicate credi­
tors' claims. 294 
According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, because the FDIC never 
has asserted that it has the power to adjudicate creditor claims, Con­
gress did not grant it that power. Because the Board gave FSLIC the 
same powers Congress gave the FDIC, FSLIC lacks adjudicatory 
power.295 
This argument, however, is based on a false premise: Congress 
did not give the FDIC the same powers by statute that the Board gave 
FSLIC by regulation. The statute controlling the FDIC as receiver, 
section 193, provides that the "Comptroller shall, ... cause notice to 
be given,· ... calling on all persons who may have claims against such 
association to present the same, and to make legal proof thereof."296 
289. The Morrison-Knudsen court held that Congress intended not to empower 
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1215, 1222. This 
comment has established that Congress did not intend to empower FSLIC with adjudica­
tory authority, a weaker position. See section II B for the discussion of Morrison-Knudsen. 
290. Ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982 and Supp. IV 
1986». 
291. Ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. IV 1986». 
292. 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1982). 
293. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982). 
294. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 (quoting, in part, 12 U.S.C. §§ 193, 194, 
1821(d) (1982». 
295. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221. 
296. 12 U.S.C. § 193 (1982). The Comptroller of Currency is appointed by the Pres­
ident, along with two others, to constitute the three member board which oversees yet is 
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Section 194 provides that "the comptroller shall make a ratable divi­
dend of the money so paid over to him ... on all such claims as may 
have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of com­
petent jurisdiction ...."297 Finally, section 1821(d) provides that the 
"Corporation as ... receiver, ... may, in its discretion, pay dividends 
on proved claims . . . ."298 The FDIC as receiver pays out claims 
proved to the FDIC board or "adjudicated in a court of competent 
jurisdiction."299 
In quoting section 194, the Morrison-Knudsen court failed to 
quote the entire text and, most notably, omitted the language "adjudi­
cated in a court of competent jurisdiction."3°O There is no analogous 
language in FSLIC's enabling statute or in regulations 549.4 or 
569.a(8), the Board-created rules for claim resolution.30l Under sec­
tions 549.4 and 569.a(8), FSLIC has the power to allow claims proved 
to its satisfaction, and to disallow any claim not so proved.302 Thus, 
the FDIC receivership powers are distinct from FSLIC's receivership 
powers. 
It has been argued persuasively that the FDIC does not have the 
power to adjudicate creditor claims. 303 Sections 191 through 194, 
which govern the FDIC,304 have been in existence since 1864.305 Long 
before the FDIC was created, the Supreme Court held that a receiver 
appointed under these sections did not have final authority to refuse a 
part of the FDIC. See S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 2,at 224, and 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1812 (1982). While the FDIC's board is similar to the Board, the Board is separate from 
FSLIC. See section I A for the discussion of the structure of the Board and FSLIC. The 
FDIC is itself an independent agency. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 89. 
297. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added). Sections 193 and 194 originally were 
enacted as part of the National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (1864) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-194). 
298. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). 
299. 12 U.S.C. § 194. 
300. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 194). 
301. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 569.a(8) (1987). 
302. Id. 
303. Note, Creditors' Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National 
Bank, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1429, 1433-34 (1986). In the event that the FDIC refuses to allow 
a creditor's claim, the creditor may bring a court action, and if the creditor succeeds on the 
merits, the court will order the FDIC as receiver to honor the creditor's claim. Id. at 1438. 
See also Philadelphia Gear Co. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984) (court ordered 
FDIC to allow claim), and First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978), (frozen out creditors entitled to prove their claims against 
the receivership in court). 
304. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-200 apply to receiverships of national banks. Since 1934, the 
receiver for national banks has been the FDIC. 
305. Ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C. (1982». 
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claim, and thus had no adjudicatory authority.306 ;.\ 
The Morrison-Knudsen court also contended that "Congress 
meant to give both agencies [FSLIC and FDIC] parallel authority 
over their respective institutions,"307 when it enacted the GSDIA.308 
Congress intended through the GSDIA to enable the FDIC and 
FSLIC to better assist troubled banks and savings and loans.309 The 
GSDIA empowered both agencies, on a temporary emergency basis, 
with expanded "merger-related" powers and enhanced powers to as­
sist banks in order to prevent their closing.310 While Congress did 
intend to "give both agencies parallel authority over their respective 
institutions,"311 in this respect, the GSDIA did not alter any statute 
affecting the creditor claims procedure. The most sensible reading of 
the GSDIA is that it achieved "parallel authority" in a limited area 
but left other areas, and other differences, untouched. 
The Morrison-Knudsen court then reasoned that because Con­
gress failed to distinguish FSLIC and FDIC adjudicatory authority, 
Congress intended the a~encies' adjudicatory authority to be the same. 
Since the FDIC does not have adjudicatory authority, neither does 
FSLIC.312 This argument is fallacious. It also would be fallacious, 
306. White v. Knox, 111 U.S. 784 (1884) (creditor claim originally refused by re­
ceiver was allowed by the court). See also Schulenberg v. Norton, 49 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 
1931) (court ordered the receiver to pay the claim after the receiver had refused the claim). 
307. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221. The court intended "parallel authority" 
in the broadest sense: parallel authority in every respect. Id. 
308. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). See section III B (2)(a)(iii) for the 
discussion of the legislative history of the GSDIA. 
309. S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232 at I, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3054. Between January I, 1981, and July 30, 1982, the FDIC closed 
twenty-six commercial banks and nine mutual savings banks, at a total cost of 1.7 billion 
dollars (only four cases involved direct payment to depositors), and the situation was ex­
pected to get worse. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
3057-58. During this same period, FSLIC closed 281 saving and loan associations. Sev­
enty-six were merged voluntarily, and 205 were merged under FSLIC supervision. Of these 
205, sixteen required direct financial assistance. Id. at 3058. In 1981,328 saving and loans 
associations were merged voluntarily and sixty-one were merged under FSLIC supervision. 
Of these, twenty-three required financial assistance. Id. 
310. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3059. Com­
pare 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1982) (emergency powers of FDIC codified) with 12 U.S.C. § 1729 
(1982) (emergency powers of FSLIC codified). 
311. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221. 
312. The Morrison-Knudsen court argued that Congress 
easily could have distinguished FSLIC's adjudicatory authority from that of the 
FDIC. It did not do so. . .. Because the FSLIC only recently has found itself 
defending controverted creditor claims in its receivership capacity, we regard the 
FDIC's longstanding interpretation of the receiver's role, acquiesced in by Con­
gress, as very persuasive authority. 
Id. 
282 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 10:227 
under these circumstances, to argue from the premise that Congress 
failed to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority, to the conclusion that 
Congress thereby acquiesced in FSLIC's interpretation of its adjudica­
tory authority. Both arguments ignore the context in which Congress 
acted. Congress had'no reason to distinguish FSLIC and FDIC adju­
dicatory authority: the question of FSLIC adjudicatory power was 
not at issue in 1981 and early 1982.313 Congress was concerned with 
keeping FSLIC and the FDIC solvent and preserving as many banks 
and savings and loan associations as possible; Congress was not con­
cerned with FSLIC or FDIC creditor claims procedures.314 
IfCongress had intended FSLIC not to have adjudicatory author­
ity, it could have enacted a statute analogous to section 194.31S Con­
gress did not enact such a statute when it created FSLIC only one year 
after the FDIC and in many respects was modelling FSLIC after the 
FDIC. Thus, there is no basis for the Morrison-Knudsen holding that 
Congress intended FSLIC not to adjudicate. 
In the absence of a statutory grant explicitly authorizing the adju­
dication of creditor claims, and the lack of evidence that adjUdication 
is implicit in the statutory scheme, it is unlikely that Congress in­
313. Congress had no reason to be aware of FSLIC's position on adjudication. 
FSLIC stated that it never argued this point until the 1980's because no federally chartered 
association was liquidated between 1941 and 1980, and only seven state-chartered savings 
and loan associations were liquidated during that period. FSLIC's Petition and Suggestion 
for Appropriateness for Rehearing in Bane at 7 n.6, Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d 1209 (9th 
Cir. 1987). The Hudspeth court was the first circuit court of appeals to hold that FSLIC 
had adjudicatory authority. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. Thus, Congress had little reason 
to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority one way or the other when it enacted the GSDIA. 
If Congress had little reason to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority in 1982, it had no 
reason to clarify such authority when it enacted the BPA, the FISA, the NHA, or the 
HOLA. But see First Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Sav., 639 F. Supp. 93, 98 (W.D. 
Wash. 1986) (FSLIC has been adjudicating claims for 30 years, Congress had at least three 
. opportunities to clarify FSLIC and Board authority in this regard and did not, thus Con­
gress intended that FSLlC adjudicate.). 
314. It has been proposed that FSLIC and the FDIC merge. See, e.g., S. KIDWELL 
& R. PETERSON, supra note 2, at 411. FDIC-insured banks have not been in favor of this 
proposal. Id. FDIC-insured institutions would end up paying higher premiums, 
"[b]ecause the FSLIC had higher losses, it accumulated fewer reserves than the FDIC, gave 
lower rebates and levied extra premiums." Id. There is at present a FSLIC re-capitaliza­
tion plan. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: THE TREASURY/ 
FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK BOARD PLAN FOR FSLIC RECAPITALIZATION (1987). 
Were a merger to occur, however, it is more likely that FSLIC would cease to exist than the 
FDIC. The FDIC received more capitalization to begin with, oversees more institutions, 
and has lost less money. For example, the FDIC made 280 payments totaling 160 million 
dollars in its first 35 years. FSLIC made only 12 payments in its first 34 years yet paid out 
almost 238 million dollars, over double what the FDIC paid out. See T. MARVELL, supra 
note 28, at 97-98. 
315. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982). 
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tended FSLIC to have the power to adjudicate creditor claims, much 
less the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims. However, Con­
gress, rather than detailing FSLIC claims procedures through statutes, 
gave the Board rulemaking authority to promulgate rules regulating 
receivership proceedings.316 The next section explores an alternative 
theory for FSLIC adjudication: that Congress, by failing to prohibit 
FSLIC adjudication and by granting the Board rulemaking authority, 
has empowered the Board to authorize FSLIC adjudication by 
promulgating appropriate regulations. 
C. 	 Board Rulemaking Power: FSLIC Adjudication and Exhaustion 
ofAdministrative Remedies 
Subsections III B (1), (2), and (3) of this comment surveyed sev­
eral statutes and regulations for evidence that Congress intended to 
empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, and found no such evi­
dence. This lack of any evidence does not dispositively refute adjudi­
catory authority, however, for two reasons. First, as subsection III B 
(4) demonstrated, Congress failed to prohibit FSLIC from adjudicat­
ing when it might reasonably have done so. Second, Congress granted 
the Board the "power to make rules ... for the reorganization, consol­
idation, liquidation, and dissolution of associations."317 That 
rulemaking power might encompass the power to establish FSLIC ad­
judication, provided that such adjudication is: 1) not inconsistent with 
any established interpretation of a statute in the NHA or the HOLA, 
2) consistent with some congressional policy that the NHA or the 
HOLA was intended to effectuate, 3) not inconsistent with any con­
gressional policy that the NHA and the HOLA was intended to effec­
!uate, and 4) constitutional. 
Because exclusive FSLIC adjudication is probably unconstitu­
tional,318 the Board would be prohibited from promulgating an adjudi­
catory scheme that required exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
The Board may promulgate regulations that require exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies if it were to adopt a non-adjudicatory claims 
procedure. Courts, however, may not be bound by those regulations. 
Subsection III C (1) first examines the rulemaking statute for re­
ceivership proceedings, section 1464(d)(11),319 by exploring its legisla­
tive history and meager case law and comparing it to the rulemaking 
.•. 
316. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(II) (1982). 
317. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1l) (1982). 
318. Section IV A argues that exclusive FSLlC adjudication is unconstitutional. 
319. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(II) (1982). 
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statute for the regulation of federal savings and loan associations, sec­
tion 1464(a).320 Subsection III C (2) then explains the four necessary 
conditions for proper administrative rulemaking and evaluates, in an 
abstract way, whether the Board could promulgate FSLIC adjudica­
. tion. Subsection III C (3) measures the current and proposed regula­
tions against the four necessary conditions and suggests possible 
FSLIC adjudicatory schemes that would satisfy them. Subsection III 
C (4) concludes by discussing a Board-promulgated exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies requirement and the extent to which courts 
would therefore be bound to require exhaustion. 
1. Board Rulemaking Authority under Section 1464(d)(II) 
Enacted in 1966 as part of the FISA, section 1464( d)( 11) provides 
that "[t]he Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for 
the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, and dissolution of as­
sociations ...."321 The legislative history of section 1464(d)(11) fails 
to indicate the scope of delegation. The only recorded comment, the 
Senate Report accompanying the FISA, simply repeats the statutory 
language of section 1464(d)(11).322 While section 1464(d)(11) bears a 
striking resemblance to the original section 5(d) of the HOLA,323 the 
legislative history of that section also is sparse. 324 
320. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). 
321. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 695 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(11) (1982». 
322. S. REp. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 3546. "The Board would be authorized to make rules and regulations for 
the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, dissolution, and merger of associations, for 
associations in conservatorship and receivership, and for the conduct of conservatorships 
and receiverships." Id. 
323. Ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d». 
As originally enacted, § 5(d) of the HOLA read: "The Board shall have full power to 
provide in the rules and regulations herein authorized for the reorganization, consolidation, 
merger, or liquidation of such associations, including the power to appoint a conservator or 
a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any such association, ...." Id., 48 Stat. at 133. 
324. See section III B (1) for the legislative history of the HOLA. See also Fidelity 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982); Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses 
and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wellenkamp Apply to Federal Institutions?, 11 PAC. L.J. 
1085, 1102-04 (1980). 
In 1954, Congress amended § 5(d) of the HOLA with section 503(2) of the Housing 
Act of 1954 (Housing Act). Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 503(2), 68 Stat. 590, reprinted in 1954 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 675. Section 503 replaced the one paragraph § 5(d) of 
the HOLA with two very detailed sections 503(1) and (2). Section 503(2) read, in part: 
"The Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for the reorganization, merger, 
and liquidation of Federal associations and for such associations in conservatorship and 
receivership and for the conduct of conservatorships, and receiverships." Id., reprinted in 
1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 732. Congress enacted the Housing Act to 
provide "a means by administrative and court proceedings whereby the Board could en­
force compliance with law and regulations by Federal savings and loan associations ...." 
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Section 1464(d)(II)'s case law is similarly unilluminating. Only 
five cases, including Morrison-Knudsen, ,cite section 1464(d)(1l), and 
none of these cases give section 1464(d)(II) more than a passing 
reference.325 
Basing its position on the language of section 1464(d)(II) and a 
case construing a different statute, Fidelity Savings and Loan Associa­
tion v. de la Cuesta,326 the Board has contended that this provision 
grants the Board plenary power to make rules regulating the receiver­
ship of insolvent associations.327 At issue in Fidelity was the Board's 
power under section 1464(a) to make and enforce rules regulating fed­
eral savings and loan associations.328 Stating that the Board was 
"vested with plenary authority to administer the Home Owners' Loan 
Act of 1933,"329 the Supreme Court construed the Board's power 
under section 1464(a) broadly, and held that the Board's regulations 
were valid and preempted conflicting state law. 330 In light of Fidelity, 
the Supreme Court probably would find that the Board's power under 
section 1464(d)(II) is as broad as the Board's power under section 
1464(a).331 
S. REp. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 2723, 2766 (hereinafter S. REp. No. 1472). Additionally, the Housing Act also 
provided a procedure for appointing a receiver and granted FSLIC the same power to 
terminate an association's insurance as the FDIC had over the banks it insured. Id. at 8, 
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2729-30. See supra notes 168-69 
and accompanying text for a description of the enforcement procedure that the Housing 
Act put into effect and which the FlSA later modified. The Senate RepOrt to section 503(2) 
focused entirely on the new Board enforcement powers without indicating the scope of 
Board rulemaking power under section 5(d) of the HOLA. S. REp. No. 1472, supra at 87­
88, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2810-11. 
325. See, e.g., Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 
504, 598 n.2 (8th Cir. 1970) (unsuccessful challenge to the Board's authority to approve 
mergers); Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 72 (W.O. Wash. 1986) (superseding Baer v. Abel, 
637 F. Supp. 347, 350 (W.O. Wash. 1986» ("The Board was also authorized to promulgate 
rules and regulations governing the liquidation of an association and the conduct of receiv­
erships."); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 526 F. 
Supp. 343, 396-97 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (unsuccessful challenge to the Board's power to pro­
mulgate regulations under § 1464(dXll) which empower FSLIC to liquidate assets for 
cash); Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 910 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
326. 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
327. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985). 
328. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). Under § 1464(a), the Board is "authorized, under 
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorpora­
tion, examination, operation, and regulation of associations ...." Id. 
329. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 144. 
330. Id. at 152-54. The Board governs "the powers and operations of every Federal 
savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave." Id. at 145 (quoting 
People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951». 
331. If the Board was vested with plenary authority to administer the HOLA, Fidel­
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2. Four Conditions for FSLIC Adjudication 
Even with a broad deleg'ation of power, there is some limit to the 
Board's power to promulgate regulations. The court will not sustain 
administrative rulemaking that "transcends the delegation."332 Re­
cent Supreme Court decisions suggest several factors to consider in 
order to detennine whether the administrative nilemaking was legal: 
first, the administrative action must not be inconsistent with the well­
established interpretation of a statute;333 second, the administrative ac­
tion must serve or be consistent with a congressional policy behind the 
act that the agency is to administer;334 third, the administrative action 
must not be inconsistent with a well-defined congressional policy be­
hind the enabling legislation;33s and fourth, the administrative action 
must be constitutional;336 
The Board could promulgate regulations authorizing some fonn 
of FSLIC adjudication that would satisfy these four conditions. With 
ity, 458 U.S. at 144, and § 1464(d)(II) is part of the HOLA, then the Board has plenary 
authority to administer § 1464(d)(11). 
332. 1 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03[5] 
(1987). 
333. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 
361 (1986). The Board of Governors promulgated a regulation defining "bank" to include 
certain institutions specifically not included in the statutory definition of "bank." Id. at 
363-64. The Court held that the Board of Governors went beyond its authority in promul­
gating the regulation, and struck it down. Id. at 374-75. See also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961) "[T]he fact is that the Board is entirely a creature 
of Congress and the determinative question is not what the Board thinks it should do but 
what Congress has said it can do." Id. at 322. 
334. The administrative act must "serve congressional will as evidenced in the stat­
ute it is empowered to administer." Dimension, 474 U.S. at 374. See also Mourning v. 
Family Pubs. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). Congress authorized the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) to administer § lOS of the Truth in Lending Act. 82 Stat. 148 (codified at IS 
U.S.C. § 1604). The FRB promulgated a regulation to enforce that statute by defining a 
credit sale to include any sale with four or more installments. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 3S8, 
362. Congress clearly empowered the FRB to enact statutes that would prevent companies 
from disguising credit sales as non-credit sales. Id. at 367-68. The Supreme Court applied 
a very deferential standard to determine the validity of the regulation: it was valid because 
it was "reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation." Id. at 369 (quoting 
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969». 
335. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In Porter, the Supreme Court 
struck down a NLRB action ordering 'a company to agree to a certain term in a difficult 
contract negotiation setting because the policy behind the National Labor Relations Act 
was not to force labor and management to agree to terms, but to provide a context for fair 
negotiations. !d. at 102.Q9. 
336. The respondent in Mourning argued that the FRB's regulation violated the fifth 
amendment. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 376-77. Cf. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 
(1926) (taxing regulation violated the constitution); accord Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 
(1932). See also 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.01 
(1987). 
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respect to the first condition, there is only a possible conflict, and it is 
not a serious one. Section 1729(d) grants FSLIC the power "settle, 
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured insti­
tutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection 
therewith ...."337 While settling, compromising, and releasing claims 
is different from adjudicating them,338 this difference probably would 
not be viewed as unacceptable, and surely not as a contradiction of a 
stated congressional interpretation, because Congress has not made its 
interpretation of section 1729(d) known. Congress often enacts en­
abling statutes which survive despite containing potential 
inconsistencies.339 
FSLIC adjudication also could satisfy the second condition. In 
enacting both the FISA and the BP A, Congress intended to give the 
Board and FSLIC more control over receivership proceedings, so that 
FSLIC could preserve its assets and wind up the affairs of insolvent 
associations as expeditiously as possible.340 FSLIC argued strenuously 
that exclusive FSLIC adjudication is necessary to effectuate that pur­
pose.341 The question then becomes whether non-exclusive FSLIC ad­
judication serves this congressional purpose.342 FSLIC adjudication 
would serve this purpose, although perhaps not as well as exclusive 
FSLIC adjudication. FSLIC adjudication would provide creditors 
with an informal, less expensive, more efficient forum in which to pres­
ent their claims. Any claim resolved by administrative adjudication 
would aid in serving the purpose of efficiency in winding up the affairs 
of the association. 
The third condition already has been shown: Congress failed to 
prohibit FSLIC from adjudicating when it might reasonably have 
337. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(d) (1982) (describing FSLIC powers in the liquidation con­
text). See section III B (2)(a) for the legislative history and analysis of § 1729(d). 
338. The Morrison-Knudsen court held that compromise and settlement is not adju­
dication; rather, adjudication is holding for one party or the other. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 
F.2d at 1219. 
339. See R. Pierce, supra note 16 at § 3.1, at 44. 
340. The FISA significantly increased the Board's powers to enforce law and regula­
tion in an efficient manner. See section III A (1) for the discussion of the FISA. The BPA 
increased the Board's powers to appoint a receiver for state-chartered savings and loan 
associations so that FSLIC could better protect its assets. See section III B (2)(a)(ii) for the 
discussion of the BPA. 
341. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. See also FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and 
Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing in Banc at 2-6, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. 
CHG Int'I Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). 
342. Exclusive FSLIC adjudication, without judicial review, would, as a matter of 
common sense, best serve this congressional policy. This, however, would not be constitu­
tional. Exclusive FSLIC adjudication with judicial review also fails to pass constitutional 
muster. See section IV A for the discussion of this problem. 
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done SO.343 Thus, no express or implied congressional policy prohibits 
FSLIC adjudication. FSLIC adjudication, ifproperly designed, would 
be constitutional, and thus could satisfy the fourth requirement. Ex­
clusive FSLIC adjudication, however, has insurmountable constitu­
tional problems. 
It is not clear whether these four factors constitute the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for proper agency rulemaking. If they do, the 
Board could empower FSLIC with non-exclusive adjudicatory author­
ity if carefully prescribed. There is, however, no evidence that these 
conditions are sufficient, and there are no examples of an agency's ac­
quiring adjudicatory authority in this manner. It is undisputed that 
Congress has the power to delegate legislative authority and judicial 
power to administrative agencies.344 Congress granted the Board leg­
islative authority: it is questionable whether the Board may, as an 
exercise of its legislative power, delegate adjudicatory authority to 
FSLIC. 
Adjudicatory authority is different from most powers that agen­
cies acquire through rulemaking. Congress delegates general author­
ity to administer an act which involves considerable technical 
expertise for which the agency is better equipped than the Congress to 
,decide.345 There are examples of congressional delegation of authority 
to enforce an act where the agency is given free reign to determine the 
manner of enforcement.346 There are also examples of vague, open­
ended delegations to agencies when it is impossible to determine ex­
actly what problems will arise in the future; the intent is to leave to the 
agency the authority to make rules to handle whatever problems do 
arise.347 Finally, Congress may delegate a particular general function, 
leaving the agency free to fill in the blanks. 348 
Adjudication, arguably, is a reasonable means to effectuate the 
HOLA, but is otherwise different from the examples of agency delega­
tion. Adjudication of creditor claims where the decisionmaker is, 
343, See section III B (4), 
344, 1], STEIN, G, MITCHELL & B, MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3,03[6] 
(1987) (citing Federal Trade Comm'n v, Rubberoid Co" 343 U,S, 470 (1952», See a/so 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v, Schor, 106 S, Ct. 3245 (1986), 
345, R, PIERCE, supra note 16, at § 3.4,3 at 58 (citing Industrial Union Dep't v, 
American Petroleum Inst" 448 U,S, 607 (1980) (Occupational Health an Safety Adminis­
tration required to set exposure limits for toxic substances for employees), 
346, Mourning v, Family Pubs, Serv" Inc" 411 U,S, 356 (1973), See supra note 334 
for more details of Mourning, 
347, North Carolina Uti!. Comm'n v, FCC, 552 F,2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir, 1977), 
cert, denied, 434 U,S, 874 (1977); Lichter v, United States, 334 U,S, 742 (1948), 
348, See United States v, Grimaud, 220 U,S, 506 (1911), 
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most often, applying state law does not involve special agency exper­
tise; FSLIC is a regulator and an insurer, not a court. Although the 
Board and FSLIC have distinct enforcement powers, FSLIC adjudica­
tion is not a means for enforcing those powers, and thus the enforce­
ment model is not a good analogy.349 The analogy of unforeseeable 
future problems prompting the Board to use its discretion and regulate 
accordingly, also is inappropriate. Congress gave the Board rulemak­
ing power to regulate receiverships, and FSLIC adjudication surely 
would have been foreseeable. Finally, FSLIC adjudication is more like 
a general function rather than a particular function needed to justify 
some other specifically delegated general function. As a general func­
tion, it is the kind of power Congress would delegate directly to 
FSLIC, perhaps leaving it to the Board to fill in the exact procedures 
to be employed.35o Thus, the Court would have room to distinguish 
adjudicatory authority from other, more typical rulemaking exercises 
if it so chose. There is, however, no case law that would preclude 
Board delegation of adjudicatory authority to FSLIC. 
3. Regulations: Current, Proposed and Possible 
Even if one accepts the argument that the congressional grant of 
rulemaking authority to the Board empowers it to authorize FSLIC 
adjudication, the Board has not yet exercised its power. The current 
rules detailing FSLIC claims procedures fail to establish adjudicatory 
authority.351 There is no evidence that the Board or FSLIC ever con­
strued these reguiations as being evidence of adjudicatory authority 
until quite recently.352 Section 549.4(b) has been in existence for more 
than thirty years,353 and it describes an administrative procedure 
which is analogous to the non-adjudicatory administrative procedure 
for resolving depositor claims.354 It is unlikely that the regulation was 
promulgated to implement adjudicatory authority.355 
349. Compare promulgated FSLIC adjudication with Mourning v. Family Pubs. 
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) discussed supra at note 334. 
350. This is, essentially, FSLIC's position, but as sections III B (2) and (3) show, 
Congress did not delegate adjudicatory authority to FSLIC. 
351. See supra notes 54 & 56 for the current claims and appeals procedures. See 
section III B (3) for the discussion and analysis of the regulations. 
352. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216. 
353. 21 Fed. Reg. 4548, 4553 (June 21, 1956). 
354. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text for the comparison of the deposi­
tor claims procedure with the creditor claims procedure. 
355. But see First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 
93,98 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (the existence of regulations establishing adjudicatory authority 
for more than thirty years is evidence of FSLIC adjudicatory authority). 
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The proposed regulations, which detail FSLIC claims and appeals 
procedures,3s6 are based on the Hudspeth court's holding that Con­
gress empowered FSLIC with exclusive adjudicatory authority, and 
the Board was thus merely filling in the details. This view has two 
serious problems: . first, Congress did not empower FSLIC with adju­
dicatory authority;3S7 and second, exclusive FSLIC adjudication, as 
construed by the Hudspeth court, is not constitutional.3s8 .. 
The proposed regulations do not appear to establish FSLIC adju­
dicatory authority.3s9 That is, the claims procedure outlined at pro­
posed rule section 569c.7 might be adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory~ 
depending· on what congressionally mandated power the regulation 
was designed to promote.360 Had Congress explicitly authorized 
FSLIC to adjudicate, the proposed administrative procedure would be 
adjudicatory. Congress, however, did not so authorize FSLIC, and 
thus there is no basis for regarding this administrative procedure as 
adjudicatory. Proposed rule section 569c.7 details separate notice pro­
cedures for depositors and creditors, but the same FSLIC decision­
making process is described for both depositors and creditors.361 As 
previously demonstrated, FSLIC does not have adjudicatory authority 
with respect to depositor claims.362 Thus, there is no reason to infer 
that the described procedure is an adjudicatory one. 
If the Board were to promulgate regulations which effectively es­
tablish FSLIC adjudication, those regulations should establish a 
scheme that is clearly adjudicatory~ Because there is no specific con­
gressional authority for FSLIC adjudication, the regulations will be 
the basis from which courts will infer that FSLIC has adjudicatory 
authority.363 Furthermore, that adjudicatory scheme must be consti­
tutional and thus be non-exclusive and include a neutral 
356. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,992 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.7) (claims proce­
dures). Id. at 48,994-95 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.9). (appeals procedures). 
357. See sections III B (2) and III B (3). 
358. See Part IV. 
359. Focusing on the proposed regulations, without referring to the lengthy dis­
course accompanying them, which clearly states that the proposed regulations are designed' 
to implement exclusive FSLlC adjudication (see 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970-983 (1985», it ap­
pears that the regulations do not establish an adjudicatory scheme. 
360. The proposed rules would codify the existing claims resolution procedure. See 
supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
361. See 50 Fed. Reg. 48,992 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.7(c». 
362. See section III B (2)(b )(ii). 
363. In Morrison-Knudsen, the court found no statutory basis for FSLlC adjudica­
tion and no evidence that the administrative procedure was an adjudicatory one. Conse­
quently, the court concluded that FSLIC was not an adjudicator. See Morrison-Knudsen, 
811 F.2d at 1215-18. 
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decisionmaker.364 
The proposed claims and appeals procedures attempt to mandate 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The proposed regulation 
which details the appeals procedure clearly states that "[a] timelyap­
peal filed with the Director FSLIC in accordance with the provisions 
of this section shall be mandatory to establish judicial review of an 
initial determination."365 Proposed section 569c.7(e)366 states that 
FSLIC will pay dividends on FSLIC-allowed claims only. The follow­
ing subsection evaluates the extent to which the Board, through regu­
lations, can require courts to dismiss creditor claims for failing to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
4. Rulemaking and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Perhaps more than the adjudicatory power, FSLIC wants credi­
tors to exhaust administrative remedies prior to any court preced­
ing.367 That is, if the Board had to choose between promulgating 
regulations that established adjUdication and regulations that estab­
lished an exhaustion requirement, the Board more probably would 
elect the exhaustion requirement. This subsection explores the effec­
tiveness of Board-promulgated regulations which would require the 
claimant to exhaust administrative remedies. The more difficult ques­
tion is whether a court would be bound by the regulation and be re­
quired to dismiss a creditor's claim for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies, or whether a court would have discretion to 
hear the case provided certain conditions obtained. 
The Morrison-Knudsen court stated that "[w]here there is no ex­
plicit statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
the application of exhaustion rules is a matter committed to the discre­
tion of the district court."368 FSLIC, on the other hand, argued that 
364. See Part IV. 
365. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,994 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.9(a)(5». 
366. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,993 (1985). 
367. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear­
ing in Banc 3-5 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CRG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). 
By requiring a claimant to exhaust its administrative remedies, it is possible 
to achieve a more orderly and timely disposition of the receivership estate, which 
is one of FSLIC's chief duties .... If exhaustion is not required, FSLIC receiver­
ships will be seriously disrupted. . . . 
Even more fundamental, if all claimants are required to submit claims to the 
administrative process before they can proceed in court, some- perhaps most­
of those claims will be resolved without resort to the courts. This will conserve 
receivership assets and hasten the liquidation of the receivership estate. 
Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted). 
368. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223 (citing Wong v. Department of State, 789 
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"[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies can be mandated either by 
statute or regulation."369 There is no statutory prerequisite requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review. The 
two positions can be reconciled. The Board may promulgate rules 
that purport to mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a 
court, in the absence of a statutory requirement, may exercise its dis­
cretion. "[T]he exhaustion doctrine is a prudential rule created by the 
courts to enable them to allocate responsibilities efficiently between 
agencies and courtS."370 The Board, in promulgating an exhaustion 
requirement, would be attempting to deprive courts of their ability to 
allocate responsibilities, and thus the courts may not be bound by the 
regulatory requirement. Yet courts generally require a party to ex­
haust administrative remedies,371 and it is only for good cause that a 
court would not require a party to exhaust.372 Thus, the best way for 
the Board and FSLIC to require exhaustion is to put in place sound 
procedures that protect the interests of the claimant so that courts will 
require exhaustion. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
Part IV 0 discusses and evaluates two constitutional problems 
raised by FSLIC adjudication, the propriety of a non-article III entity 
adjudicating state law claims- the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line CO.373 issue-and due process concerns. As 
discussed in this section, a constitutionally sound FSLIC adjudicatory 
scheme must, at a minimum, be non-exclusive and employ a neutral 
decisionmaker. In addition, the Constitution may require that the los­
ing party be offered more than "ordinary appellate review."374 Section 
F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986); Rodriques v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 
1985». 
369. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear­
ing in Banc at 8, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(citing Doria Mining and Engin'g Corp. v. Morton, 608 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980». 
370. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, at § 5.7.3, at 190 (footnote omitted) (citing Ass'n of 
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.c. Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 447 U.S. 921 
(1980) (Levanthal, J., concurring». 
371. Id. 
372. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for factors courts balance when con­
sidering to require exhaustion. See also section IV A and IV B for further discussion of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory 
claims procedures. 
373. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
374. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985). See infra 
note 390 for the facts of Thomas. Northern Pipeline rejected the deferential "clearly errone­
ous" standard, terming it "ordinary appellate review." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85. 
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A discusses the Northern Pipeline issue. Section B discusses the due 
process concerns. 
A. The Northern Pipeline Issue 
Article III of the Constitution provides: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin­
uance in Office.37s 
Taken literally, article III prohibits Congress from delegating any ju­
dicial authority to article I entities.376 The Supreme Court, however, 
has upheld the constitutionality of article I courts which are created to 
adjudicate "public rights."377 
In Northern Pipeline,378 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (Act) which granted bankruptcy courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 
11."379 The Court reasoned that article III prevented Congress from 
establishing article I COurts380 which would have jurisdiction over "all 
375. u.s. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
376. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986). 
"[F)rom its language, [article III] . . . appears to tolerate no exceptions to its require­
ments." Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline De­
cision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197,226 (1983). 
377. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67. The "Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of legislative courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases 
involving 'public rights.''' Id. 
378. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50. Northern Pipeline filed for reorganization 
under the bankruptcy laws in January of 1980. Id. at 56. In March of 1980, Northern 
Pipeline brought suit against Marathon Pipe Line in the bankruptcy courts created by the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 on a breach of contract claim. Id. at 56-57. The Supreme Court 
held that the broad grant of jurisdiction in the 1978 Act, and thus the entire Act, was 
unconstitutional. Id. at 87. Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in which Justice 
O'Connor joined, agreed that "adjudication of Northern's lawsuit cannot be ... sustained." 
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (concurring opinion). However, Justice Rehnquist would 
have stricken only so much of the Act as permitted this case to be decided in bankruptcy 
court, rather than striking down the entire Act as unconstitutional. Id. 
379. Id. at 50 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) (subsequently amended to read: 
"Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or 
courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases 
under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1986». 
380. When it creates an article I court, "Congress will usually employ one of its 
enumerated powers in article I, in combination with the 'necessary-and-proper' clause of 
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civil'proceedings" under the Act, because some of those proceedings 
would involve "private rights" as opposed to "public rightS."381 Pub­
lic rights "arise 'between the government and others.' "382 "Private 
rights," on the other hand, involve the" 'liability of one individual to 
another under the law as defined,' " and may not be removed from 
article III courtS.383 The issue here presented is whether exclusive or 
non-exclusive FSLIC adjudication of creditors' "private rights" 
claims offends article III. 
Morrison-Knudsen expressed concern that exclusive FSLIC adju­
dication might be unconstitutional because private rights were being 
adjudicated in non-article III fora. 384 The court did not reach, and 
thus did not decide, the issue, but rejected FSLIC's statutory "inter­
pretation because it raises these 'serious' constitutional difficulties, 
which the statute can quite 'fairly be read' to avoid."38s 
FSLIC contended that the Supreme Court modified the Northern 
Pipeline doctrine in decisions upholding agency adjUdication of private 
rights in the face of article III challenges.386 Some courts have held 
that FSLIC adjudication is constitutional because judicial review is 
available under the Administrative Procedure Act.387 Morrison-Knud­
that same article, as the source of its authority to create these courts, they are referred to as 
'article I' courts or 'legislative courts.''' Redish, supra note 376, at 198 (footnotes omit­
ted). "[T]he category includes the territorial courts, the military courts, the court of the 
District of Columbia and the Tax Courts." Id. at 199 n.18. Congress attempted to estab­
lish an additional class of article I courts through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. Northern 
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. Although Congress establishes both article I and article III courts, 
these courts differ in that article I judges do not enjoy life tenure and protection against 
salary diminution (the bankruptcy judges were appointed for a term of 14 years and their 
salary was "subject to adjustment"). Id. 
Administrative agencies, though not referred to as courts, "are analogous to legislative 
courts because, although they may and often do perform adjudicatory functions, their 
members do not receive the salary and tenure protections of article IlL" Redish, supra 
note 376, at 214 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that Northern 
Pipeline applies to agency adjudication as well. See infra notes 390-91 and accompanying 
text. 
381. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 51. 
382. Id. at 69 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929». 
383. Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932». 
384. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222. 
385. Id. at 1222 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 
3245, 3252 (1986». 
386. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear­
ing in Banc at 13, Morrison-Knudsen Co., v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 
1987). See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Schor, 106 S. 
Qn~. . 
387. See. e.g., First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. 
Supp. 93 (W.O. Wash. 1986) (investors' suit against Westside dismissed once the Board 
appointed FSLIC as receiver); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 
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sen conceded that, with respect to the Northern Pipeline problem, a 
FSLIC adjudicatory scheme that passes "constitutional muster" is 
possible.388 
Though it might have struck the death knell for much adminis­
trative agency adjudication,389 Northern Pipeline has not caused such 
drastic consequences. Recently, the Supreme Court upheld agency ad­
judication of private rights, or claims based solely on state law. Under 
current Northern Pipeline doctrine, as found in the two majority opin­
ions written by Justice O'Connor in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricul­
tural Products Co. 390 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor,391 a non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme might pass con-
F. Supp. 576, 581-82 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987) (Northern Pipe­
line does not apply to administrative procedures because agencies neither "render final 
judgment" nor "issue binding orders."). 
388. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222. 
389. See Redish, supra note 376, at 199-200. 
390. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). The Court upheld a voluntary binding arbitration system 
for resolving compensation disputes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti­
cide Act (FIFRA) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Under the FlFRA, 
the Environmental Protection Agency must license every insecticide, fungicide, and roden­
ticide. Id. at 571. In support of its application for a license, a firm must submit scientific 
data. Id. Any data which are not protected as trade secrets may be used by other firms 
seeking to license a chemically similar substance, provided that they compensate the origi­
nal submitter. Id. at 571-72. If the parties fail to agree on the amount of compensation, the 
dispute is resolved through binding arbitration with limited judicial review for "fraud, mis­
representation, or other misconduct." /d..at 573-74 (quoting § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) of the Federal 
Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982)). This 
arbitration system replaced judicial resolution of compensation questions. Thomas, 473 
U.S. at 571-73. 
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in which two other justices joined, found that 
the statutory compensation question was a matter of "public rights," and thus agency adju­
dication was appropriate. Id. at 594-602. 
391. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld agency adjudication, on a 
voluntary basis, of a narrow class of private, state law claims with judicial review. Con­
gress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTq to implement the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Id. at 3250. One of the duties of the CFTC was to 
administer a "reparations procedure through which disgruntled customers of professional 
commodity brokers could seek redress for the brokers' violations of the Act or CFTC regu­
lations." Id. The CFTC employed formal adjudication procedures for claims alleging vio­
lations of the CEA or any CFTC regulation. Id. at 3250-51. The CFTC promulgated a 
regulation which allowed it to "adjudicate counterclaims 'aris[ing] out of the transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.';' Id. at 3250 
(quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 3994,3995,4002 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2)(1987)). 
Schor was a customer and debtor of ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti) at the 
time the dispute began. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3250. Schor brought suit in the administrative 
forum, alleging that his debt was due to Conti's violations of the CEA. /d. Conti, prior to 
notice of the suit in the administrative forum, brought an action in federal district court for 
the balance due on Schor's debt. Id. Schor moved to dismiss the district court proceeding 
so that all claims could be adjudicated in the administrative forum. Id. at 3250-51. Before 
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stitutional muster. Though not compelled by its recent decisions, the 
Supreme Court might require more than ordinary appellate review for 
FSLIC adjudications. 392 
In Thomas and Schor, the Supreme Court used the "public 
rights" I"private rights" distinction as an evaluative, but not determi­
native, guide in assessing whether a particular claim may be adjudi­
cated in a non-article III forum.393 According to the Court, agency 
adjudication of public rights is less likely to encroach on the indepen­
dence. of the judicial branch than agency adjudication of private 
rights.394 Thus, "where private, common law rights are at stake, [the 
Court's] ... examination of the congressional attempt to control the 
manner in which those rights are adjudicat.ed has been searching."39s 
Although no single characterization of the nature of the claims subject 
to FSLIC adjudication can be made,396 included among them are pri­
vate rights claims, based solely on state law for their existence and 
resolution, and subject to "searching" review.397 
A majority of the Justices in Northern Pipeline agreed that "Con­
the court ruled on Schor's motion to dismiss the federal court action, Conti voluntarily 
withdrew the action. Id. at 3251. 
The CFfC held in favor of Conti on both the claim and counterclaim. Schor then 
challenged the constitutionality of the CFfC power to decide the state law-based contract 
counterclaim. Id. 
392. See infra notes 407-39 and accompanying text. 
393. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586-88). 
394. Id. 
395. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (Rehnquist, J. concurring». 
396. Under Hudspeth, all claims are switched to the administrative track. The credi­
tor inHudspeth sought to challenge FSLIC's handling of the receivership. The creditors in 
Morrison-Knudsen and Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), asserted state law-based claims and sought court adjudica­
tion. See supra note 144 for facts of Coit. 
397. The issue addressed in this comment is whether FSLIC has the exclusive power 
to adjudicate creditor claims. Those creditor claims are based primarily on contract, or 
other state law causes of action. As such, state law provides the rule of decision. "It is 
therefore a claim of the kind assumed to be at the 'core' of matters normally reserved to 
Article III courts." Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587; Northern 
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70-71, and n.25). 
The argument might be made that FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims is a matter of 
public right: FSLIC is restructuring debtor-creditor relations. In his Northern Pipeline 
plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote: "But the restructuring of debtor-creditor rela­
tions, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the 
adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages 
that is at issue in this case." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71. Although granting the 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate Northern Pipeline's contract claim violated 
article III, the adjudication of claims against Northern Pipeline in the bankruptcy courts 
would not violate article III. Adjudication of claims against the entity in some stage of 
bankruptcy is a matter of restructuring debtor-creditor relations. Justice Rehnquist's con­
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gress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, 
render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional con­
tract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, 
and subject only to ordinary appellate review."398 Focusing on sub­
stance rather than form,399 the Schor court concluded that the under­
lying purposes of article III protection were to guard the independence 
of the judicial branch within the doctrine of the separation of pow­
ers,400 and to protect litigants' "right to have claims decided before 
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of 
govemment."401 According to Schor, this article III, section 1 protec­
tion was designed primarily to safeguard the personal interest, rather 
than the structural or institutional interest. 402 
The Schor Court held that the Commodity Futures Trading Com­
mission's (CFTC) adjudicatory scheme protected this personal interest 
in choice of forum, because the statute gave the claimant the choice to 
bring a claim for Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) violations in either 
a federal district court or the administrative forum.403 The CFTC ad­
curring opinion in Northern Pipeline is consistent with this view. See supra note 378 for 
Justice Rebnquist's opinion. 
FSLIC could argue by analogy that when it adjudicates claims against the insolvent 
savings and loan, it is restructuring debtor-creditor relations. The restructuring of debtor­
creditor relations, however, is distinct from the adjudication of creditor claims. An article 
III court could, for instance, determine the validity of all claims against the bankrupt en­
tity. FSLIC, as the federal agency which has been empowered by Congress to restructure 
debtor-creditor relations, would then decide how the assets of the bankrupt would be 
shared by the creditors. Creditors may argue that Congress intended FSLIC's powers as 
receiver to be more like this model. 
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline viewed the entire. Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978 as unconstitutional. In response, Congress restored most of the judicial power 
to the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1474 (Supp. IV 1986). As a result, the question of 
whether adjudication of claims against a bankrupt entity is a matter of public rights cannot 
now arise. Congress, by restoring most of the judicial power to article III courts, may be 
indicating that it regards adjudication of claims against the bankrupt as a matter of private 
right. 
Furthermore, since the Supreme Court has abandoned the private right/public right 
test for determining when agency adjudication is proper, and upheld agency adjudication of 
private rights under certain conditions, the Court does not have to sacrifice its intuitions 
about what is and is not a private right. That is, the Court may uphold agency adjudication 
of state law contract claims, without finding them to be a matter of public right. The Court 
can find these rights to be private rights, without the result that agency adjudication is 
forbidden. 
398. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality 
opinion); Id. at 90-92 (concurring opinion); Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting». 
399. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980». 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 3250. 
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judicated the state law contract claim in Schor only with the consent 
of the parties.404 The absence of consent was a "significant factor" in 
the Court's rejection of the bankruptcy scheme in Northern 
Pipeline.4Os 
Exclusive FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims cannot be sus­
tained under this rationale because the creditor has no choice of fo­
rum.406 What offends the Constitution in this view is not FSLIC 
adjudication of claims, but rather the exclusive adjudicatory authority 
and consequent lack of personal choice. A non-exclusive FSLIC adju­
dicatory scheme would satisfy the personal interest aspect of the un­
derlying article III concerns. FSLIC and the courts would have 
concurrent jurisdiction; the creditor could choose the forum. 
With respect to the institutional interest of separation of powers, 
the Court recently stated that there are no hard and fast rules.407 If it 
were non-exclusive and afforded more than "ordinary appellate re­
view,"408 FSLIC adjudication might very well be sustained.409 A non­
exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme with only "ordinary appellate 
review" also might be sustained. The Schor court employed a balanc­
ing test "with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional ac­
tion [of empowering an agency with adjudicatory authority] will have 
on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal jUdiciary."41O 
Among the factors upon which [the Court] ha[s] focused are the 
extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are re­
served to Article III courts, and conversely, the extent to which the 
404. With respect to a state law counterclaim, the CFfC has jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim when it arises out of the same facts as the alleged CEA violation. In Schor, 
the parties consented to CFfC adjudication of the state law claim in two senses: 1) by 
bringing the action in the administrative forum, Schor consented to the adjudication of all 
of the facts of the controversy, and Conti consented when it voluntarily dismissed the state 
law contract claims; and 2) Schor actually agreed to have all the facts adjudicated in the 
administrative forum when he moved to have the district court dismiss Conti's claim in 
order that all claims be decided in one forum. See supra note 391 for facts of Schor. 
405. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 n.31 (plurality 
opinion); Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting». 
406. The Glen Ridge court agreed and held that exclusive FSLIC adjudication of 
creditor claims was unconstitutional. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 
S.W.2d 374 (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tex. App. 1987), ajJ'd on 
other grounds, No. C-6776, slip op. (Tex. March 30, 1988). See infra notes 421-25 and 
accompanying text for the appeals court's constitutional analysis. 
407. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258. 
408. See supra note 374. 
409. Exclusive FSLlC adjudication probably would offend the Constitution on the 
institutional prong because it deprives courts of jurisdiction. See infra notes 421-25 and 
accompanying text. 
410. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258 (citation omitted). 
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non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers 
normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and impor­
tance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove 
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111411 
In Schor, the Court held that CFfC adjudication of state law 
contract claims did not "impermissibly intrude on the province of the 
judiciary."412 CFfC's initial jurisdiction depended on a violation of 
the CEA, a "particularized area of law,"413 whereas jurisdiction given 
to the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was 
broad.414 CFfC orders are enforceable only by the district COurt,41S 
whereas the bankruptcy courts could issue final orders.416 Judicial re­
view of CFfC conclusions of fact was under the "weight of the evi­
dence" standard,417 and judicial review of CFfC conclusions of law 
was under the de novo standard,418 "rather than the more deferential 
standard found lacking in Northern Pipeline."419 Finally, unlike the 
bankruptcy courts, the CFfC did not "exercise 'all the ordinary pow­
ers of district courts.' "420 
The Texas Court of Appeals in Glen Ridge I Condominiums, 
Limited v. FSLIC,421 applied these factors to an exclusive FSLIC adju­
411. Id. at 3258 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 582-84; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 
84-86). 
412. Id. 
413. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85). 
414. See supra note 379 and accompanying text for a description of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction under the Act. 
415. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259. 
416. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85-86. 
417. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259. 
418. Id. Courts are the final arbiters on matters of law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B), 
706(2Xc) (1982). 
419. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85 (The standard 
of review for bankruptcy court judgments was the "more deferential 'clearly erroneous' 
standard."». 
420. Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85). 
421. 734 S.W.2d 374 (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987). The Glen Ridge court followed the Hudspeth court's statutory construction, finding 
that Congress empowered FSLIC with exclusive adjudicatory authority. Id. at 390. In an 
.effort to convince the Glen Ridge court that FSLIC adjudication was constitutional, 
FSLIC contended that the proper standard of review for FSLIC determinations was de 
novo. Id. at 389. However, the Glen Ridge court followed Morrison-Knudsen, and found 
that the standard of review was either the "arbitrary or capricious" standard or the "sub­
stantial evidence test." Id. 
Interestingly, FSLIC has stated that the appropriate standard of review for its deter­
minations was the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing 
and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 14, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. 
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed Glen Ridge, but on different grounds, following the 
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dicatory scheme with only ordinary appellate review, and held that 
such a scheme was unconstitutional. The Glen Ridge court reasoned 
that because section 1464 "proscribe[s] any judicial action over FSLIC 
whatsoever,"422 and judicial review is limited to a fairly deferential 
standard, "FSLIC has usurped all the functions of article III 
courtS."423 Balancing the right to an article III court with the govern­
mental interest the legislature sought to achieve,424 the Glen Ridge 
court found that, due to the absence of any choice on the part of the 
creditor, the right to an article III court received no value in the equa­
tion, and thus exclusive FSLIC adjudication was unconstitutiona1.42s 
As Glen Ridge indicated, applying the various factors to non-ex­
clusive FSLIC adjudication of contract claims is more difficult than 
the situtation in Schor and does not yield a conclusive result. 426 
FSLIC's authority is neither as broad as the bankruptcy courts', nor as 
narrow as the CYrC's. FSLIC acquires jurisdiction only after a sav­
ings and loan association is in receivership and may only adjudicate 
claims against the association in receivership.427 Nevertheless, FSLIC 
adjudicates state law contract claims, not matters that depend on 
agency expertise in a specific area of law, as was the case in Schor.428 
The contract disputes in Coit Independence Joint Venture Inc. v. First­
South Saving & Loan Association and Morrison-Knudsen are at the 
Morrison-Knudsen court's statutory construction and not deciding the constitutional issue. 
FSLIC v. Glen Ridge Condominiums, Ltd., No. C-6776, slip op. (Tex. March 30, 1988) 
("We neither approve nor disapprove the holding of the court of appeals that the exercise 
of adjudicatory power by the FSLIC as receiver violates Article III ...."). 
422. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 388. 
423. Id.. at 389. FSLIC has more power than an article III court; FSLIC acts as 
plaintiff, judge, and jury. Id. 
424. This governmental interest, according to the Hudspeth approach, is to provide 
an efficient and inexpensive claims procedure so that the receivership can be resolved 
quickly in order to preserve FSLIC assets. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
42S. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 388-90. 
426. In Schor, the right to an article III forum was given a high value in the equation 
because the claimant had a choice of forum. For purposes of this discussion, the standard 
of review in the non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme would be "weight of the evi­
dence" standard for findings of fact, and de novo review for findings of law. These stan­
dards were approved of in Schor, see supra text accompanying note 417. 
427. Any right of the insolvent savings and loan to acquire assets must be adjudi­
cated in court. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Re­
hearing in Bane at 6-7 n.S, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th 
Cir. 1987). "(T]he receiver must go to court or use whatever other process is available 
outside of the administrative receivership to assert claims on behalf of the receivership." 
Id. 
428. CYrC adjudication of state law contract claims was ancillary to the CYrC's 
primary jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the CEA. 
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"core" of "matters normally reserved to Article III COUrts,"429 and do 
not depend on any statute in either the NHA or the HOLA for the 
existence or the resolution of the legal issues. Additionally, FSLIC 
does not require a court to enforce its final orders. FSLIC actually 
holds the assets and thus has the power to give them up or refuse to 
give them up. On the other hand, a higher-than-ordinary standard of 
judicial review of a final FSLIC determination, as well as a provision 
permitting a choice of forum, suggests that article III courts would 
retain sufficient power to assure that FSLIC adjudication of some state 
law contract claims would not impermissibly threaten the separation 
of powers. 
While the outcome of any balancing of these various factors is 
unpredictable, the trend in the post-Northern Pipeline cases is towards 
constitutionality. In Schor, th~ court upheld CYrC adjudication of a 
narrow class of private rights as incident to its primary adjudicatory 
function with consent of the parties and the availability of more than 
"ordinary appellate review," finding that it did not impermissibly 
threaten the separation of powers, the institutional prong of article HI 
analysis.430 An analogous FSLIC adjudicatory scheme is likely to pass 
constitutional muster. Further, in view of the Court's recent stife­
ment that the primary purpose of the article III protection is per­
sonal,431 a non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme with merely "ordinary 
appellate review" might also satisfy article III concerns. 
Under a non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme with only 
"ordinary appellate review," the creditor's right to court adjudication 
is preserved. Thus, the primary article III concern is satisfied. Once 
this concern is satisfied, the institutional concern of separation of pow­
ers is lessened substantially: first, no article III court is deprived of 
jurisdiction to hear a case; second, on review of a FSLIC determina­
tion, an article III court has the last word on matters of law;432 and 
third, if the factual record is inadequate, the court may review any 
factual findings anew under the de novo standard.433 Provided that 
th~ factual record were adequate, the reviewing court would be limited 
to reviewing findings of fact under the deferential "arbitrary and capri­
429. Schor. 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas. 473 U.S. at 585-86; Northern Pipeline. 
458 U.S. at 70-71 and n.25). 
430. Schor. 106 S. Ct. at 3260. 
431. Id. at 3256. 
432. 5 B. MEZINES. J. STEIN & J. GRUFF. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. § 43.02[6] (1987) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982». 
433. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1982». 
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cious" standard.434 The Supreme Court has not decided whether this 
. standard of review in a non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme infringes on 
the institutional concerns of article III. 
The Thomas Court upheld a voluntary arbitration scheme with 
judicial review limited to circumstances involving "fraud, misrepre­
sentation, or other misconduct,"435 a standard of review seemingly 
even more deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 
The rights at issue in Thomas, however, are distinguishable from the 
rights involved with FSLIC adjudication of state law claims. Thomas 
upheld the arbitration scheme but limited its holding to "the proposi­
tion that Congress, acting for a valid purpose pursuant to its constitu­
tional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right 
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a 
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by 
the Article III judiciary."436 As the Glen Ridge court noted, FSLIC's 
regulatory scheme does not alter the rights of the parties with respect 
to the validity of the state law claim.437 Thus, the rights involved are 
distinguishable, and the Thomas holding does not reach FSLIC adju­
dication. Schor, dealing specifically with private state law claims, up­
held non-exclusive adjudication of creditor claims with a lower 
deference "weight of the evidence" standard which was specifically 
prescribed by statute.438 Thus, Schor does not directly support the 
constitutionality of non-exclusive adjudication of state law claims with 
merely "ordinary appellate review." 
Non-exclusive FSLIC adjudication with "ordinary appellate re­
view," however, avoids the Northern Pipeline holding.439 In light of 
the post-Northern Pipeline trend towards finding agency adjudication 
schemes constitutional, it is likely that a non-exclusive adjudicatory 
scheme with only "ordinary appellate review" also would pass consti­
434. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard applies to review of infonnal adjudica­
tions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The "substantial evidence" standard applies to review 
offonnal adjudications. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Since there is no statute which re­
quires FSLIC adjudication to be "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 
FSLIC is not required to comply with APA standards for formal adjudication, and thus the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard would apply. See section IV B (I) for arguments that 
FSLIC must adjudicate fonnally. 
435. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-74. 
436. Id. at 593-94. 
437. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 378-79. 
438. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259. 
439. The Northern Pipeline problem can be stated as follows: exclusive agency adju­
dication of state law claims with only "ordinary appellate review" is unconstitutional. 
Thus, any non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme avoids the Northern Pipeline problem. 
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tutional muster, but the question remains open. A greater constitu­
tional threat to FSLIC adjudication is that it offends due process. 
B. The Due Process Issue 
The Constitution requires that no individual shall be deprived of 
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."440 Court and 
formal agency adjudication441 afford due process to the parties of an 
action.442 As subsection B (1) shows, due process concerns are raised 
because there is no statutory requirement that FSLIC adjUdication be 
formal. Subsection B (2) discusses due process requirements in the 
context of informal FSLIC adjudication and concludes that the lack of 
a neutral decisionmaker in FSLIC adjudication, as presently con­
ducted, denies due process to the creditors. Finally, subsection B (2) 
suggests two possible solutions to this due process problem. 
1. FSLIC Adjudication is Informal, not Formal 
The APA divides adjudication into two categories: formal and 
informal. Formal adjudication under the APA is a trial-type proceed­
ing with substantially the same safeguards afforded to the parties as 
;­
are provided by court adjudication.443 Of particular importance is the 
requirement that a neutral decisionmaker, usually an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ), conduct formal adjudications.444 But the APA 
does not provide requirements for informal adjudications. 
The APA requires formal adjudication only when "adjudication 
[is] required by statute to be determined on the record after opportu­
nity for an agency hearing. "445' While the Hudspeth court asserted 
440. u.s. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
441. 5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982). 
442. Formal adjudication under the APA exceeds the minimum requirements of due 
process under the Constitution. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4, at 280-281. 
443. Id. § 6.4.3, at 302. 
[A] party to a formal adjudication is entitled to an unbiased decision-maker, no­
tice of the proposed action and the basis for that action, right to counsel, opportu­
1 	nity to present evidence orally and to make arguments, opportunity to know the 
opposing evidence and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, resolution of factual 
issues based exclusively on evidence admitted at trial, and written findings and 
conclusions. 
Id. 
444. Id. § 6.4.3a, at 302. "Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law 
judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sec­
tions 556 and 557 of this title." 5 U.S.c. § 3105 (1982). Sections 556 and 557 prescribe 
how hearings are to be conducted in formal agency adjudication or rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 556-557 (1982). 
445. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 
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that FSLIC adjudication is required by statute, this comment demon­
strates that there is no statute or combination of statutes that explicitly 
requires FSLIC adjudication.446 Thus, in APA terms, not only is 
there no statutory requirement that the determination be "on the rec­
ord after opportunity for an agency hearing,"447 there is not even a 
statutory requirement for a hearing. 
Instances involving an interpretation of the formal adjudication 
provision of the APA fall into four categories. First, there are exam­
ples where "Congress explicitly indicated that the agency is not re­
quired to use formal adjudication," courts will not require formal 
adjudication.448 "Second, there are cases where Congress explicitly in­
dicated its intent to require an agency to use formal adjudication by 
including in the statute the precise language that triggers the APA 
formal adjudication provision ...."449 Third, there are instances 
where the legislative history clearly indicated that Congress intended 
to require formal adjudication, but the statutory language is less than 
clear.450 Finally, in the fourth class, there are instances where both 
ambiguous language and legislative history are present.451 The case 
for formal FSLIC a4judication does not fit into even the fourth class of 
cases. FSLIC adjudication, if required by statute at all, does so implic­
itly. It is not a question of vague language and legislative history. 
There is no statutory language, and at best only vague legislative his­
tory. There is no basis on which a court could decide that Congress 
required FSLIC to use formal adjudication.452 
446. The HUdspeth arguments are based on the notion that Congress implicitly em­
powered FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. 
447. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 
448. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4.2, at 299 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 
302 (1955». 
449. Id. § 6.4.2, at 299. 
450. /d. (citing Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re­
serve Sys., 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975». 
451. Id. § 6.4.2, at 298 (citing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 
872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978». Seacoast was required to hold a public 
hearing but the statute was silent as to whether a record was required. Seacoast, 572 F.2d 
at 875. The court held that Congress required Seacoast to conduct its hearings as formal 
adjudications. Id. at 877-78. 
Other courts have resolved ambiguous or vague language as evidence that Congress 
did not require formal adjudication. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4.2, at 301-02 (citing 
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978». 
452. There is a second argument, albeit attenuated, that Congress intended FSLIC 
adjudications to be in accord with the formal adjudication requirements. Under 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1437(a) (1982), which is part of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA). Ch. 522 
§ 17,47 Stat. 736 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982», the Board has the power to 
"adopt, amend, and require the observance of ... rules, ... and orders as shall be necessary 
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Even if a court held, as a matter of statutory. construction, that 
FSLIC was not required to adjudicate formally, a court might never­
theless hold that FSLIC must adjudicate formally on due process 
grounds. The Supreme Court upheld formal agency adjudication of a 
narrow class of private law contract claims in Schor.4s3 That case 
might have been resolved differently, on due process grounds, if the 
agency had been adjUdicating informally, because due process has dif­
ferent requirements depending on the context. Agency a",judication of 
private common law rights might require more due process protection 
than agency adjudication of public rights created by statute. In partic­
ular, agency adjudication of private rights might require formal adju­
dication in order to satisfy due process requirements, whereas informal 
agency adjUdication of public rights would not. Section B (2) exam­
ines the particular requirements of due process in the context of 
informal FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims, and concludes that 
due process requires, at a minimum, that FSLIC use a neutral 
decisionmaker. 
2. Due Process and Informal FSLIC Adjudication 
FSLIC currently adjudicates claims on an informal basis. Claim­
ants submit forms and accompanying documentation to FSLIC as re­
ceiver. FSLIC hires "special representatives" who are the 
decisionmakers.4s4 In this context, three questions arise: first, 
whether due process applies to FSLIC adjudication; second, whether 
the current procedures meet minimum due process requirements; and 
from time to time for carrying out the purPoses of the provisions of this chapter." Section 
1437(a) continues: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Board may from time to time 
make such provision as it deems appropriate authorizing the performance by any 
officer, employee, agent, or administrative unit thereof of any function of the 
Board (including any function of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo­
ration), except with regard to promulgation of rules and regulations in accord­
ance with section 553 of title 5, and adjudications subject to section 554 of title 5. 
lei. This language appears to be of general application and not limited to powers and duties 
of the Board in the context of the FHLBA. Section 1437 is entitled: "Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board; powers and duties; independent agency; report to Congress." 
FSLIC is a part of the Board; any FSLIC action is an action by the Board. If the 
Board empowered FSLIC with adjudicatory authority through rulemaking, § 1437(a) 
might mandate that those adjudications be conducted formally. However, still absent is 
any statutory requirement of a hearing or legislative history indicating that Congress re­
quired FSLIC to adjudicate 'creditor claims'. 
453. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). 
454. For more detail of FSLIC's claims resolution procedures, see supra note 54. 
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third, if the current procedures do not satisfy due process, what 
changes must be made to satisfy due process. 
Though not addressed explicitly in Morrison-Knudsen, there are 
serious due process concerns with a FSLIC adjudicatory scheme that 
allows FSLIC to be both a party to the proceeding and the deci­
sionmaker.45s Stevenson Associates, one of the appellants in Morri­
son-Knudsen, contended that it would violate their right to due 
process to require them to pursue their claims administratively.456 In 
particular, Stevenson complained: 
There is no opportunity ... for Stevenson (1) to present other 
than documentary evidence; (2) to know, much less examine or 
cross-examine, the data on which FSLIC or the Board would deny a 
claim; (3) to subpoena witnesses or documents; (4) to conduct dis­
covery; (5) to present any legal analysis of complex transactions 
which are the basis of the claim; or (6) for oral argument .... More­
over, ... the FSLIC is, in effect, acting as both the respondent to the 
charges and as the adjudicator of the claim-an inherent and insur­
mountable conflict that creates a preordained result.457 
The threshold question as to whether the constitutional require­
ment of due process applies to FSLIC adjudication must be answered 
affirmatively.458 Due process applies to adjudicative proceedings 
which affect particular individuals and threaten the loss of life, liberty, 
or property.4S9 A FSLIC adjudicative proceeding applies to individu­
als, as opposed to groups, and threatens the loss of property . 
. The next step is to . determine the particular procedural safeguards 
that due process requires. Due process requires "some kind of hear­
ing"460 with a neutral decisionmaker.461 Thus, the most serious com­
455. The Morrison-Knudsen court's concern that FSLIC was both claimant and ad­
judicator may have been motivated by due process considerations. See Morrison-Knudsen, 
811 F.2d at 1216. The court's holding avoided confrontation with due process just as it 
avoided the Northern Pipeline problem, by finding that FSLIC does not have the power to 
adjudicate. 
456. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consolidated 
with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) (86-2081». 
457. Id. at 11-12. As FSLIC argued, the due process challenge may have been pre­
mature. Since a party must go through the claims procedure for there to be a due process 
violation, a challenge prior to a final determination would be "nothing more than specula­
tion." FSLIC's Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss at 15, Stevenson 
Assocs. v. FSLIC, No. C-85-7192 WHO (motion granted) (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
458. See Note, Decisionmaker Bias and the Procedural Due Process Rights of With­
drawing Employers Under the MPPAA, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 227, 234 (1987). 
459. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.3.1, at 227. 
460. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (quoting 
Justice White in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974». 
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plaint Stevenson makes is that it is denied a neutral decisionmaker.462 
FSLIC as receiver is not a neutral decisionmaker. FSLIC institu­
tionally, and the special representatives and FSLIC counsel appointed 
by FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims personally, are potentially bi­
ased. FSLIC itself always is a creditor of the association in receiver­
Ship.463 This situation would be problematic even if FSLIC were in 
sound financial condition. Because FSLIC is financially troubled,464 
461. Judge Friendly placed the requirement for a neutral decisionmaker as the single 
most important factor. Id. at 1279. See also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) 
(" 'neutral and detached' hearing body" was a minimum due process requirement); R. 
PIERCE, supra note 16, § 9.2.1, at 484; Note, supra note 458, at nn.199-200 and accompany­
ing text. But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (The Court developed a balanc­
ing test to determine, in each instance, what due process requires. The Court did not 
require any particular safeguard in each instance.). Under the Mathews test, there are no 
absolute due process requirements. The test, however, has been criticized, and the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to apply it even when it had the opportunity to do so. See Note, 
supra note 458, at 2S4-55 nn.I84-85 & 193 and accompanying text. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that "administrative review of 
FSLIC receivership actions affords due process." Coit Independence Joint Venture v. 
FirstSouth Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 829 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1987), petition/or cert. granted, 
108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (citing Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 
1411 (5th Cir. 1987». The issue in Coit was whether FSLIC adjudication of state law­
based claims violated due process. Coit, 829 F.2d at 565. The issue in Woods, however, 
was whether the procedure according to which the Board appointed FSLIC as receiver, 
thereby ousting the directors and placing an association in receivership, violated due pro­
cess. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1411. The issues presented by the two cases are distinct: the 
Woods opinion does not, by itself, control Coit. The ousted directors in Woods were enti­
tled to immediate judicial review in a federal district court of the Board's administrative 
action of placing the association in receivership. The creditors in Coit are challenging the 
constitutionality of FSLIC acting as "both party and judge" of state law claims. Coit, 829 
F.2d at 565. While administrative review of Board actions such as that in Woods may 
afford due process, it is far from automatic that administrative review of FSLIC adjudica­
tions of state law claims affords due process. The creditor is entitled to a neutral deci­
sionmaker in the first instance. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972). 
462. The ten factors Judge Friendly singled out as the procedural safegaurds of a 
hearing were, in order of importance: 
(1) An unbiased tribunal. (2) Notice of the proposed action and the grounds 
asserted for it. (3) Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action 
should not be taken. (4) The right to present evidence, including the right to call 
witnesses. (5) The right to know opposing evidence. (6) The right to cross-ex­
amine adverse witnesses. (7) Decision based exclusively on the evidence 
presented. (8) Right to counsel. (9) Requirement that the tribunal prepare a rec­
ord of the evidence presented. (10) Requirement that the tribunal prepare written 
findings of fact and reasons for its decision. 
R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.3.3, at 255-56 (citing Friendly, supra note 460, at 1267.) 
463. Even if FSLIC did not have to reimburse depositors out of its own funds, 
FSLIC has borne the costs of the receivership, thereby becoming a creditor of the failed 
association. Every creditor claim allowed by FSLIC reduces the potential amount of recov­
ery for FSLIC. 
464. See supra note 2. 
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the potential for actual bias is far greater. There is a positive incentive 
for FSLIC to decide claims against the creditor in order to keep itself 
solvent,46S a dynamic which may create actual bias.466 
FSLIC as adjudicator also presents the problem of apparent 
bias.467 FSLIC has a statutory duty to do "whichever it deems to be in 
the best interest of the association, its savers, and the Corporation."468 
To be neutral, however, a decisionmaker must not owe a duty to one 
of the parties, let alone be one of the parties. This situation prevents, 
at a minimum, "the requisite appearance of fairness."469 
In order to cure this unconstitutional bias, the interested deci­
sionmaker must be removed from,the claims procedure and an impar­
tial process must be established which includes a neutral 
decisionmaker.470 This can occur in several ways. The most straight­
. 465. In Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the Supreme Court held that hav­
ing the mayor of the town preside over the town's traffic court violated due process because 
the proceeding lacked a neutral decisionmaker. The mayor was responsible for the town's 
finances and a large percentage of the town's finances came from the traffic court. The 
situation where FSLIC is an interested party and is also the adjudicator of creditor claims 
presents a similar and even more egregious violation: in Ward. there was no evidence that 
the town of Monroeville was in desperate straits, whereas the FSLIC is. See supra note 2. 
466. See Note, supra note 458, at 258 nn.204-05 for an explanation of the notions of 
actual and apparent bias used by the Court as explicated in Redish & Marshall, Adjudica­
tory Independence and the Values ofProcedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 492 (1986). 
For an example of actual bias, see the facts of Ward, supra note 465. For an example 
of apparent bias, see Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1961). In Long Beach, the Board conducted a formal administrative 
adjudication when the ousted directors of Long Beach Savings and Loan Association chal­
lenged the Board's appointment of FSLIC as receiver. Id. at 404. At the time of Long 
Beach, the Board did not have any permanent appointed Hearing Examiners (now known 
as Administrative Law.Judges (AU's), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (August 19. 1972». and sought 
to borrow an examiner from the Security Exchange Commission. Long Beach, 295 F.2d at 
407,410. "[W]here an agency such as the Board does not have examiners of its own an 
examiner shall be selected by the Civil Service Commission." Id. (An agency is entitled to 
borrow AU's from other agencies if the agency either does not have any permanent AU's 
or is overburdened with adjudications temporarily. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1982).) In Long 
Beach, the court invalidated the use of the particular hearing examiner because he was 
selected by the Board, not by the Civil Service Commission. Long Beach. 295 F.2d at 410­
11. 
The court indicated concern over the appearance of "commingling" of the 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions creating an appearance of bias in that the Board 
had selected the hearing officer. Id. at 410. The court also noted that in enacting § 1010 
(precursor to § 3344). which requires that the examiner be selected by the Civil Service 
Commission, Congress sought to prevent the appearance of bias in the decisionmaker. Id. 
Congress' concern with providing disinterested decisionmakers for formal adjudica­
tions is another indication that Congress did not intend FSLIC to act as adjudicator. 
467. See id. 
468. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982). 
469. See Note, supra note 458, at 259 (footnote omitted). 
470. A standard of de novo judicial review will not cure the constitutional defect. 
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forward alternative would be to use Administrative Law Judges 
(AU's), whose adjudicatory independence is protected by the APA, to 
preside over the hearings.471 Alternatively, FSLIC may use a system 
of arbitration.472 In any event, FSLIC must remove itself and its 
agents from the decisionmaking role in the adjudicatory process. 
V. ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATORY AND NON-ADJUDICATORY 

CLAIMS PROCEDURES 

Part V of this comment evaluates adjudicatory and non-adjudica­
tory FSLIC claims resolution procedures for state law-based claims 
that do not arise under FSLIC's enabling statute or any Board regula­
tion. Claims that arise as a result of FSLIC's handling of the receiver­
ship and <;lepend on a FSLIC statute or Board regulation, on the other 
hand, should be resolved by means of a separate administrative proce­
dure. Section A discusses the best adjudicatory procedure. Section B 
discusses the best non-adjudicatory procedure. Both sections discuss 
exhaustion of administrative remedies as applied to these adjudicatory 
and non-adjudicatory claims procedures. Section C compares the best 
adjudicatory procedure with the best non-adjudicatory procedure and 
evaluates which of them is better. 
This part uses several terms which, for clarity and consistency, 
are defined in the following manner. An "adjudicatory procedure" is 
The claimant is entitled to a neutral decisionmaker "in the first instance." Ward v. 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972). 
471. The Board is entitled to appoint "as many Administrative Law Judges as are 
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with section 556 and 557 
of the" APA; that is, formal adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). As Long Beach indi­
cates, the Board conducts some formal adjudication, and thus, the Board has access to 
AU's. The Board is still without any permanent AU's of its own. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,151 
(Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States) (1987). Were 
FSLIC to conduct formal adjudications of creditor claims, the Board might be able to 
supply the AU's. 
FSLIC, however, adjudicates informally, and the less formal the adjudicatory proceed­
ing, the less expensive and more efficient the administrative process. As discussed previ­
ously, supra notes 2 & 367 and accompanying text, FSLIC is desperate to keep costs down 
and efficiency up. It would, therefore, be ideal if FSLIC could use AU's in place of the 
"special representatives" in informal adjudications. While there appear to be no examples 
of agencies' use of AU's in informal adjudication, there may not be any reason why the 
Board and FSLIC could not use an AU in this capacity. 
472. If they agreed, FSLIC and the creditor could have their claims arbitrated under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982). Under the Act, a court could ap­
point the arbitrators, and thus the problem of institutional bias would be avoided. 
The standard of review under the Act is quite deferential and may pose Northern 
Pipeline problems (arbitrators award may be overturned for corruption, fraud, impartiality, 
misconduct and exceeding his or her authority). 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). See section IV A for 
a discussion of the Northern Pipeline problem and various standards of judicial review. 
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a procedure where FSLIC determines the parties' legal rights apart 
from those that result from the receivership proceeding itself and 
therefore depend on a FSLIC statute or Board regulation.473 In a 
FSLIC adjudicatory claims procedure, FSLIC adjudication would 
take the place of court adjudication of those claims. A "non-adjudica­
tory procedure" is a procedure through which FSLIC may "settle" or 
"compromise"474 with a creditor any such claim, but failing settlement 
or compromise, the claimant would have the right to have his or her 
claim adjudicated in a court.475 The "best procedure" is the procedure 
optimally suited to effectuate the Board's and FSLIC's policy goals 
while preserving the constitutional rights of the parties involved.476 
A. The Best Adjudicatory Claims Procedure 
The best adjudicatory claims procedure would involve a proce­
dure much like the one currently in use,477 but instead of FSLIC or its 
473. For example, the parties in Morrison-Knudsen were in court litigating before the 
Board placed Westside in receivership. The legal issues that the parties sought to deter­
mine in Morrison-Knudsen had nothing to do with the receivership, or any FSLIC statute 
or Board regulation, because Westside was not yet placed in receivership. 
474. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). 
475. Claims that arise from FSLIC's handling of the receivership and depend on a 
FSLIC statute or Board regulation (receivership claims) should be resolved by an adminis­
trative procedure. As previously discussed, the current and proposed claims procedures 
are not designed to handle challenges of FSLIC's determinations as receiver. An adminis­
trative procedure analogous to the process by which an association or a director of an 
association may challenge a FSLIC or a Board enforcement order would be appropriate. 
See section III A (1) for a description of the administrative procedure for challenging a 
Board enforcement order. The administrative procedure for challenges to FSLIC enforce­
ment orders is analogous. Cf, 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982). Such a system would empower 
FSLIC with exclusive adjudication of receivership claims. 
While exclusive FSLIC adjudication of state law-based claims raises the Northern 
Pipeline problem,exclusive FSLIC adjudication of receivership claims does not. Receiver­
ship claims are more naturally categorized as a matter of "public rights" as opposed to 
"private rights." The determination that FSLIC acted properly will depend on statutes and 
regulations that prescribe FSLIC's powers as receiver. 
Exclusive FSLIC adjudication of receivership claims, however, does raise due process 
concerns. FSLIC is an interested party, and thus the administrative procedure must in­
clude a neutral decisionmaker. 
Because a determination that FSLIC acted properly depends on statutes and regula­
tions that prescribe FSLIC's powers, those powers must be described ",ith particularity so 
that a decisionmaker or a reviewing court can measure FSLIC's conduct against them. As 
previously argued, this is an area in need of improvement. See supra notes 59-73 and ac­
companying text. In either an adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory claims procedure, as de­
fined in this part, receivership claims might be handled in this manner. 
476. Those policy goals are efficiency in winding up the affairs of insolvent associa­
tions and preservation of FSLIC's assets. The constitutional rights at issue are the right to 
have private rights adjudicated in a court and the right to a neutral decisionmaker. 
477. See supra note 54. 
19881 FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS 311 
agents acting as decisionmakers, a neutral decisionmaker would be in­
troduced to FSLIC claims procedures. While FSLIC adjudication 
would not be exclusive,478 the Board or Congress could, nevertheless, 
require that once the creditor elected to have his or her claims adjudi­
cated by FSLIC, the creditor would be required to remain in the ad­
ministrative track. If the creditor chose FSLIC adjudication, any 
appeal would have to be made to the Board prior to judicial review 
under the APA.479 The creditor, however, would have the right to 
choose either court adjudication or FSLIC adjudication. 
Because of the Northern Pipeline concern, and the litigant's right 
to choose between agency or article III court adjudication, no adjudi­
catory scheme can require a creditor to exhaust administrative reme­
dies. If the creditor chooses court adjudication, and the court 
dismisses for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the creditor is 
denied the right to court adjudication. In an effort to attract creditors 
to the administrative forum, the Board can promulgate fair and effi­
cient procedures. A claims procedure similar to the one currently 
used is sufficient, however, to handle adjudication of the vast majority 
of cases.480 It would complicate the claims process significantly to 
provide procedures to handle the complicated legal relationships that 
exist in a case like Mo"ison-Knudsen.481 It may be more efficient, for 
FSLIC and the litigants alike, for a court to sort out the legal tangles 
of particularly complicated claims. Thus, the best adjudicatory claims 
procedure would be fashioned after the scheme approved in Schor and 
would involve much the same procedures that currently are in use. 
478. "Exclusive jurisdiction," as used in this comment, refers to the Hudspeth ap­
proach: all claims are switched to the administrative track once FSLlC is appointed re­
ceiver. This would deprive a creditor of the right to have his or her claims adjudicated in a 
court and deprive courts of their jurisdiction. See section IV A for a discussion of the 
Nonhem Pipeline issue. 
479. This is the approach that the Supreme Court approved in Schor. See supra 
notes 391-405 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of Schor. See also 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (1982) (APA requirement for final agency action prior to judicial review). 
480. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,978 (1985). In explaining the proposed regulations, the Board 
stated that in FSLI.C's experience "many claims can be described and presented without 
difficulty by submitting a simple claim form .... [I]n some cases involving more complex 
claims, a substantial amount of additional information is necessary . . . . Therefore, 
§ 569c.7(c)(2) provides that the receiver may require submission of additional evidence in 
written form." Id. (citing proposed regulation § 569c.7(c)(2) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 568c.7(c)(2»). See also supra note 54 for description of current claims procedures which 
the proposed regulation is to codify. 
481. Morrison-Knudsen is an example of a complicated claim with all the many par­
ties, original and impleaded, and many claims, counter-claims, and cross-claims. 
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B. The Best Non-Adjudicatory Claims Procedure 
The best non-adjudicatory process would involve procedures that 
encourage FSLIC and the creditor to reach an agreement, whereby 
either FSLIC accepts the claim or FSLIC and the creditor settle or 
compromise. If the parties fail to agree, the creditor could appeal to 
the Bo~d, giving the agency a chance to correct any errors itself. If 
the creditor and the Board still cannot reach an agreement, the credi­
tor could file a court claim. This is how the Morrison-Knud~en court 
viewed the current claims and appeals procedures.482 
Because the procedure is non-adjudicatory, it presents no due 
process or Northern Pipeline concerns. The doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies would apply.483 A court would require ex­
haustion unless there are factors present which would make this inap­
propriate. Those factors are: 
whether resort to the administrative process would be futile, 
whether the administrative process is well understood and well de­
veloped, whether a prompt decision as to all of the contested issues 
in the case is likely, whether an exhaustion requirement would be 
fair to the parties in light of their resources, whether it would be fair 
to other parties in the case whose interests might be affected, 
whether the interests of judicial economy would be served by re­
quiring exhaustion, and whether the agency demonstrates that not 
requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its functioning.484 
Although most of these factors involve a case-by-case determina­
tion, regulations and procedures could limit the occasions where a 
court would not require exhaustion. The promptness of the decision is 
a matter that could be controlled completely by regulation. The 
Board could "demonstrate[] that not requiring exhaustion would un­
duly interfere with its functioning."48s FSLIC has argued forcefully 
that exhaustion is necessary to an orderly and efficient receivership 
proceeding.486 Furthermore, an exhaustion requirement serves judi­
cial economy because only those cases that need to be litigated end up 
in court.487 By developing a separate administrative procedure for 
482. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223-24. 
483. Id. at 1223. 
484. Id. at 1223-24. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of these factors as applied to the facts of Morrison-Knudsen. 
485. [d. 
486. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehear­
ing in Bane at 3-6, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
487. Id. at 4. 
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claims arising under FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation, the 
Board or Congress could improve considerably the administrative pro­
cess, and increase understanding of it.488 The other factors are factu­
ally based, and no amount of regulation will prevent them from 
occurring. 
In the vast majority of cases, courts should and would require 
exhaustion. The few situations where a court might not require ex­
haustion would involve cases where requiring exhaustion would either 
contravene the stated policy goals of FSLIC, or resUlt in unreasonable 
unfairness to the creditor.489 The judicial doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, if properly applied, would serve the interests 
of both the agency and the individual. 
C. The Best Claims Procedure 
The best claims procedure is a non-adjudicatory one. Although 
both the best adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory claims procedures 
would protect the constitutional rights of the parties effectively, the 
best non-adjudicatory claims procedure better serves the stated policy 
goals of FSLIC.490 Because it is non-adjudicatory, courts would re­
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies absent special and unu­
sual circumstances. As argued previously, if FSLIC had to choose­
488. The Hudspeth court never acknowledged the distinction between state Jaw 
claims and claims arising out of FSLIC's enabling statute or a Board regulation. Had the 
court acknowledged the difference, it might have confined its holding to the receivership 
claims at issue in Hudspeth, which were challenges to FSLIC's determination to repudiate 
Hudspeth's contract and freeze him out. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for 
facts of Hudspeth. If the court had confined its holding to receivership claims, Hudspeth 
would not have controlled the courts' subsequent decisions involving state laW-based claims 
like the ones at issue in Coit, and the court would have had to approach the issue of FSLlC 
exclusive adjudication of state Jaw claims on the merits. See supra note 144 for the facts of 
Coit. 
By developing different claim resolution procedures for the different types of claims, 
courts will be better able to determine when it is appropriate to require exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies. 
489. For example, suppose a creditor and a savings and loan association are in court 
nearly finished litigating a contract claim when the Board places the association in receiver­
ship and appoints FSLIC receiver. A court might be inclined not to require exhaustion for 
the following reasons: 1) there already was a failure to come to an understanding, which 
makes it less likely that the creditor and FSLIC would come to terms, and thus the admin­
istrative process is likely to be futile; 2) it would be a significant drain on the resources of 
both parties to dismiss a case so near its resolution; 3) it would be a waste of judicial 
resources, especially if the case is likely to reach a court once administrative remedies are 
exhausted; and 4) the court was near to deciding the contested issues. Requiring exhaus­
tion in this case would not serve either the creditor's or FSLIC's interest. 
490. Exclusive FSLlC adjudication best serves the stated policy goals of the FSLlC, 
but is unconstitutional. See section IV A for the discussion of the Northern Pipeline issue. 
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and it does-it should give up any adjudicatory power in exchange for 
the exhaustion requirement.491 Under a non-adjudicatory claims pro­
cedure, FSLIC could settle most claims informally and inexpensively. 
Both sides would have an economic incentive to settle in order to 
avoid litigation, and only those claimants with real controversies 
would end up in court. 
In an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure, FSLIC would have 
much less control over the receivership. With creditors free to bring a 
court action, FSLIC would be adjudicating some claims and defending 
other claims in court. Furthermore, a FSLIC adjudicatory scheme 
would be more expensive than a non-adjudicatory scheme. First, the 
required neutral decisionmaker is an added expense. Second, the legal 
costs involved in defending the receivership estate in court against 
claimants who select court adjudication might be significant. The re­
ceivership process in an adjudicatory claims procedure is likely to be a 
lengthy one. Presumably, more claims would be adjudicated in courts 
in an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure than would be adjudicated 
in a non-adjudicatory claims procedure. In a non-adjudicatory claims 
procedure, most claims first would be presented to FSLIC. FSLIC's 
initial claims procedure takes a maximum total of 270 days from the 
date notice is published to the date that FSLIC must make its d!!termi­
nation.492 The creditor must file a claim with the receiver within 
ninety days of notice.493 If the creditor in an adjudicatory claims pro­
cedure were permitted to either file a claim with the receiver for 
FSLIC adjudication or file a court claim within 90 days, the maximum 
total of days for FSLIC adjudication would still be 270 days, but the 
maximum number of days for court adjudication is indeterminate, and 
the average number of days certainly would be longer. Thus, a non­
adjudicatory claims procedure is less expensive and more efficient than 
an adjudicatory procedure and better serves the stated policy concerns 
of FSLIC. 
CONCLUSION 
The Morrison-Knudsen court correctly determined that FSLIC 
does not have congressionally mandated adjudicatory authority; Con­
gress did not explicitly or implicitly empower FSLIC with adjudica­
491. FSLlC placed failure to require exhaustion first on its list of "most troublesome 
errors" made by the Morrison-Knudsen court. FSLlC's Petition for Rehearing and Sugges­
tion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 2, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). See also id. at 3-5. 
492. See supra note 54 for FSLlC claims procedures. 
493. Id. 
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tory authority, and such authority is not established by the current or 
proposed Board regulations. The Morrison-Knudsen court, however, 
incorrectly held that Congress intended FSLIC to have no adjudica­
tory authority. A better-reasoned conclusion is that Congress neither 
required nor forbade FSLIC adjudication. Accordingly, the Hudspeth 
court is incorrect in holding that Congress empowered FSLIC with 
exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims, and is incorrect in hold­
ing that the regulations actually establish that authority. 
According to Morrison-Knudsen, the Board does not have the 
power to promulgate rules that would establish FSLIC adjudication 
because Congress intended that FSLIC not adjudicate. Thus, while a 
constitutionally sound FSLIC adjudicatory scheme is possible, it must 
be authorized by an act of Congress. This comment has explored an 
alternative view that the Board may, through rulemaking procedures, 
empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority without an act of 
Congress. 
Whether congressionally-enacted or Board-promulgated, a 
FSLIC adjudicatory scheme must be constitutionally sound. Such a 
scheme must be non-exclusive, provide a neutral decisionmaker, and, 
perhaps, provide the claimant with more than ordinary judicial re­
view. While an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure would remain 
largely intact, FSLIC would not have the exclusivity of remedy that 
FSLIC asserts is necessary. A non-adjudicatory claims procedure 
would serve FSLIC's interests more effectively. FSLIC would control 
the settlement procedure and have the chance to come to terms with 
the creditor prior to any court litigation. Under the judicial doctrine 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts generally will require 
exhaustion. However, unless Congress provides through statutes that 
FSLIC has an exclusive remedy, a court may not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in particular cases. The more comprehensive 
the claims procedure is, the more probable a court will require 
exhaustion. 
Sidney Mannheim Jubien 
